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executive summary
Capital account regulations  
for stability and development: a new approach
Kevin P. Gallagher, Stephany Griffith-Jones,  
and José Antonio Ocampo
Since the revival of global capital markets in the 1960s, cross-border capital 
flows have increased by orders of magnitude, so much so that international 
asset positions now outstrip global economic output. Most cross-border capital 
flows occur among industrialized nations, but emerging markets are increasing 
participants in the globalization of capital flows. While it is widely recognized 
that investment is an important ingredient for economic growth, and that capital 
flows may under certain conditions be a valuable supplement to domestic 
savings for financing such investment, there is a growing concern that certain 
capital flows (such as short-term debt) can have destabilizing effects in develop-
ing countries. 
During the recent financial and currency crises a number of emerging market 
and developing countries experimented with a variety of measures that have 
traditionally been referred to as “capital controls”—defined as regulations on 
capital flows. Given that capi-
tal controls have been highly 
stigmatized, in this paper we 
will refer to them as capital 
account regulations (CARs). 
Those nations that deployed CARs in the years leading to the financial crisis 
were among the least hard hit when the global financial crisis wracked the world 
economy (Ostry et al. 2011).
The 2008 global financial crisis has opened a new chapter in the debate over the 
proper policy responses to pro-cyclical capital flows. Until very recently certain 
strands of the economics profession as well as industrialized country national 
governments and international financial institutions have remained either hostile or 
The 2008 global financial crisis has opened 
a new chapter in the debate over the proper 
policy responses to pro-cyclical capital flows.
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silent to regulating capital movements. Regardless, a number of emerging econo-
mies, including Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea, have been successfully experi-
menting with CARs to manage volatile capital flows (Gallagher 2011; IMF 2011b). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has come to partially recognize the appro-
priateness of capital account regulations and has gone so far as to recommend (and 
officially endorse) a set of guidelines regarding the appropriate use of CARs.
In September 2011, the Global Economic Governance Initiative at Boston 
University’s Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future—along with 
Columbia University’s Initiative for Policy Dialogue and Tufts University’s Global 
Development and Environment Institute—convened a Task Force on Regulating 
Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development. Based on discussions among 
members, we argue that there is a clear rationale for capital account regulations 
in the post-crisis world, that the design and monitoring of such regulations is 
essential for their effectiveness, and that a limited amount of global and regional 
cooperation would be useful to ensure that CARs can form an effective part of 
the macroeconomic policy toolkit. 
This report addresses these issues and provides a protocol for the use of CARs—
one that stands in stark contrast to a set of guidelines for the use of capital con-
trols endorsed by the board of the IMF in March 2011 (see IMF 2011b) but now 
superseded by a G-20 set of “coherent conclusions” on CARs in November 2011. 
Endorsed by the G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors in October, 
then endorsed by the G-20 leaders themselves in Cannes, the G-20’s conclusions 
say that “there is no ‘one-size fits all’ approach or rigid definition of conditions 
for the use of capital flow management measures.” This Task Force report will 
help policymakers and the IMF navigate their thinking under these newer G-20 
recommendations.
CaPital Flows and the two-sPeed reCovery
A long line of prominent economists throughout history have argued that finan-
cial markets can be inherently unstable (see Ocampo, Spiegel, and Stiglitz 2008). 
Different authors use different terms but there is a consistent concern that during 
periods of growth, expectations can become extremely optimistic, leading to a 
reduction in risk aversion, a rapid expansion in credit and a rise in asset prices. 
Imbalances associated with excessive risk taking build up, and if there are 
changes in expectations, possibly unleashed by facts that lead to a loss in asset 
values, the unwinding of positions may lead to instability, panics, and crises. 
Boom is then followed by bust.
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Cross-border capital flows to emerging and developing countries tend to follow a 
similar pattern. Between 2002 and 2007 there were massive flows of capital into 
emerging markets and other developing economies. After the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, there was capital flight to the “safety” of the U.S. market, which spread 
the North Atlantic financial crisis to emerging markets. As interest rates were 
lowered for expansionary purposes in the industrialized world between 2008 and 
2011, capital flows again returned to emerging markets, where interest rates and 
growth were relatively higher. The carry trade was one of the key mechanisms 
that triggered these flows. Increased liquidity induced investors to go short on the 
dollar and long on currencies in nations with higher interest rates and expecta-
tions of strengthening exchange rates. With significant leverage factors, investors 
gained on both the interest rate differential and the exchange rate movements. 
These sudden surges in capital flows can be de-stabilizing for four reasons. First, 
if capital flows are large enough, such speculation can cause undue appreciation 
and volatility of exchange rates and lead to a boom in asset prices in developing 
economies. Second, relatively small interest rate or currency changes can trigger 
an unwinding of (highly leveraged) positions, which can cause a sudden stop 
of external financing and capital flight. Third, a sudden unwinding of positions 
where the investment entity is highly interconnected with other parts of the 
financial system might cause systemic risk. Fourth, in an environment where 
nations have open capital accounts, short-term capital movements reduce the 
space for independent monetary policies. The dominant tool to stem inflation 
is the interest rate. However, raising interest rates would actually attract more 
capital flows, in effect generating expansionary pressures.  
Private capital flows to Asia and Latin America have returned to their pre-
Lehman Brothers highs. This is the case in nations like Brazil, which saw an 
appreciation of its currency of more than 40 percent between the third quarter 
of 2009 and September of 2011, and rising concern over asset bubbles and 
inflation. Indeed it will come as no surprise that it was Brazil’s finance minister 
who declared the surge in capital flows, the subsequent appreciations, and the 
myriad reactions to the surges as the beginning of a “currency war.” In the midst 
of these capital flows, individual nations have responded in various ways. In 
Brazil’s case, it has taken the form of a tax on foreign purchases of Brazilian 
securities and later with a reserve requirement and taxes for firms going short on 
the nation’s currency and holding some derivative positions in foreign currency. 
Box 1 outlines the various types of capital account regulations that have been 
deployed by nations in the run up to and during the crisis.
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Capital account regulations are often deployed to manage exchange rate volatil-
ity, avoid currency mismatches, limit speculative activity in an economy, and 
provide the policy-space for independent monetary policy. Measures often come 
in two varieties, price-based or quantity-based. Price-based measures alter the 
price of foreign capital such as with a tax on inflows or outflows, and unremu-
nerated reserve requirements (URRs) that have been deployed by such nations as 
Chile, Colombia, and Thailand. Quantity-based measures include prohibitions or 
caps on certain types of transactions (for example, on foreign borrowing below 
certain maturities, or for purposes other than investment or international trade), 
or minimum stay periods for capital that comes into the country.
rules oF thuMb For dePloying Cars
With respect to CARs, in February 2010 the IMF published a staff position note 
which found that capital controls on the inflows of capital that were deployed 
over the past 15 years have been fairly effective. It also found that those nations 
that used capital controls were among the least hard hit during the world 
financial crisis (Ostry et al. 2010). A comprehensive review of the literature on 
box 1: Capital account regulations—an illustrative list
Inflows
•	 	Unremunerated	reserve	requirements	(a	
proportion	of	new	inflows	are	kept	as	
reserve	requirements	in	the	central	bank)
•	 	Taxes	on	new	debt	inflows,	or	on	foreign	
exchange	derivatives
•	 	Limits	or	taxes	on	net	liability	position	in	
foreign	currency	of	financial	intermediaries
•	 Restrictions	on	currency	mismatches
•	 	End-use	limitations:	borrowing	abroad	only	
allowed	for	investment	and	foreign	trade
•	 	Limits	on	domestic	agents	that	can	borrow	
abroad	(e.g.,	only	firms	with	net	revenues	
in	foreign	currency)
•	 	Mandatory	approvals	for	all	or	some	capital	
transactions
•	 Minimum	stay	requirements
Outflows
•	 	Mandatory	approval	for	domestic	agents	
to	invest	abroad	or	hold	bank	accounts	in	
foreign	currency
•	 	Mandatory	requirement	for	domestic	
agents	to	report	on	foreign	investments	
and	transactions	done	with	their	foreign	
account
•	 	Prohibition	or	limits	on	sectors	in	which	
foreigners	can	invest
•	 	Limits	or	approvals	on	how	much	non-
residents	can	invest	(e.g.,	on	portfolio	
investments)
•	 	Restrictions	on	amounts	of	principal	or	
capital	income	that	foreign	investors	can	
send	abroad
•	 	Limits	on	how	much	non-residents	can	
borrow	in	the	domestic	market
•	 Taxes	on	capital	outflows
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this topic published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in the United 
States found, in turn, that capital regulation on inflows can make monetary 
policy more independent, alter the composition of capital flows towards longer-
term flows and reduce real exchange rate pressures, and that regulations on 
outflows can be effective as well (Magud et al. 2011). 
The IMF now recognizes that CARs should be part of the policy toolkit for 
financial stability. Moreover, the IMF also recognizes that the very use of the term 
“capital controls” can bring a stigma to some nations that may impact the way 
investors perceive the investment climate in a nation. Indeed, in the 1990s credit 
rating agencies would downgrade the credit of nations that deployed controls 
(Abdelal 2007). Therefore, the IMF proposed a new nomenclature for capital 
controls, suggesting they be referred to as capital flow management measures 
(CFMs).  Others have previously suggested the term “capital management tech-
niques” to the same end (see Epstein et al. 2003; Ocampo et al. 2008). As we have 
indicated, we prefer to use the term “capital account regulations,” to underscore 
the fact they belong to the broader family of financial regulations. 
The IMF formulated and approved at the board level a set of guidelines pertain-
ing to when a nation should and should not deploy CARs. In a nutshell, the 
official report recommends that CARs be used as a last resort and as a temporary 
measure, and only after a 
nation has accumulated suffi-
cient reserves, adjusted inter-
est rates, and let its currency 
appreciate, among other mea-
sures. When capital account 
regulations are used, the IMF suggests that controls be price-based and that they 
not discriminate against the residence of the investor that makes the flow.
Though the IMF should be applauded for recognizing that CARs are useful, its 
prescriptions fall short of being sound advice for developing countries on a 
number of fronts. Without the advice of the IMF many nations have deployed 
CARs, alongside a host of other macroeconomic and macroprudential policies 
as they have seen appropriate. And, according to the IMF’s own research, CARs 
have been a success even though they have sometimes not met those guidelines. 
We outline an alternative set of guidelines in Box 2. In no way do we think these 
should be binding protocols at the global level. Rather, we hope they can serve 
as useful rules of thumb for national policymakers.
Though the IMF should be applauded for 
recognizing that CARs are useful, its prescrip-
tions fall short of being sound advice for 
developing countries on a number of fronts. 
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First and foremost, CARs should be seen as an essential part of the macroeco-
nomic policy toolkit and not as mere measures of last resort. In the econometric 
work that recognizes the utility of CARs, such regulations were part of a battery 
of approaches taken in tandem to manage the capital account. CARs should 
thus be seen as part of the arsenal that needs to be used to prevent and mitigate 
box 2:  guidelines for the use of Capital account regulations in  
developing Countries
•	 	Capital	Account	Regulations	(CARs)	should	be	seen	as	an	essential	part	of	the	macroeco-
nomic	policy	toolkit	and	not	seen	as	measures	of	last	resort.
•	 	CARs	should	be	considered	differently	in	nations	where	the	capital	account	is	still	largely	closed	
versus	those	nations	where	CARs	are	prudential	regulations	to	manage	an	open	capital	account.
•	 	Price-based	CARs	have	the	advantage	of	being	more	market	neutral,	but	quantity-based	
CARs	may	be	more	effective,	especially	in	nations	with	relatively	closed	capital	accounts,	
weaker	central	banks,	or	when	incentives	to	bring	in	capital	are	very	large.
•	 	CARs	should	not	only	be	relegated	to	regulations	on	capital	inflows.	Capital	outflow	restric-
tions	may	be	among	the	most	significant	deterrents	of	undesirable	inflows	and	can	serve	
other	uses	as	well.
•	 	CARs	can	be	seen	as	alternatives	to	foreign	exchange	reserve	accumulation,	particularly	to	
reduce	the	costs	of	reserve	accumulation.
•	 	CARs	should	not	be	seen	as	solely	temporary	measures,	but	should	be	thought	of	as	perma-
nent	mechanisms	to	be	used	in	a	counter-cyclical	way	to	smooth	booms	and	busts.	Their	
permanence	will	strengthen	institutional	capacity	to	implement	them	effectively.
•	 	Therefore,	CARs	should	be	seen	as	dynamic,	requiring	a	significant	degree	of	market	monitor-
ing	and	‘fine	tuning.’	as	investors	adapt	and	circumvent	regulation.	Investors	can	increasingly	
circumvent	CARs	through	mis-invoicing	trade	flows,	derivative	operations,	or	foreign	direct	
investments	that	are	in	fact	debt	flows.	Regulators	constantly	need	to	monitor	and	adapt.
•	 It	may	be	useful	for	effective	CARs	to	distinguish	between	residents	and	non-residents.
•	 	The	full	burden	of	managing	capital	flows	should	not	be	on	emerging	market	and	develop-
ing	countries,	but	the	‘source’	countries	of	capital	flows	should	also	play	a	role	in	capital	flow	
management,	including	supporting	the	effectiveness	of	those	regulations	put	in	place	by	
recipient	countries.
•	 	Neither	industrialized	nations	nor	international	institutions	should	limit	the	ability	of	nations	to	
deploy	CARs,	whether	through	trade	and	investment	treaties	or	through	loan	conditionality.
•	 	Industrialized	nations	should	examine	more	fully	the	global	spillover	effects	of	their	own	
monetary	policies	and	evaluate	measures	to	reduce	excessive	outflows	of	short-term	capital	
that	can	be	undesirable	both	for	them	and	emerging	countries.		
•	 	The	stigma	attached	to	CARs	should	be	removed,	so	nations	have	ample	confidence	that	they	
will	not	be	rebuked	for	taking	action.	The	IMF	could	play	a	valuable	role	in	taking	away	the	
stigma	of	CARs,	as	well	as	doing	comparative	analysis	of	which	CARs	are	most	effective.
Source:	Pardee	Task	Force	on	Regulating	Global	Capital	Flows	for	Long-Run	Development
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crises. In turn, they should not be seen as solely temporary measures, but rather 
as permanent tools that can be used in a counter-cyclical way to smooth booms 
and busts. 
Second, CARs should be considered differently in nations where capital accounts 
remain largely closed—and in which they may be used as part of a strategy 
to gradually open the capital account—versus those nations where CARs are 
prudential regulations to manage an already open capital account. The IMF 
report acts as if the set of nations it was talking to were nations with open capital 
accounts and floating exchange rates, but many developing countries deploy 
capital account regulations as a regular macroprudential management technique 
and intervene heavily in foreign exchange markets.
Third, quantity-based CARs may be more effective than price-based CARs, espe-
cially in those nations with relatively closed capital accounts, weaker central banks 
or when incentives to bring in capital are very large (large interest rate differen-
tials or strong expectations of exchange rate appreciation). This is consistent with 
economic theory and some IMF staff work. Because of uncertainties and asym-
metric information about the private sector’s response, price-based measures may 
be difficult to calibrate correctly and therefore a quantity-based measure may be 
more appropriate. Indeed, IMF research has shown that quantity-based CARs have 
proven to be more effective under several conditions (Ariyoshi et al. 2000). 
In addition, while there has been a sea change in thinking regarding CARs on 
capital inflows, regulations on capital outflows have largely been shunned. CARs 
should not only be relegated to regulations on capital inflows. Capital outflow 
restrictions may be among the most significant deterrents of undesirable inflows 
and can serve other uses as well. Moreover, in times of acute crisis capital 
controls on outflows may be necessary to help stop the precipitous slide of a 
currency and a run on banks.  
Indeed, the IMF sanctioned 
controls on outflows in Ice-
land as part of its rescue pack-
age with that nation during 
the financial crisis. Finally, some members of our task force argued that regulat-
ing outflows can help channel credit and investment into the “real economy.”
CARs should also be seen as alternatives to foreign exchange reserve accumula-
tion. Recent work has shown that the social costs of foreign reserve accumulation 
Capital outflow restrictions may be among 
the most significant deterrents of undesirable 
inflows and can serve other uses as well.
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in developing countries can reach two to three percent of GDP (Aizenman 2009; 
Rodrik 2006). CARs are an instrument to reduce excessive reserve accumulation.
the need For Monitoring and Fine-tuning
The IMF guidelines give scant attention to the policy design issues related to 
CARs. Though IMF econometric work shows that CARs have been effective, 
there is to date a lack of research regarding how nations administratively have 
designed and fine-tuned such regulations to make them successful. Much of 
the literature shows that, without the proper fine-tuning, capital regulations 
may lose their effectiveness due to the ability of foreign investors to evade and 
circumvent such regulations. This can be done by ‘misinvoicing’ trade flows, 
disguising debt flows as foreign direct investment, and by using derivatives.
Nations such as Brazil and South Korea have increasingly “fine-tuned” their 
regulations in an attempt to keep up with the various levels of circumvention. 
Fine-tuning of CARs is essential for their effectiveness—and may be far simpler 
than some may argue, especially if they target the large actors. When regulations 
are price-based and administered by the tax system, violators could see criminal 
penalty—creating a strong incentive to comply. Table 1 illustrates examples of 
the use of CARs in the wake of the crisis and shows how Brazil and South Korea 
have been constantly strengthening and changing the composition of their capi-
tal account regulations in response to new market conditions.
Country Date Measure
Brazil 19-Oct-09 Inflows tax (2 percent) 
18-Nov-09 ADR tax (1.5 percent)
3-Oct-10 Inflows tax (4 percent)
17-Oct-10 Inflows tax (6 percent)
5-Jan-11 Reserve requirement
26-Jul-11 Tax on derivatives
South Korea 30-Jun-10 Currency controls
30-Jun-10 End use limitations
18-Dec-10 Outflows tax
Capital Account Regulations and the Crisis
Source: Gallagher 2011a
table 1
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the need For international CooPeration
Rather than a globally enforceable code of conduct that could lead to the require-
ment to open capital accounts across the globe, the IMF, G-20, the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) and other bodies should make a stronger effort to reduce 
the stigma attached to CARs and protect the ability of nations to deploy CARs 
to prevent and mitigate crises. Moreover, these bodies can be part of a global 
dialogue about the extent to which nation states should coordinate CARs.  
In the original design of the IMF, it was charged with both permitting and help-
ing to enforce CARs. Both John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White saw 
them as a core component of the Bretton Woods system. In those deliberations 
Keynes said that, “control of capital movements, both inward and outward, 
should be a permanent feature of the post-war system.” Indeed, the IMF was not 
given jurisdiction over liberalization of the capital account at all under its articles 
of agreement. Article VI of those articles goes further to say that members may 
“exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital move-
ments” (see Helleiner 1994).  
The IMF, G-20, the FSB, and their respective members could clarify the new 
thinking on CARs in communiques, speeches and other venues, including 
official reports such as the World Economic Outlook. Such continued attention 
to CARs would help continue to remove the stigma associated with their use. Not 
only would it calm both national governments and market participants, it may 
also trickle into the legal discourse and help broaden the way the global commu-
nity legally interprets macroprudential regulations.  
This is important because the policy space provided under the IMF articles of 
agreement is being eroded by trade and investment agreements. Increasingly, these 
agreements prohibit the use of CARs, and those treaties that have exceptions for 
measures to manage balance of payments crises only allow CARs to be temporary 
in nature. In Asia, where CARs on both inflows and outflows are the most prevalent, 
ASEAN will require nations to eliminate most CARs by 2015, with relatively narrow 
exceptions. Trade and investment agreements with the United States provide the 
least flexibility. In January 2011, some 250 economists from across the globe called 
on the United States to recognize the recent consensus on CARs and to permit 
nations the flexibility to deploy controls to prevent and mitigate crises. The letter 
was rebuked by prominent business associations and the U.S. government. In 
response to the letter, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner replied that U.S. 
policy would go unchanged. Secretary Geithner wrote:
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“In general, we believe that those risks are best managed through a mix 
of fiscal and monetary policy measures, exchange rate adjustment, and 
carefully designed non-discriminatory prudential measures, such as bank 
reserve or capital requirements and limitations on exposure to exchange 
rate risk.”
This is ironic given that the U.S. approved the guidelines for CARs at the IMF. 
Finally, the global community should start a conversation regarding the extent 
to which there should be coordination among national governments regarding 
CARs—especially between inflow and outflow nations. In the meetings leading 
up to the establishment of the IMF both Harry Dexter White and John Maynard 
Keynes agreed that capital controls be targeted at “both ends” of a capital flow 
(Helleiner 1994). Furthermore, the industrialized nations are more often the 
source of such flows but 
generally ignore the nega-
tive spillover effects of their 
actions. The expansionary 
monetary policy by the U.S.—
which is quite justified in 
order to generate employment 
and recovery in that country—leads to the harmful carry trade effects discussed 
earlier. However, despite this fact, thus far the entire burden of managing capital 
flows has fallen on those countries that are the recipients of those inflows.
One member of the Task Force, Arvind Subramanian, goes so far as to suggest 
that an entirely new global regime is needed to regulate global capital flows. And 
moreover, the focus should not only be on North-South flows but South-South 
and North-North as well. 
There may be an alignment of interests to coordinate on capital flows. Indus-
trialized nations are aiming to recover from the crisis and hope that credit and 
capital stays in their nations. Meanwhile the developing world has little interest 
in having to receive those flows. There is therefore some alignment of interests 
that could form the means for industrialized nations to adjust their tax codes and 
deploy other types of regulation to keep capital in their countries, as emerging 
markets deploy CARs to change the composition and reduce the level of those 
capital flows that may destabilize their economies.
The global community should start a con-
versation regarding the extent to which 
there should be coordination among nation-
al governments regarding CARs—especially 
between inflow and outflow nations.
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Section I: The Rationale for Capital Account 
 Regulation
1. the Case For and experience with  
Capital account regulations*
José Antonio Ocampo 
A major agreement during the recent crisis was that deregulated financial activi-
ties can be a source of major macroeconomic disruptions. The G-20 thus led a 
major effort to re-regulate finance, mainly at the national level. However, cross-
border finance was left almost entirely out of the agenda, as if it did not require 
any regulation—or indeed as if it was not part of finance. A particular twist of 
terminology is also involved in traditional discussions of this issue: domestic 
financial regulations are called by that name, but if they involve cross-border 
flows, they are called ‘controls’. We would refer to them by their appropriate 
name: capital account regulations.
The essential problem here is that capital flows, like finance in general, is 
pro-cyclical. Agents that are perceived to be risky borrowers are subject to the 
strongest swings in the availability and costs of financing. These riskier agents 
include small firms and poor households in all domestic markets and emerging 
markets and, more generally, developing country borrowers in global markets. 
There is overwhelming evidence that capital flows to developing countries are 
pro-cyclical and have become one of the major determinants (and perhaps the 
major determinant) of business cycles in emerging economies (Prasad et al. 2003; 
Ocampo et al. 2008a,b). Furthermore, the cyclical supply of finance is increas-
ingly driven by portfolio 
decisions in industrial coun-
tries, which may be entirely 
delinked from demand for 
capital by emerging and 
developing countries. These countries face further problems: their domestic 
financial markets are significantly more ‘incomplete’ and, as a result, they are 
It is important to emphasize that the  cyclical 
behavior that characterizes capital flows 
goes beyond volatility of short-term flows.
* This essay is Section 5 of the 14th WIDER Lecture given by the author on “Reforming the International Monetary System.”
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plagued by variable mixes of currency and maturity mismatches, and their capi-
tal markets are shallower and small relative to the magnitude of the speculative 
pressures they face.
It is important to emphasize that the cyclical behavior that characterizes capital 
flows goes beyond volatility of short-term flows. Even more important are the 
medium-term cycles in the availability and costs of financing. Since the mid 
1970s, we have experienced three full medium-term cycles—from the mid 1970s 
to the end of the 1980s, from 1990 to 2002, and from 2003 to 2009—and we are 
at the beginning of a fourth one. The major problem with these cyclical swings is 
their strong effect on major macroeconomic variables: that is, on exchange rates, 
interest rates, domestic credit, and asset prices. As a result of this, pro-cyclical 
capital flows exacerbate major macroeconomic policy trade-offs, significantly 
limiting the space to undertake counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. For 
example, during a boom, countries may float the exchange rate to maintain 
some degree of monetary policy autonomy, but this merely displaces the effects 
of pro-cyclical capital flows to the exchange rate. The resulting deterioration in 
the current account allows these countries to ‘absorb’ the increasing flows but 
experience indicates that it also increases the probability and costs of crises. 
More exchange rate volatility generates, in turn, disincentives to invest in export 
and import-competing sectors. If there is hysteresis associated to dynamic 
economies of scale (e.g., if productivity tomorrow depends on production today), 
there may be permanent losses in production structure during booms, and there-
fore adverse effects on growth.1
Since a restrictive monetary policy would only exacerbate appreciation pres-
sures, an alternative for authorities to reduce the expansionary pressures gener-
ated by capital inflows is to adopt a contractionary fiscal policy. But this makes 
fiscal policy hostage to capital account volatility. Fiscal policy may lack the 
flexibility to respond rapidly to variations in capital flows, and there may not be 
political backing for doing so. Authorities may also try to stabilize the exchange 
rate by accumulating foreign exchange reserves while sterilizing their domestic 
monetary effects. But such sterilized accumulation generates quasi-fiscal losses 
that are particularly costly in countries with high domestic interest rates. When 
foreign exchange reserves are already high, as they are in many emerging and 
developing countries, these costs are hard to justify. Such interventions also 
destroy the rationale for capital inflows in the first place, which is to transfer 
resources to the country. To the extent that such reserves are a way to counter-
1 See the review of the literature in Frenkel and Rapetti (2010).
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balance the risk of future reversals of capital flows, they destroy the additional 
rationale for capital account liberalization, which is to diversify risks. In fact, 
experience indicates that they are rather a source of additional risk.
During boom periods, capital account regulations can therefore be justified as 
a way to help authorities manage booms while avoiding exchange rate appre-
ciation, the risks associated with rising current account deficits and/or useless 
foreign exchange reserve accumulation. During crisis, they may also be used as 
a way to avoid or mitigate capital flight, which has the opposite macroeconomic 
effects. More generally, these regulations can play a dual role: they can be a 
complementary macroeconomic policy tool and help reduce the risks associated 
with liability structures tilted towards reversible capital flows. As a macroeco-
nomic policy tool, they provide some room for counter-cyclical monetary poli-
cies. During booms, they increase the policy space to undertake contractionary 
monetary policy while reducing exchange rate appreciation pressures. In turn, 
during crises, they can create some room for expansionary monetary policies. 
Viewed as a liability policy, capital account regulations recognize the fact that 
pro-cyclical behavior and, particularly, reversibility, varies significantly according 
to the nature of capital flows: foreign direct investment is more stable than port-
folio and debt flows and, among the latter, short-term debt flows are particularly 
volatile.2
Capital market regulations obviously segment domestic from international mar-
kets, but this recognizes the fact that markets are already segmented. Indeed, 
the basic flaw of capital account liberalization is that it does not recognize the 
implications of this basic fact. As with prudential regulations, capital account 
regulations can be either quantitative (or administrative) or price-based, but 
there are more complex typologies (see, for example, IMF 2011a).3 The former 
include, among others, prohibitions or ceilings on certain capital flows, deriva-
tive operations or net exposure in foreign currencies; minimum stay periods; and 
restrictions on foreign investors taking positions in domestic securities or rules 
on what type of agent can undertake some capital transactions (residents versus 
non-residents, and corporate versus non-corporate). In turn, price-based regula-
tions include unremunerated reserve requirements on capital inflows, taxes on 
inflows or outflows, and larger reserve requirements for external liabilities of net 
2 See, for example, Reddy (2010: ch. 21). The classic treatment of the riskiness of short-term capital is Rodrik and 
Velasco (2000).
3 There are also terminological differences. IMF (2011) coins the term ‘capital flow management measures’, and 
Epstein et al. (2003) have suggested the term ‘capital management techniques’.
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balances in foreign currencies. Furthermore, they can be partly substituted by 
domestic prudential regulations when they involve domestic financial interme-
diation, though not when they entail access to external capital markets by non-
financial domestic agents.4
They thus belong to the family of what have come to be called ‘macroprudential 
regulations’, including particularly of counter-cyclical prudential regulations 
(for an early analysis of this link, see Ocampo 2003). Indeed, they may be seen 
as part of the continuum, which goes from regulation on financial transactions 
of domestic residents in the domestic currency (normal prudential regulation, 
including now countercyclical prudential regulations), to those of domestic resi-
dents in foreign currency (e.g., managing dollar/euroized financial systems, or 
correcting the risks associated with currency mismatches in domestic portfolios), 
to finally those involving domestic agents’ transactions with foreign residents 
(capital account regulations).
The concrete analysis of experiences with the use of capital account regulations 
leads to several conclusions.5 First, regulations on either inflows or outflows can 
work (though the more orthodox literature is skeptical of the effectiveness of the 
latter), but the authorities must have administrative capacity to manage them, 
which includes acting on time to close loopholes and respond to ‘innovations’ by 
private agents aimed at circumventing regulations. As a result of the link with 
administrative capacity, permanent regulatory regimes that tighten or loosen 
the norms in response to external conditions may be the best choice rather than 
improvising a system in the face of shocks. Second, regulations help generate a 
mix of increased monetary autonomy, reduce exchange rate pressures and alter 
the magnitude of flows, with greater skepticism on the latter effect by several 
authors. Some of these effects may be temporary, largely due to greater circum-
vention of regulations as time passes, and in this sense regulations may act as 
‘speed bumps’6 rather than permanent restrictions; this implies that further 
reinforcement may be required to maintain their effectiveness. Third, capital 
account regulations on inflows help improve debt profiles and thus act as an 
effective liability policy that reduces external vulnerability. Finally, and perhaps 
4 In the latter case, price-based regulations can also be substituted by tax provisions applying to foreign- 
currency liabilities (see, for example, Stiglitz and Bhattacharya 2000).
5 See, among others, three papers by the IMF and IMF experts (Ariyoshi et al. 2000; Ostry et al. 2010; IMF 2011), 
Magud and Reinhart (2007), Kawai and Lamberte (2010) and my own work (Ocampo 2003, 2008). 
6 This is the term used by Palma (2002) and Ocampo and Palma (2008).
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most importantly, regulations are a complement to sound macroeconomic poli-
cies, not a substitute for them.
Overall, the evidence is therefore that capital account regulations are a useful 
and effective complementary instrument of counter-cyclical policy management 
(IMF 2011a). There is also evidence that countries using regulations on capital 
inflows fared better during the recent global financial crisis (Ostry et al. 2010), 
and that the new regulations put in place by some countries since 2010 have 
been at least partly effective (Gallagher 2011; IMF 2011a). 
Debates on this issue since 2010 have emphasized some global dimensions of 
these regulations that must be at the center of attention. The first and essential 
problem is the asymmetry generated between the strength of several emerging 
economies and the continuing weakness of most industrial countries. This situa-
tion, which is likely to continue, implies that the latter have to maintain expan-
sionary policies, but the former are gradually moving towards more restrictive 
policies, though partially constrained for doing so by massive capital inflows. 
In short, the ‘multi-speed’ character of the recovery creates a need for a mirror 
asymmetry in monetary policies, which would be very difficult to manage with-
out some restrictions on capital flows. 
A second problem is that monetary expansion may be largely ineffective in 
industrial countries but can generate large externalities on emerging markets. 
This is particularly problematic when it involves the country issuing the major 
global reserve currency. Indeed, expansionary monetary policies in the U.S., 
including now quantitative easing, has had at best mixed effects in generating 
a reactivation of credit, the major transmission mechanism of monetary expan-
sion to domestic economic activity, but the low dollar interest rates associated 
with that policy are inducing massive capital flows to emerging markets, where 
they are generating appreciation pressures and risks of asset price bubbles. They 
may also be contributing to the weakening of the dollar, with negative effects on 
trading partners.
A third problem is that unilateral actions by countries also have negative exter-
nalities on other countries; that is, regulations by some countries may generate 
even stronger flows towards those not doing so. This is also true, of course, of 
interventions in foreign exchange markets.
Thus cross-border capital account regulations are an essential part of global 
monetary reform. Actually, the basic principle that should guide actions in this 
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field is the ‘embedded liberalism’ under which the IMF was built: that it is in the 
best interest of all members to allow countries to pursue their own full employ-
ment macroeconomic policies, even if this requires blocking free capital move-
ments. It is therefore positive that the Fund has recognized that capital account 
regulations can play a positive role, as part of the broader family of macropru-
dential regulations, and has taken the step to openly discuss this issue and has 
suggested a possible ‘policy framework’ for discussion (IMF 2011b). Furthermore, 
this is the first step taken to include cross-border capital flows within ongoing 
efforts at strengthening prudential regulation worldwide.
Such policy framework should start, however, by designing mechanisms to 
cooperate with countries using these policies, helping in particular make those 
regulations effective. In fact this may require eliminating provisions in several 
free trade agreements (particularly those signed by the U.S.) that restrict the use 
of such regulations. This type of cooperation is excluded from the IMF guidelines 
even while recognizing that capital account volatility is a negative externality 
inflicted upon recipient countries.
The guidelines try to identify ‘best practices’ in this area. As indicated, such best 
practices include the recognition that they are a complement and not a substi-
tute for counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. However, the guidelines tend 
to view them as interventions of ‘last resort’ (or a second, third, or fourth line of 
defense), to be used once other macroeconomic policies have been exhausted: 
exchange rate adjustments, reserve accumulation, and restrictive macroeco-
nomic policies. This is a limited view of their role. They must, therefore, be seen 
as part of the normal counter-cyclical packages, and particularly as tools to avoid 
excessive exchange rate appreciation and reserve accumulation.
In addition, the IMF guidelines tend to view CARs as temporary measures. This 
goes against another IMF recommendation, which calls for “strengthening the 
institutional framework on an ongoing basis.” This implies that regulations 
should be part of the permanent toolkit of countries, which are strengthened 
or weakened in a counter-cyclical way. Also, and again against the guidelines, 
almost by necessity they require some discrimination between residents and 
non-residents, which reflects the segmentation that characterizes financial 
markets in an international system: as different moneys are used in different 
territories, residents and non-residents have asymmetric demands for assets 
denominated in those currencies.
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In any case, any guidelines in this area should recognize that there is no obliga-
tion to capital account convertibility under the IMF Articles of Agreement—an 
issue that was settled in the 1997 debates—and therefore countries have full 
freedom to manage their 
capital account. In the words 
of the Group of Twenty-Four 
(G-24 2011: par. 8): “Policy 
makers of countries facing 
large and volatile capital flows 
must have the flexibility and 
discretion to adopt policies 
that they consider appropriate 
and effective to mitigate risks.” So, although the IMF has made a positive contri-
bution by bringing the issue of capital account regulations into the global debate, 
it can only be taken as a first step in the necessary task of including this issue in 
the efforts to re-regulate finance and avoid global macroeconomic imbalances.
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2. Capital account Management:  
the need for a new Consensus1
Rakesh Mohan
The North Atlantic Financial Crisis (NAFC) that started in 2008 has been an 
epoch-changing one in many respects. Among its consequences is the attention 
that the IMF is paying to issues related to cross-border capital flows and the need 
for capital account management (CAM), what it calls capital flow management. 
There has been a spate of papers on this topic, both research and policy-related 
over the last couple of years (IMF 2011a, 2011b; Habermeier et al. 2011; Ostry et 
al. 2010; Ostry et al. 2011). Their conclusion, broadly stated, is that capital flow 
management measures can be considered in certain circumstances, but only 
after exhausting traditional policy avenues of tighter fiscal policy, accommoda-
tive monetary policy, and exchange rate flexibility that allows appreciation in the 
face of large capital flows. In this paper I argue that in emerging market econo-
mies (EMEs) CAM should, instead, form part of the normal toolkit of overall 
macroeconomic management, and should not be seen as an extreme measure 
only to be used in specific special circumstances.
Capital flows to EMEs, both gross and net, have been rising in volume, along 
with increasing volatility since the early 1980s (CGFS 2009). They reached their 
peak in 2007 just before the NAFC broke out; and then there was a typical 
sudden reversal in 2008–2009, followed by recovery in 2010 and 2011 as the 
extended and continuing (almost) zero interest rate policy has been in place in 
advanced economies (AEs). As funds from AEs have again flowed to EMEs in 
search of yield, the latter have experienced renewed appreciation pressures on 
their real exchange rates. They have therefore had to resort to CAM measures 
in a variety of ways in the interest of preserving their growth trajectories while 
ensuring continued financial stability. That provides the context for the IMF’s 
increased interest in this issue. 
The surprising feature of this ongoing NAFC has been the dog that didn’t bark: 
the resilience exhibited by Asian and Latin American EMEs. The  immediate 
1 The paper has benefited from very thoughtful comments from Shinji Takagi.
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impact of the crisis during 2008–2010 on these economies was through two 
channels. First, there was a sudden reversal of capital flows, which had been 
unprecedented in magnitude during the years prior to the crisis. This reversal 
in 2008–2009 had significant impact on capital and foreign exchange markets 
in these countries. Second, the fall in global trade far exceeded the contraction 
in global GDP. Despite these setbacks no significant banks or financial institu-
tions in these countries exhibited substantial stress: none required a bailout. 
Furthermore, in spite of stagnation in the major advanced economies, these 
economies have experienced a strong recovery. Evidently, these countries have 
been doing something right since the various Latin American crises of the 1980s 
and 1990s, and the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. Given the volatility observed in 
capital flows and the need to 
ensure broad-based stability 
of the financial sector, most 
Asian and Latin American 
EME governments and 
central banks have employed 
multiple instruments related 
to CAM, along with traditional 
monetary and fiscal policy, and financial regulation and supervision. Judging 
from their performance in terms of growth, and maintenance of price and finan-
cial stability—both over the decade preceding the crisis and in the subsequent 
period—it must be concluded that their overall policy stance, including CAM 
measures has been broadly in the right direction.
The general conclusion is that for EMEs, capital account management in its 
broad form should become part of the normal overall toolkit for macroeconomic 
management oriented towards ensuring growth with price and financial stabil-
ity. It should not be regarded as a tool that is only used as an extreme measure, 
as the IMF papers tend to emphasize. Accumulation and management of forex 
reserves also needs to be consistent with this overall approach.
the need For CaPital aCCount ManageMent
Until recent years most developing countries suffered from the inadequacy of 
savings relative to the investment levels needed for the economic growth that 
they aspired to. Consequently the mobilization of external savings, and hence 
capital flows, was necessary in the interest of promoting economic growth. 
Thus a well-managed and somewhat steady flow of external capital can clearly 
The general conclusion is that for EMEs, 
capital account management in its broad 
form should become part of the normal 
overall tool kit for macroeconomic manage-
ment oriented towards ensuring growth 
with price and financial stability.
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be beneficial to EMEs that need to enhance resources for investment. In earlier 
decades most of these flows consisted of official flows from multilateral and 
bilateral donors, which were relatively stable. 
However, after the opening of capital markets in varying degrees, the record 
of capital volatility has been stark over the last three decades. Before this past 
decade the previous peak of net capital flows to emerging-market economies 
was around U.S. $190 billion in 1995. The average over the four years prior to 
that was around U.S. $100 billion. There was a big reversal after the Asian crisis, 
but then there was a recovery to about U.S. $240 billion, on average, during 
2003–06. Net capital flows jumped to almost U.S. $700 billion in 2007 but then 
slumped to an average of around U.S. $200 billion during 2008 and 2009 (Mohan 
and Kapur 2011b). With the extended continuation of monetary accommodation 
in the advanced economies after their financial crisis, capital flows to EMEs have 
surged further. The volume of gross capital flows has of course been even higher, 
along with its volatility. There has been a continuing cycle of capital flows from 
at least the early 1980s, with the amplitude of the cycles increasing consistently.
It is then not surprising that emerging-market economies have had to resort to 
capital account management in varying degrees. It is a little difficult to imag-
ine what would happen if these countries had not actively resorted to capital 
account management. The IMF has now begun recognition of this element of 
macroeconomic management as being effective and legitimate, albeit with many 
caveats. However, its approach is hierarchical, and CAM is regarded by the IMF 
as a last resort. Whereas it is understandable that aggressive CAM can be seen 
as disruptive from a multilateral perspective if it leads to beggar-thy-neighbor 
 policies, there is little evidence of such practices. 
Second, on average, there is a persistent inflation differential between advanced 
economies and EMEs. It is very interesting that in the 10 or 12 years before the 
crisis, there was a persistent inflation differential of around 2 or 3 percent on 
average between advanced-economy inflation and emerging market inflation, 
though with significant variance between different countries. Hence there was a 
persistent interest rate differential as well, and that gave rise to huge opportuni-
ties for interest rate arbitrage, and the existence of the carry-trade on an endur-
ing basis. The differential has been persistent and is now further exacerbated by 
the extended zero interest rate policy of the United States: hence, the expecta-
tion of rising capital flows and the enhanced need for managing them.
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Third, there has been a good deal of volatility in the monetary policies of 
advanced economies, and that has also given rise to capital flow volatility. If we 
examine the record of AE monetary policy over the past 30 years there has been 
broad correspondence between episodes of accommodative monetary policy 
in advanced economies and capital flows to emerging-market economies; and 
also the reverse: each tightening produced the reversal of capital flows and the 
crises that occurred in EMEs in the 1980s and 1990s. These episodes were well 
documented in the Committee on the Global Financial System’s Report (2009) on 
capital flows to EMEs (a report surprisingly ignored by all the IMF papers). Since 
the policies of advanced economies are driven by their own domestic needs, 
emerging markets need to take adequate defensive action in the interest of pre-
serving their own growth and stability.
Fourth, there is now the emergence of a persistent growth differential between 
the AEs and EMEs, which has been getting starker. The two-speed recovery after 
the North Atlantic Financial Crisis has only served to bring this phenomenon 
to more pointed attention of both policymakers and financial markets alike. 
Overall, there is a huge incentive for large capital flows, which then lead to large 
exchange rate appreciation, the possibility of credit booms, and asset-price 
booms in recipient countries, followed eventually by higher trade and current 
account deficits over time. There is then a reversal of capital flows at some point 
or other, leading to substantial output and unemployment costs. All of this could 
not have been managed by financial development, as shown by the United 
States itself. This demonstrates the need for a combination of measures, includ-
ing CAM, particularly since markets can be irrational for extended periods.
Fifth, exchange rate fluctuation poses greater difficulties for economic stability in 
EMEs. Typically, their export baskets are more dependent on relatively low tech-
nology labour using products that are price sensitive and which are therefore 
easily substitutable; their competitiveness is much more dependent on the level 
of their exchange rates. Thus even temporary real exchange rate appreciation 
resulting from a surge of capital flows can have significant effects on economic 
activity in EMEs, both through a possible surge in imports and lull in such 
exports. The social effects through labor displacement can be difficult to man-
age, particularly in the absence of appropriate social security mechanisms. With 
the lack of well developed financial markets it is also not easy to hedge against 
such exchange rate fluctuations. Whereas exchange rate appreciation that results 
from improved competitiveness should not be resisted, the same cannot be said 
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for exchange rate fluctuation arising from capital flow volatility unrelated to host 
country domestic fundamentals.
Sixth, the basic assumption behind much of the discussion on CAM, in principle, 
is that the flow of capital across borders brings benefits to both capital importers 
and capital exporters. The traditional view has been that EMEs are capital scarce 
and AEs are capital rich so the former would only gain by greater freedom in the 
flow of cross border capital flows. What is different about the recent experience 
with capital flows is that many EMEs have run significant current account sur-
pluses, so net flows are actually in the opposite direction. Even in those countries 
that do not exhibit current account surpluses, the capital inflows have tended to 
be far in excess of their financing needs. Excess incoming capital flows have then 
only added to the capital account management problem. Moreover, even with 
domestic savings rates in excess of their investment rates, their investment levels 
have been much higher than those of AEs, so they have exhibited relatively high 
economic growth rates. The argument that more liberal capital account regimes 
would have produced even higher growth rates is difficult to sustain.
Seventh, in any case, historical evidence, reinforced by the current North 
Atlantic Financial Crisis—not the global financial crisis—clearly shows that it 
can create new exposures and bring new risks. The failure to understand and 
analyze such risks, as well as the excessive haste that many countries have 
shown over time in liberalizing capital accounts, has compromised financial or 
monetary stability, particularly in many EMEs. Such liberalization has usually 
been done without placing adequate prudential buffers that are needed to cope 
with the greater volatility characteristic of market-based capital movements. 
Consequently, many EMEs in Latin America and Asia suffered repeated financial 
crises during the 1980s and 1990s. They appear to have learned their lessons 
well, and have generally succeeded in avoiding crises since the Asian crisis of 
the late 1990s. However, such failure became manifest in the current crisis in an 
even more virulent form in the North Atlantic advanced economies.
role oF CaPital aCCount ManageMent in overall MaCro-
eConoMiC ManageMent
In addressing issues related to capital account management, and after examining 
the recent record of Asia and Latin American EMEs, I see them in the broader 
context of prudent macroeconomic and monetary management, with a particu-
lar focus on maintaining financial stability. I believe that some of the errors in 
the approach to capital account management arise from looking at it from a very 
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narrow viewpoint of capital controls. The reality of capital flows to emerging 
markets over the past decade and a half is one of rising volumes accompanied 
by high volatility. The optimal management of these large and volatile flows is 
not one-dimensional.
Overall, my conclusion is that what is needed broadly is a combination of policies:
• sound macroeconomic policies, both fiscal and monetary
• exchange rate flexibility with some degree of management through forex 
intervention as needed, along with appropriate sterilization
• relatively open capital account but with some degree of management includ-
ing use of specific capital controls
• prudent debt management
• the use of micro- and macroprudential tools
• accumulation of appropriate levels of reserves as self insurance and their sym-
metric use in the face of volatility in capital flows
• and the development of resilient domestic financial markets
That sounds like motherhood and apple pie, but it is different from looking 
at CAM in extremis. Capital account management should not be discussed in 
isolation: it must be seen as an integral and legitimate element of the overall 
toolkit deployed in macroeconomic management. Just as different instruments 
are used at different times in achieving fiscal policy and monetary policy goals, 
the deployment of the various instruments available in the CAM toolkit would 
depend on the extant circumstances, both domestic and external. 
Much discussion on CAM is sidetracked on the use of capital account controls, 
but these should be seen as only one element in the overall toolkit (as illustrated 
in the menu above), which are used whenever they need to be. Just as advanced 
economy central banks have used a variety of instruments to stabilize their 
economies in the wake of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis, from (almost) zero 
interest rate policy to aggressive quantitative easing, EMEs have used different 
forms of CAM to ensure the continuance of growth with financial stability in their 
economies. There is increasing discussion on the use of prudential regulation for 
CAM, both micro and macro. Again, I see these as legitimate tools in the CAM 
armory for ensuring financial stability. Similarly, there is renewed discussion 
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on the management of exchange rates, intensified by the recent action of the 
Swiss National Bank announcing the initiation of aggressive intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. Much of the discussion is contaminated by going to the 
extremes of total flexibility or fixed exchange rates. In fact, what many emerg-
ing markets have practiced since the Asian crisis is a greater degree of flexibility 
in exchange rates, but with some degree of management. Similarly, emerging 
markets have maintained relatively open capital accounts, but again with some 
degree of management. The discussion is contaminated by going to extremes 
here as well: either a totally open capital account or totally closed, when the 
reality for Latin American and Asian EMEs has been somewhere in the middle 
over the past decade or so.
A good deal of discussion on management of the capital account and foreign 
exchange intervention has been influenced by the existence of the open econ-
omy trilemma. No country can simultaneously enjoy free capital mobility, oper-
ate a fixed exchange rate, and practice independent monetary policy directed at 
managing domestic objectives. In fact, most Asian countries have actually man-
aged this open economy trilemma successfully since the 1990s crisis. Whereas 
they have operated managed exchange rates, they have allowed increased 
flexibility: their exchange rates no longer exhibit rigidity. Similarly, whereas they 
have actively managed their capital accounts, they have been neither totally 
open nor totally closed at any time. This middle ground of managed but flexible 
exchange rates and managed but mostly open capital accounts have enabled 
Asian EMEs to operate independent monetary policies despite high volatility in 
external capital flows during the post-Asian crisis period. By and large, Asian 
countries have been able to set their own policy for interest rates even in the 
presence of persistent interest rate differentials with advanced countries. The 
practice of adequate sterilization has been successful in preventing the unwar-
ranted growth of base money and other monetary aggregates in the face of rising 
foreign exchange reserves. Hence, by and large, they have also been successful 
in containing inflation (Mohan and Kapur 2011b). 
On the other hand, rigidities in capital account management can also lead to 
difficulties in macroeconomic and monetary management. As can be expected, 
whereas theory has much to say on the conditions desirable for an end state 
equilibrium, it has little guidance to offer on the sequencing of capital account 
liberalization. 
30   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  March 2012
indian exPerienCe with CaPital aCCount ManageMent
In recent years, many EMEs have received capital flows much larger than their 
financing requirements. When capital flows are significantly in excess of a 
sustainable level of current account deficit, and the exchange rate is flexible, it 
is obvious that they cannot be absorbed domestically, howsoever efficient the 
financial system may be. Real exchange rate misalignment, current account 
imbalances, excesses in credit markets, asset price booms, overheating, and infla-
tion are the most likely outcomes. It would be a question of time before financial 
fragility leads to crisis. Thus, surging capital flows should not be perceived as a 
sign of strength, but as a potential source of disequilibrium (UNCTAD 2009). 
Capital flows, therefore, need to be managed actively, particularly when financial 
markets are still in a nascent state of development. Absorption of capital flows 
becomes easier as domestic financial markets develop along with the emergence 
of strong domestic financial institutions and investors. High gross inflows can 
then also be balanced by increasing outflows. As seen in the outbreak of the 
NAFC, however, even the most developed financial markets in Europe and the 
United States had difficulty in coping with the explosion of cross border capital 
flows that occurred in the years prior to the crisis (Bernanke 2011).
Capital controls can be effective, even though they may not be foolproof, and are 
in fact subject to leakages in the context of the current global financial market 
environment. Capital controls 
have to be a part of an overall 
package comprising exchange 
rate flexibility, the maintenance 
of adequate reserves, steriliza-
tion, and the development of 
the financial sector. There is a 
clear need for the deployment 
of multiple instruments. The current fashion of a single objective, single instrument 
monetary policy is undoubtedly inadequate to deal with capital flows. 
Against this backdrop, the Indian experience holds important lessons. Monetary 
policy in India has faced growing challenges from large and volatile capital flows 
since 1993–1994, especially during 2007–2009. In response to these capital 
flows, a multi-pronged approach was adopted including active management 
of the capital account, especially of debt flows. Tighter prudential restrictions 
Capital controls have to be a part of an 
overall package comprising exchange rate 
flexibility, the maintenance of adequate re-
serves, sterilization, and the development of 
the financial sector. There is a clear need for 
the deployment of multiple instruments.
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were placed on access of financial intermediaries to external borrowings; greater 
flexibility in exchange rate movements was introduced but with capacity to 
intervene in times of excessive volatility; treating capital flows as largely volatile 
unless proven otherwise; building up of adequate reserves; sterilization of inter-
ventions in the foreign exchange market through multiple instruments, includ-
ing cash reserve requirements and issuance of new market stabilization bonds; 
continuous development of financial markets in terms of participants and instru-
ments, but with a cautious approach to risky instruments; strengthening of the 
financial sector through prudential regulation while also enhancing competition; 
pre-emptive tightening of prudential norms; and refinements in the institutional 
framework for monetary policy. 
Policies operate symmetrically. During periods of heavy inflows, liquidity is 
absorbed through increases in the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and issuances under 
the market stabilization scheme. During periods of reversal, liquidity is injected 
through cuts in CRR and the unwinding of the market stabilization scheme. 
Overall, rather than relying on a single instrument, many instruments have been 
used in a coordinated manner. This was enabled by the fact that both monetary 
policy and the regulation of banks and other financial institutions and key finan-
cial markets are under the jurisdiction of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which 
permitted smooth use of various policy instruments. Unlike many EMEs, India 
has been running trade and current account deficits. While the current account 
deficit is modest and manageable, the trade deficit is high. Management of the 
capital account and exchange rate is also important from this perspective.
The outcomes have been satisfactory. Growth in monetary and credit aggregates 
was, by and large, contained within desired trajectories and consistent with the 
overall GDP growth objective. There has been significant financial deepening. 
Though inflation has been high again in 2010–2011, it had been reduced signifi-
cantly in the decade prior to 2008 from its levels prevailing during the 40-year 
period until the late 1990s. Growth has witnessed significant acceleration on 
the back of productivity gains, which are also reflected in the growth of exports 
of goods and services. Domestic investment has increased substantially since 
the beginning of this decade, and this is predominantly financed by domestic 
savings. The surge in investment and savings was made possible by an efficient 
allocation of resources by the domestic banking system and financial markets, 
despite many constraints. Overall, financial stability has been maintained (see 
Mohan and Kapur 2011a for details).
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The volatility in capital flows poses large challenges but these can be managed. 
The key lessons from the Indian experience are that monetary policy needs to 
move away from the narrow price stability/inflation targeting objective. Cen-
tral banks need to be concerned not only with monetary policy but also with 
development and regulation 
of banks and key financial 
markets—money, credit, 
bond, and currency. Depend-
ing on the institutional legacy 
within different countries, 
if these additional functions are not vested within the central bank, adequate 
coordination mechanisms need to be put in place to enable the central bank to 
interact with the other agencies and act on needed prudential measures. Given 
the volatility and the need to ensure broader stability of the financial system, 
central banks need multiple instruments. Capital account management has to be 
counter-cyclical, just as is the case of monetary and fiscal policies. Judgments in 
capital account management are no more complex than those made in mon-
etary management. 
Overall, as the CGFS (2009) concludes, it is a combination of sound macroeco-
nomic policies, prudent debt management, exchange rate flexibility, the effec-
tive management of the capital account, the accumulation of appropriate levels 
of reserves as self-insurance, purposive use of prudential regulation, and the 
development of resilient domestic financial markets that provides the optimal 
response to the large and volatile capital flows to the EMEs. Individual countries 
have used different combinations of measures from time to time. If the pressure 
of excess flows is very high, as it was in India in 2007, it becomes necessary to 
use almost all the possible measure available. Thus how these elements can be 
best combined will depend on the country and on the period: there is no “one 
size fits all.”
Such a discretionary approach does put great premium on the skill of policy-
makers in both finance ministries and central banks. It also runs the risk of 
markets perceiving central bank actions to become uncomfortably unpredict-
able. If, however, as many Asian countries have demonstrated in recent years, 
the actions of the authorities do result in the virtuous circle of high growth, low 
inflation and financial stability, such an approach has much to commend it. One 
such example is that of India.
The key lessons from the Indian experience 
are that monetary policy needs to move 
away from the narrow price stability/infla-
tion targeting objective.
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3. Managing Capital Flows: lessons from the recent 
experiences of emerging asian economies
Masahiro Kawai, Mario B. Lamberte, and Shinji Takagi1
introduCtion
The essay draws lessons from the recent experiences of emerging Asian 
economies (EAEs)2 for managing capital inflows. While capital inflows bring 
about invaluable benefits, large flows, if not managed properly, can expose 
the recipients to various types of risks. EAEs collectively were a significant 
recipient of capital inflows 
prior to the global financial 
crisis. Although the Republic 
of Korea (hereafter Korea) 
and Indonesia were affected 
by capital outflows to some 
extent, most of Asia did not 
suffer as much as eastern European and Baltic countries did. Following the 
crisis, they were among the first to recover and are now experiencing a new 
surge of inflows. The issue of how best to manage capital inflows is therefore 
especially relevant for Asia. We frame our discussion primarily on the basis of 
the country and analytical chapters of Kawai and Lamberte (2010) with some 
updated information.
1 The authors are, respectively, Dean and Chief Executive Officer, Asian Development Bank Institute; Director of 
Research, Asian Development Bank Institute; and Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Economics, Osaka Uni-
versity, and a member of the Pardee Center Task Force on Regulating Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development.
acknowledgement: The views expressed in this note are the authors’ alone and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the Asian Development Bank, its Institute, the Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
2 Unless noted otherwise, emerging Asian economies (EAEs) include the following 14 economies: Cambodia 
(CAM); People’s Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, China (HKG); India (IND); Indonesia (INO); Republic of 
Korea (KOR); Lao PDR (LAO); Malaysia (MAL); Myanmar (MYA); the Philippines (PHI); Singapore (SIN); Taipei, 
China (TAP); Thailand (THA); and Viet Nam (VNM). Of these, we pay particular attention to nine economies for 
which Kawai and Lamberte (2010) include country chapters.
Following the crisis, [Asian countries] were 
among the first to recover and are now 
experiencing a new surge of inflows. The 
 issue of how best to manage capital inflows 
is therefore especially relevant for Asia.
36   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  March 2012
CaPital Flows in eMerging asian eConoMies
degree of Capital account openness
Capital account openness varies across EAEs, according to both de jure and 
de facto measures. First, Chinn and Ito (2009) constructed an index of financial 
openness based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, where a higher index value indicates greater openness 
(Figure 1). Except for Hong Kong and Singapore, most EAEs maintain various 
controls on cross-border capital flows, though many are substantially open with 
respect to foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and portfolio inflows through 
purchases by nonresidents of domestic securities.
Second, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) developed a volume-based measure of 
international financial integration, defined as the ratio of the stock of assets and 
liabilities to GDP (Table 1). We have updated data for 2005 and 2009 by using the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics stock data, where available, or capital 
flow data, where stock data are not available. For Asia, the ratio generally rose 
for all economies from 1990 to 2009. Despite the relatively low overall de jure 
openness (as indicated by the Chinn-Ito index), the capital account of many 
economies in fact appears to have been sufficiently open to allow a sizable 
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Figure 1: de Jure Capital account openness in emerging asia, 2009
Source: Chinn and Ito 2009.
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 accumulation of external assets and liabilities over time, with the ratio exceeding 
or close to 100 percent for all but two economies in 2009.
Patterns of Capital Flows
EAEs saw a resurgence of capital flows after the 1997–1998 Asian financial 
crisis, with inflows reaching $856 billion in 2007, before the onset of the global 
financial crisis (Table 2). The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) inflows rose 
dramatically, posting $241 billion in 2007, which accounted for 28 percent of 
the total in EAEs; India also saw rapid increases in inflows, which reached $98 
billion in 2007. Capital outflows also picked up, suggesting that capital flows in 
the region have become increasingly two-way. The PRC and Hong Kong had the 
largest capital outflows in 2007. Together, they accounted for 60 percent of the 
total outflows from EAEs, followed by Singapore and Korea.
As to the composition of capital flows, FDI began to take the dominant role in 
the middle of the 1990s (Figure 2). By the late 1990s, FDI had accounted for 
more than half of all private capital inflows to EAEs. Portfolio equity inflows 
increased following the Asian financial crisis. Most Asian economies reduced 
barriers to investment on equity markets to recapitalize ailing banks and non-
financial corporations. As a result, equity inflows rapidly increased in 1999, but 
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Economies 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Cambodia (CAM)  96.3 176.8 145.2 156.0 
China, People's Republic of 
(PRC) 
38.9 58.7 84.7 90.6 108.3 
Hong Kong, China HKG) 1462.9 1338.6 1246.5 1434.5 2097.1 
India (IND) 30.2 39.7 42.3 49.1 64.1 
Indonesia (INO) 80.6 86.2 136.8 86.1 76.9 
Korea, Republic of (KOR) 35.4 50.9 82.7 107.5 161.9 
Lao PDR (LAO) 215.3 147.5 198.7 148.0 153.2 
Malaysia (MAL) 121.6 160.8 185.5 183.9 242.2 
Philippines (PHI) 95.0 97.3 143.3 114.7 99.2 
Singapore (SIN) 361.3 419.5 809.5 966.7 1216.4 
Taipei, China (TAP) 103.4 97.7 132.3 257.0 369.7 
Thailand (THA) 68.8 114.4 142.7 135.1 168.0 
Viet Nam (VN)  96.2 110.7 100.2 129.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
table 1:  external assets and liabilities as a share of gdP  
in emerging asia, 1990–2009(%)
Sources: For 1990, 1995 and 2000, the figures came from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), except for Tai-
pei, China, whose figures were obtained from the China Economic Information Center (CEIC) database. 
For 2005 and 2009, the figures were calculated using IMF IFS stock data, where available, or capital flow 
data, where stock data are not available. For Lao PDR and Viet Nam, the latest data are for 2007.
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momentum was reversed in 2000. Portfolio equity inflows resurged in 2003, 
peaking at $205 billion in 2007. Equity inflows turned negative (-$81 billion) in 
2008 as the global crisis deepened, but rebounded strongly in 2009.
Unlike portfolio equity inflows, debt securities inflows were a relatively small 
component of capital inflows in EAEs, although they have been on the rise, 
especially in Korea. Underdevelopment of the local currency bond market has 
been pointed out as one of the main reasons. Currently, several policy initiatives 
are under way to promote local-currency denominated bond markets, and debt 
securities inflows are expected to increase over time. Bank financing in EAEs 
was relatively small in the 1990s except during the three years prior to the 1997–
1998 crisis. Thereafter, bank financing accounted for a negligible proportion of 
capital inflows in Asia until 2006. In 2007 it rose sharply to almost $70 billion, 
with Korea accounting for almost two-thirds of the total. In 2008, bank financing 
turned negative (-$12 billion), with Korea accounting for almost all of it. 
impact of Capital Flows
Persistent current account surpluses and rising capital inflows exerted upward 
pressure on the exchange rates in most EAEs until right before the global finan-
 1 
Chap 3 Table 2 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Gross 
Capital 
Flows 
Gross 
Capital 
Flows 
(% of 
GDP) 
Capital 
Inflows 
Capital 
Inflows  
(% of 
GDP) 
Capital 
Outflows 
Capital 
Outflows  
(% of 
GDP) 
Net 
Inflows 
Net 
Inflows  
(% of 
GDP) 
1990 52.85  4.18  42.96  3.40  9.90  0.78  33.06  2.62  
1991 55.01  4.17  50.79  3.85  4.22  0.32  46.57  3.53  
1992 72.10  5.11  56.14  3.98  15.97  1.13  40.17  2.85  
1993 133.06  8.63  97.91  6.35  35.15  2.28  62.76  4.07  
1994 148.74  8.10  108.13  5.89  40.61  2.21  67.53  3.68  
1995 209.30  9.43  155.76  7.02  53.54  2.41  102.22  4.61  
1996 243.94  9.81  181.56  7.30  62.39  2.51  119.17  4.79  
1997 277.68  11.00  143.10  5.67  134.58  5.33  8.52  0.34  
1998 -198.11 -8.34 -128.14 -5.40 -69.97 -2.95 -58.17 -2.45 
1999 151.26  5.72  73.76  2.79  77.50  2.93  -3.75 -0.14 
2000 332.11  11.41  167.11  5.74  165.00  5.67  2.10  0.07  
2001 47.70  1.59  32.29  1.08  15.41  0.51  16.88  0.56  
2002 95.19  2.89  55.93  1.70  39.26  1.19  16.66  0.51  
2003 260.85  7.04  149.21  4.03  111.65  3.01  37.56  1.01  
2004 479.42  11.20  300.36  7.02  179.06  4.18  121.30  2.83  
2005 571.24  11.56  310.28  6.28  260.96  5.28  49.32  1.00  
2006 973.47  16.79  499.91  8.62  473.57  8.17  26.34  0.45  
2007 1,595.29  22.22  855.97  11.92  739.32  10.30  116.65  1.62  
2008 237.95  2.88  91.13  1.10  146.82  1.78  -55.69 -0.67 
2009 318.60  3.67  271.67  3.13  46.93  0.54  224.74  2.59  
 
table 2: Capital Flows in emerging asia, 1990–2009 (us$ billion)
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IMF); World Development Indicators (World Bank); CEIC.
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cial crisis. In part to contain the appreciation pressure, the monetary authorities 
of most economies intervened in the foreign exchange market and thereby accu-
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Figure 2: Composition of Capital Flows in emerging asia, 1990–2009 (% gdP)
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IMF); World Development Indicators (World Bank); CEIC 
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mulated massive foreign exchange reserves. Total reserves held by EAEs rose 
from $214 billion or 5 perent of GDP in 1990 to $4.8 trillion or 44 percent of GDP 
in 2010, with the PRC contributing three-fifths. In 2006 and 2007, many EAEs 
experienced higher increases in money supply growth, indicating that steriliza-
tion was incomplete. Although goods and services price inflation had generally 
remained low until the global financial crisis (except for what appears to be the 
temporary impact of increases in world commodity prices in 2008), it has been 
rising in recent months. Equity prices saw a rising trend since 2003 notably in 
Indonesia, India, and the PRC. They dropped sharply at the onset of the global 
financial crisis, but recovered quickly as foreign capital returned to the EAEs.
PoliCy resPonses to CaPital Flows
Policy responses by EAEs until the onset of the global financial crisis can broadly be 
classified into sterilized intervention, interest rate reductions, and capital controls.3
intervention in the Foreign exchange Market
The monetary authorities of all nine case study economies intervened in the 
foreign exchange market, at least partially sterilizing its impact. Lack of suitable 
government paper was often a challenge. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), 
when it ran out of treasury bonds, started selling its own low-yielding central 
bank bills (CBBs) to commercial banks (while raising reserve requirements 
15 times from September 2003 to end-2007). Likewise, the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) ran out of government securities and agreed with the government 
in  January 2004 to put in place the Market Stabilization Scheme (MSS), which 
authorizes RBI to sell bonds on behalf of the government for the purpose of 
sterilization (while also raising reserve requirements).
Some economies resorted to creative ways of sterilization. The Bank of Korea 
(BOK) used its own monetary stabilization bonds (MSBs), but as the balance rose 
sharply, it became costly to remain so engaged. The Korean government then 
initiated a scheme under which it sold securities and deposited the proceeds 
with the BOK, thereby allowing the central bank to use the won for currency 
market intervention. Another case is the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). 
After exhausting the conventional tools, in 2007, BSP opened a special deposit 
account (SDA) facility to banks in order to absorb excess liquidity. Later, the 
counterparties were expanded to include non-bank government corporations as 
well as banks’ pension funds and trust operations.
3 This section draws on the nine country chapters of Kawai and Lamberte (2010).
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Sterilization created its own challenges. Bank Indonesia (BI) partially sterilized 
intervention mainly using one-month and three-month Bank Indonesia Certifi-
cates (SBI), but as the SBI interest rates were more than 8 percent, the operation 
attracted even more portfolio inflows. BI was therefore compelled to allow the 
exchange rate to appreciate, partially absorbing the impact of capital inflows 
thereby. The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), finding open market operations and 
reserve requirements less than fully effective, required commercial banks to 
purchase newly introduced 365-day bills in March 2008. This measure forced 
banks to run to the inter-bank market, pushing up the inter-bank rates sharply. 
As banks competed intensively to mobilize deposits to comply with the compul-
sory purchase of the 365-day bills, the deposit rates also rose.
interest rate Policy
When a large interest rate differential attracts additional foreign capital, the 
monetary authorities may need to narrow the gap by lowering domestic interest 
rates. This explains why the PBOC was cautious in tightening monetary policy: 
when it raised interest rates it made sure to maintain a 3 percent spread in favor 
of the dollar LIBOR, with the intention of letting the renminbi appreciate at 3 
percent per annum. Likewise, in India, while the RBI raised the reverse repur-
chase and repurchase rates between January 2006 and April 2007, it reduced the 
interest rates on non-resident deposits. Similar interest rate cuts were observed 
in Indonesia (from January 2006 to December 2007), the Philippines (from March 
2007 to March 2008), and Thailand (from January to July 2007). Viet Nam was an 
exception, however, as the SBV raised all official interest rates in February 2007 
in order to contain the acceleration of money supply growth and inflation.
Capital Controls
Use of capital controls was exceptional. Prior to the global financial crisis, only 
four EAEs tightened or introduced capital controls to stem the tide of capital 
inflows. Two cases should clearly be separated. In one case, countries with a 
tightly controlled regime reversed the pace of capital account liberalization. In 
2006, the PRC restricted the ability of foreign banks to borrow dollars abroad 
to fund dollar assets within the country, which was subsequently reinforced by 
the regulation that banks meet an increase in reserve requirements with dollar 
deposits with the central bank. In 2007, India tightened limits on external com-
mercial borrowing by placing a cap on the amount of foreign exchange domestic 
firms could convert into rupees; it also introduced controls against “participatory 
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notes,” which are over-the-counter derivatives sold by a registered foreign institu-
tional investor to a non-registered investor.
The other case involved measures introduced by a country with a substantially 
open capital account regime, especially with respect to capital inflows. On 18 
December 2006, Thailand imposed a 30 percent unremunerated reserve require-
ment (URR) on all equity and short-term securities investment inflows with 
maturities of less than one year, which was however lifted on the following day 
for equity flows. The URR for fixed income inflows remained until March 2008. 
There is statistical evidence to suggest that capital inflows shifted to equity flows, 
but the econometric analysis of Coelho and Gallagher (2010) shows that the Thai 
URR reduced the overall volume of inflows by 0.75 percent of GDP (which was 
marginally significant statistically).4 In 2007, Korea re-imposed limits on lending 
in foreign currency to Korean firms, while restricting foreign banks’ swapping 
dollars borrowed abroad for won. These measures were intended to slow down 
foreign banks’ funding of their branches in Korea.
Managing CaPital inFlows in the Post-Crisis era
As the world’s engine of growth, Asia has seen a resumption of capital inflows. 
Conventional macroeconomic tools seem to offer limited effectiveness in managing 
large capital inflows, especially given the large balance of foreign exchange reserves 
many of the economies have 
accumulated. Allowing the 
exchange rate to appreciate 
is often the best way to cope 
with large capital inflows (this 
is the standard response of 
most industrial countries), but 
emerging economies are naturally reluctant to allow a significant appreciation of 
their currencies. In view of this limited policy space, some EAEs have introduced 
prudential and other regulatory measures affecting capital inflows and foreign 
exchange positions in the post-global financial crisis era (Table 3).
Prudential and other regulatory Measures
In assessing the prospective usefulness of prudential and other regulatory measures 
limiting capital inflows or what the IMF (2011) calls capital flow management mea-
sures (CFMs), it is important to bear in mind the following considerations for EAEs:
4 But they show that it did not affect the real exchange rate or the composition of inflows.
Conventional macroeconomic tools seem to 
offer limited effectiveness in managing large 
capital inflows, especially given the large 
balance of foreign exchange reserves many 
of the economies have accumulated.
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• ASEAN member states are committed to creating an ASEAN Economic Com-
munity (AEC) by 2015, which is defined to be a region characterized by free 
movement of investment and freer movement of capital. It is difficult for any 
of these countries to reverse the process of capital account liberalization by 
introducing new barriers to capital mobility except during an emergency on a 
temporary basis.
• Hong Kong and Singapore, as major international financial centers, cannot be 
seen to be taking any measure to restrict the freedom of international inves-
tors to move funds across borders. Given the depth of their financial markets 
and the robust regulatory regimes in place, use of CFMs is probably not neces-
sary except during a crisis (they have recently introduced prudential measures 
to contain upward pressure on real estate prices).
• Cambodia and Lao PDR have virtually no domestic financial markets to speak 
of. This means that, in the foreseeable future, no large portfolio inflows are 
Chap 3 Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging 
Asian 
Economies 
 
Measures 
India • June 2010: limited the amount of short-term bonds that could be sold to 
foreign investors (while raising the overall ceiling for FII investment in 
debt in September 2011)  
Indonesia • June 2010: imposed a one-month holding period for SBIs while 
announcing the introduction of longer-term (9–12 months) SBIs (from 
August/September); introduced new regulations on banks’ net foreign 
exchange open positions 
• January 2011: re-introduced a cap (in relation to capital) on oversees short-
term borrowing by banks while requiring banks to set aside a higher 
percentage of their foreign exchange holdings as reserves 
• May 2011: lengthened the one-month SBI holding period to six months 
• July 2011: restricted investment by banks in foreign currency bonds issued 
in the domestic market in circumvention of measures to restrict foreign 
currency loans 
Korea, 
Republic 
of  
• June 2010: placed limits on foreign exchange derivatives positions, in 
relation to the capital base of financial institutions; further restricted the 
use of foreign currency loans by banks within Korea; and tightened 
regulations on the foreign currency liquidity ratio of domestic banks 
• December 2010: announced the introduction of a tax on banks’ foreign 
exchange borrowing and the re-instatement of withholding tax on interest 
income from government bonds (from January 2011) 
Thailand • October 2010: re-imposed withholding tax on interest income and capital 
gains from foreign bond holdings 
 
 
table 3.  Capital Flow-affecting Prudential and other regulatory Measures 
announced or adopted by emerging asian economies, 2010–2011
Sources: Relevant central bank publications and press reports.
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expected, even though their capital account regime is fairly open. The same 
can also be said about Myanmar, whose capital account is all but fully closed.
• The PRC and India (and, to a lesser extent, Viet Nam) still maintain extensive 
restrictions on capital inflows (as well as on capital outflows). For these coun-
tries, use of capital controls only represents a reversal of the gradual capital 
account liberalization process.5 Just as well, they could decelerate the pace of 
capital account liberalization over the coming years. 
• Except for Hong Kong and Singapore, the other EAEs maintain some restric-
tions on capital inflows, with tighter controls on outflows. Even Indonesia, 
arguably the most financially open economy in the rest of the region, is known 
to subject banking flows to tight control. In these economies, portfolio inflows 
take place mainly through purchases by nonresidents of domestic securities.
• Korea, as an OECD country, has little leeway in consistently deviating from the 
policy of free capital mobility.
These considerations suggest that:
(i)  use of outright capital controls (or what the IMF (2011) calls residency-based 
CFMs) is relevant only for a handful of EAEs (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, Philip-
pines, and Thailand); 
(ii)  purchases by nonresidents of domestic securities are the main (or the only) 
target of any potential CFMs; and 
(iii)  use of outright capital controls (that explicitly discriminate against foreign 
investors) is increasingly ruled out as a feasible policy option, especially if it 
is pursued by individual countries. 
This last point is clearly borne out by the types of measures that have been 
introduced by some of these countries recently to limit capital inflows or inflow 
volatility (see Table 3). Except for the Indian measure, the other measures 
(introduced by Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand) are carefully designed not to 
discriminate against foreign investors. The pressing question for emerging Asia’s 
policymakers is not when or in what sequence to employ CFMs. It is rather what 
non-residency-based CFMs are effective in mitigating the risk of capital inflows 
5 In these countries, it is not very useful to talk about the effectiveness of any new capital control measure, 
independently of the effectiveness of the overall control regime within which it is introduced. Given the extensive 
administrative apparatus, they can always take measures to make capital controls work.
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(if not directly reducing the purchases by nonresidents of domestic securities) as 
they preserve their commitment to an open capital account regime. 
Collective action
At the regional level, collective action is an insufficiently explored tool. For 
example, if loss of international price competitiveness is the reason for not 
allowing currency appreciation, a country’s authorities can cooperate with their 
competitor neighbors in similar circumstances to take the action simultane-
ously (Kawai 2008). This would lead to a concerted appreciation of currencies in 
the face of persistent capital inflows in the region. Another area of cooperation 
would be to coordinate the introduction of prudential and other regulatory mea-
sures, including outright capital controls, given the recognition that individual 
countries are finding it increasingly difficult to do so alone. Collective action 
is helpful in two ways. First, these measures are either introduced as part of 
regional efforts or sanctioned by a regional decision, there would be less punitive 
reaction from international investors (as was the case with Thailand in December 
2006). Second, these measures, if effective in one country, would divert more 
capital inflows to its regional neighbors. Without a regional framework, use of 
prudential and other regulatory measures to limit capital inflows could turn into 
a tool of beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
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4. Capital outflow regulation: economic  
Management, development and transformation
 
Gerald Epstein
introduCtion
As economic and financial turmoil have rocked the foundations of the global 
economy, policy makers have widened their search for policy tools to help them 
manage the massive financial instability they face. As events have forced them to 
break out of their ideological silos in a desperate search for solutions, some are 
discovering that some policies they have written off in the past might be useful 
after all.
Foremost among these “new found” old tools are so-called “capital controls.” As 
well recounted by Gallagher, Grabel, and Ocampo (all articles published in 2011), 
even the International Monetary Fund (IMF), long a staunch opponent of such 
tools, has now admitted that they can be useful under some circumstances, espe-
cially to manage capital inflows and especially if they are used on a temporary 
basis. They have even adopted a name change to make their acceptance more 
palatable, appropriately dropping the term “controls” and referring to such tools 
as “capital flow management measures” (IMF 2011).1 Still, the IMF and other 
“establishment” institutions have not completely abandoned their old ways. As 
described by Griffith-Jones and Gallagher (2011) and Ocampo (2011), the IMF 
has proposed gaining more influence over the conditions under which capital 
controls are used; and, as Gallagher and others have well documented, a web 
of bilateral and multi-lateral so-called “free-trade” agreements have structured a 
global “capital liberalization regime” that create barriers for countries to imple-
ment capital account regulations even as economists at the IMF say they are 
useful. (Gallagher 2011a.)
1 Other more palatable names have been proposed as well: e.g., “capital management techniques” (Epstein, 
Grabel, Jomo 2003)  and “capital account regulations”, (Ocampo 2011). For purposes of this paper, I will adopt 
Ocampo’s term: see below.
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Equally telling, most of these economists and policy makers retain their opposi-
tion to “capital controls” on outflows.2 Indicative is a highly influential paper by 
Nicolas Magud, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff that surveys 30 academic 
studies of capital controls on inflows and outflows. The paper concludes with 
respect to outflow controls that “As to controls on outflows, there is Malaysia 
and then there is everyone else…Absent the Malaysian experience, there is little 
systemic evidence of “success” in imposing controls, however defined.” (Magud, 
Reinhart, and Rogoff 2011, p. 2).
This conclusion is rather odd when one considers that many of the greatest 
development success stories of the late 20th century have had highly articulated 
regimes of capital account regulations on outflows: South Korea, Taiwan, China 
and India, among others (Amsden 2001; Chang and Grabel 2004; Nembhard 
1996). Capital controls and exchange control regimes were also critical to the 
recovery and industrial development of a number of countries in Europe and 
also Japan following the Second World War (Zysman 1983; Epstein 2007; Eichen-
green 2007). In virtually all of these cases, capital control regimes consisted 
not only of capital controls on outflows (and inflows), but also credit allocation 
systems managed by governmental institutions including Ministries of Finance, 
Central Banks and specialized planning ministries of various kinds. Yet Magud, 
et al. chose not to include these cases because, they argued, “one cannot lump 
together the experiences of countries that have not substantially liberalized (i.e., 
India and China) with countries that actually went down the path of financial 
and capital account liberalization and decided at some point to reintroduce con-
trols, as the latter have developed institutions and practices that are integrated in 
varying degrees to international capital markets” (Magud et al. 2011, p. 5).3
This decision to exclude China and India, among other countries, seems ques-
tionable in light of the fact that both India and China have liberalized to some 
degree over a decade or more, and, in addition, that there have been a number 
of excellent studies of the impacts of these controls on these economies, espe-
cially by Robert McCauley and his colleagues at the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) (e.g., see for example, Ma and McCauley 2007).4
2 Even here, reality sometimes wins out. The IMF encouraged even outflow controls in some of the recent rescue 
packages, including in Iceland (see Grabel, 2011). But the public resistance to controls at the IMF remains.
3 Thus, they only included studies of Malaysia, Spain and Thailand in their sample on outflows.
4 See below for further discussion and references.
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In addition, the distinction between inflow and outflow controls is not as clean 
as is often believed. For example, the regulations imposed by the Indian govern-
ment on certain kinds of derivative positions and products involves constraints 
both on short positions and long positions that involve foreigners: hence they 
can place limits both on “inflows” and “outflows.” In addition, constraints on 
outflows themselves act as a disincentive to inflows. Indeed, one of the strongest 
policies that would serve to limit inflows involve reserve requirements, and 
other limitations on outflows (see Ocampo 2011). 
Still, Magud et al. do have a point: it is important to draw distinctions 
among different kinds of capital controls, especially with respect to the 
policy regimes of which they are a part—including the goals set out for those 
regimes—and the domestic and international context that accompany them. 
Most of the recent discussion has focused on the use of capital account regula-
tions to manage the cyclical, financial stability, and balance of payments 
aspects of macroeconomic policy: we can refer to this as the macroeconomic 
management function of capital account regulations. Less discussed recently 
are the longer term developmental aspects of capital account regulations, 
where capital account regulations are important complements to industrial 
policy, industrial re-development, and income and wealth distributional poli-
cies that were so important in post–World War II reconstruction regimes as 
mentioned above.  
These developmental roles become increasingly important in times of great 
structural change as we are perhaps experiencing today. One can say that 
both the macroeconomic management and the developmental roles of capital 
account regulations relate to the policy roles of capital account regulations. 
In addition, historically, capital controls have played a deeper, transformative 
role as well. Here, capital controls accompany more profound changes in the 
underlying political and economic structure of society, often by facilitating 
a major shift in economic and political power from one group in society to 
another, thereby making feasible a more dramatic change in the overall struc-
ture of the political economy which, in some cases, can (but do not necessar-
ily) lead to a more egalitarian and sustainable order (Epstein 2010). Examples 
of these transformative roles include the case of South Korea following the 
Second World War when controls on outflows complemented their crucial 
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land reform policies that transformed the agrarian and political structure in 
the country.5
Of course, the transformational, the macroeconomic, and the developmental 
roles of capital outflow regulation need not and, indeed, are usually not mutually 
exclusive. Keynes’ views, as described by James Crotty, are especially instruc-
tive here. In his 1983 Journal of Economic Literature article titled “On Keynes 
and Capital Flight,” Crotty showed that in a period spanning the 1930s and into 
the 1940s—virtually up to the time of his death—Keynes was very skeptical that 
nations could achieve full employment and social transformation as long as they 
were integrated into a world of highly mobile capital. He therefore thought that 
controlling international capital mobility was a requirement for bringing about 
both better macroeconomic management and achieving social transformation.
Crotty quoted Keynes: “Indeed, the transformation of society, which I preferably 
envisage, may require a reduction in the rate of interest towards the vanish-
ing point within the next thirty years. But under a system by which the rate of 
interest finds a uniform level, after allowing for risk and the like throughout the 
world under the operation of normal financial forces, this is most unlikely to 
occur” (Keynes 1933, p. 762). Earlier in the essay Keynes argued that: “Advisable 
domestic policies might be easier to compass if the phenomenon known as the 
‘flight of capital’ could be ruled out” (Keynes 1933, p. 757).
Apart from the distinction among macroeconomic, developmental and transfor-
mational capital account regulations, it also makes a difference who is imple-
menting these policies. Here we have two distinctions: 1) the first is whether 
they are being implemented on a national or an international (or internationally 
coordinated) basis; and the second, is whether these outflow regulations are 
being implemented by economically small countries or regions, or whether they 
are being implemented by countries or regions that are large with respect to the 
world economy.
5 Checci was perhaps the first economist to look at the relationship between capital controls and income distri-
bution. He found that in countries that had capital controls, income distribution were more equal. (Checci 1996). 
The most thorough study of the relationship between capital controls and income distribution is that of Lee and 
Jayadev (2005). They find that capital account liberalization reduces the labor share of income in most parts of the 
world (and therefore, capital controls, all else equal, increase the labor share of income). Epstein and Schor (1992) 
showed the capital outflow (and inflow) controls in the OECD were associated with lower unemployment. Hence, 
there is good evidence that capital mobility represents the power of capital relative to labor.
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Again, as with the transformational function of regulations, these issues of coor-
dination and who is implementing the regulations are likely to be particularly 
important at a time of widespread crisis and structural change.
In what follows, I briefly discuss the macroeconomic policy roles of outflow 
regulations, turn to the developmental roles, and finish up with a brief discus-
sion of possible outflow regulations by the United States to enhance the benefits 
and limit the costs of expansionary monetary policy in the current context.
MaCroeConoMiC PoliCy role oF CaPital outFlow regulations
While it is difficult to neatly separate out the macroeconomic policy role and the 
developmental role of capital outflow regulations, one can identify a number of 
key macroeconomic objectives of these regulations (see Table 1, and Epstein, 
Grabel and Jomo 2008).
These include:
• Preserving scarce foreign exchange to avoid foreign exchange or balance of 
payments crisis.
• Protecting monetary policy autonomy to facilitate lower interest rates than 
are prevailing internationally to promote higher investment and higher 
employment. For example, this would make it easier for a country to pursue 
an expansionary monetary and credit policy in a global slump without losing 
excessive amounts of foreign exchange.
• The threat of putting on outflow controls could limit excessive inflows.
• Reducing outflows of hot money that would leave the country saddled with 
foreign denominated liabilities and that could contribute to domestic insolven-
cies and debt problems more generally.
• To help protect financial stability by limiting the build-up of risky counter-
party obligations with respect to complex derivative positions.6
• To help prevent corruption, tax evasion and other illegal activities that involve 
capital flight (see Boyce and Ndikumana, 2011, for the case of African countries).
• To help manage multinational corporation domestic obligations with respect 
to re-investment and profit allocations.
6 See Crotty and Epstein (2010) especially with respect to the case of India. Thanks due to Governor Reddy for 
sharing his expertise on these regulations.
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Studies of the response of both China and India to the Asian financial crisis and 
the 2007–2008 global economic crisis indicate that their controls on outflows, as 
well as inflows, contributed 
to their ability to weather the 
slump more effectively than 
other countries. (e.g., Icard 
2002; Ocampo in this volume). 
Of course, other factors played 
an important role, includ-
ing large foreign exchange 
reserves, and the limitations 
on foreign liabilities. These points suggest that sensible macroeconomic policies, 
as well as effective capital inflow regulations, can be important complements to 
the successful use of capital outflow tools.
An additional reason for capital outflow regulations is to reduce capital flight 
that is associated with corruption and tax evasion. For example, Ndikumana and 
Boyce document that sub-Saharan Africa experienced an exodus of more than 
$700 billion in capital flight since 1970, a sum that far surpasses the region’s 
external debt outstanding of roughly $175 billion. Some of the money wound up 
in private accounts at the same banks that were making loans to African govern-
ments. (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011; Boyce and Ndikumana 2011.)
develoPMental role oF CaPital outFlow regulations
The development role of capital outflow regulation is arguably even more 
important than the macroeconomic policy role, important as this can be in 
certain circumstances. Nembhard’s study of South Korea and Brazil, Zysman’s 
work on Western Europe and Japan, and Hersh’s work on China are particularly 
illuminating. The key lesson of this work is that capital outflow regulations are 
an essential part of a policy regime that involves industrial policy or industrial 
targeting and the use of credit allocation techniques to promote investment and 
productivity in particular areas. Without such capital outflow regulations, it is dif-
ficult to use subsidized credit to promote investment without risking the massive 
leakage of the credit abroad.
Nembhard documents how, in the case of South Korea, these capital controls 
worked because they were part of an entire policy regime of industrial policy, 
credit allocation, and seriously enforced capital outflow controls. Similar regimes 
held sway in China, Japan, India, and several European countries following the 
Studies of the response of both China and 
India to the Asian financial crisis and the 
2007–2008 global economic crisis indicate 
that their controls on outflows, as well 
as inflows, contributed to their ability to 
weather the slump more effectively than 
other countries.
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Second World War. As Alice Amsden details, combined with development banks 
and key monitoring tools to reduce the leakages, corruption and inefficiency, 
such as export targets and associated sticks and carrots, these policies were 
often very effective in promoting developmental goals (Amsden 2001).
As Nembhard details, these are not always successful of course. She recounts 
the case of Brazil in the 1970s and ‘80s where poor design and lack of follow 
Country Achievements Supporting Factors Costs 
Malaysia 1998 -facilitated 
macroeconomic 
reflation 
-helped to maintain 
domestic economic 
sovereignty 
-public support for 
policies 
-strong state and 
administrative 
capacity 
-dynamic capital 
management 
-possibly contributed 
to cronyism and 
corruption 
India -facilitated incremental 
liberalization 
-insulated from 
financial contagion 
-helped preserve 
domestic saving 
-helped maintain 
economic sovereignty 
-strong state and 
administrative 
capacity 
-strong public support 
for policies 
-experience with state 
governance of the 
economy 
-success of broader 
economic policy 
regime 
-gradual economic 
liberalization  
-possibly hindered 
development of 
financial sector 
 
-possibly facilitated 
corruption 
China -facilitated industrial 
policy  
-insulated economy 
from financial 
contagion 
-helped preserve 
savings 
-helped manage 
exchange rate and 
facilitate export-led 
growth 
-helped maintain 
expansionary macro-
policy 
-helped maintain 
economic sovereignty 
-strong state and 
administrative 
capacity 
-strong economic 
fundamentals 
-experience with state 
governance of the 
economy 
-gradual economic 
liberalization 
-dynamic capital 
management 
 
-possibly constrained 
the development of 
the financial sector 
-possibly encouraged 
non-performing loans 
-possibly facilitated 
corruption 
 
 
Chap 4 Table 1 
table 1:  summary: assessment of the Capital Management techniques 
 employed during the 1990s
Source: Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2008.
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through hindered these policies with results much less favorable than those of 
South Korea.
interest equalization tax: CaPital outFlow Controls and 
exPansionary PoliCy by the reserve CurrenCy Country?
The Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary and credit policy—the only expan-
sionary policy currently undertaken by the United States despite the high unem-
ployment and stagnant economy—has raised controversy in developing countries, 
out of concern that a flood of U.S. capital is flowing abroad and generating 
over-valued exchange rates, financial instability, and inflation risks elsewhere. 
Gallagher (2011a) has proposed that the U.S. implement capital outflow regula-
tions to limit the harmful outflow of credit and make the expansionary monetary 
policy more effective in the U.S. itself. Like in the case of other developmentally 
oriented outflow regulations discussed above, these could complement credit 
allocation policies designed to generate more employment and investment (see 
Pollin 2011, for example).
In the late 1960s the U.S. government imposed an interest equalization tax (IET) 
to reduce dollar outflows to complement more expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policy. Most economists who studied the capital outflow regulations con-
cluded that they were ineffective. But careful archival work showed that part of 
the reason was that there were bank and MNC lobby-induced loopholes created 
that made the policy porous (Conybeare 1988).
With the United States’ financial institutions awash in excess liquidity that spills 
over into speculative investments abroad, policies to channel domestic liquidity 
in employment creating, productive investments in the U.S. would be desirable, 
both from the point of view of the bulk of the U.S. population and of those coun-
tries outside of the U.S. who are receiving large amounts of “hot money” flows. 
As an element of such a policy toolkit, it is time for the United States govern-
ment to consider an interest equalization tax to reduce the debilitating carry-
trade emanating from relatively low interest rates in the United States.
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Section II: Implementing and Monitoring  
Effective Regulation
5. dynamic Capital regulations, iMF irrelevance  
and the Crisis
Ilene Grabel
In this essay, I focus on the resurrection of capital controls during the on-going 
global financial crisis.1 The new capital controls that are emerging across devel-
oping countries have three attributes:  
(1) They vary within and across countries. 
(2) They have been deployed in a dynamic fashion. By this I mean that the scope 
and modality of the controls have been adjusted in response to changes in the 
national and global economic environment, and identified channels of evasion. 
(3) Controls have often figured into multi-pronged efforts to address diverse and 
serious economic challenges. 
In some cases (such as Iceland), policymakers have used controls on outflows 
to slow the implosion of the economy. In other cases (such as Latvia) controls 
have been used to address a narrow but acute vulnerability. And in others (such 
as Brazil and South Korea), policymakers have deployed and “fine-tuned” inflow 
controls to mitigate the appreciation of their currencies, cool asset bubbles, 
and reduce financial fragility and inflation.2  These latter challenges have been 
aggravated by the large capital inflows to rapidly growing economies, which 
have resulted in part from low interest rates in the U.S. and the Eurozone and 
divergent growth prospects across the globe. And in still other cases (e.g., China), 
the fine-tuning of controls on both inflows and outflows during the crisis is con-
sistent with long-standing commitments to manage financial flows in the service 
of broader development objectives.
1  The discussion here of capital controls, policy space and the IMF draws heavily on Grabel (2011a).  See this 
paper as well for citations to the literature. 
2  Indeed, capital controls have emerged as a key weapon of choice in the modern day “currency war.” See Grabel 
(2011b, 2011c, 2010).  
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Policymakers in a significant group of developing countries have availed them-
selves of the new policy space that they enjoy to regulate international capital 
flows. This change in the policy landscape has occurred against the backdrop 
of the rise of increasingly 
autonomous states in the 
developing world, geographi-
cally curtailed IMF influ-
ence, and recognition (albeit 
inconsistent at times) by Fund 
staff that capital controls are a “legitimate part of the policy toolkit” (to invoke a 
now frequently used phrase in Fund reports).3 As each country deploys capital 
controls with no ill effects on investor sentiment and no finger wagging by the 
IMF, it becomes easier for policymakers elsewhere to deploy the controls they 
deem appropriate. And they are doing so. Indeed, capital controls have emerged 
during the crisis as the “new normal.” 
One aspect of the autonomy that some states now enjoy is their resistance to the 
IMF’s new interest in developing a code or guidelines governing the appropri-
ate use of capital controls. Indeed, the Fund’s position on capital controls has 
become increasingly irrelevant as developing countries now enjoy the policy 
space to introduce and adjust capital controls without waiting for the institution.  
It is, in my view, critical that efforts be made to maintain and expand the oppor-
tunity that has emerged in the crisis environment for national policymakers to 
experiment with capital controls and other measures.
dynaMiC CaPital Controls during the Current Crisis:  
a brieF survey 
The current crisis has achieved in a hurry something that heterodox economists 
have been unable to do for a quarter-century. It has provoked policymakers in 
a large number of developing countries to experiment with a variety of types of 
capital controls, often framing them simply as prudential policy tools (akin to 
what Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2004) termed “capital management techniques” 
and what the IMF (Ostry et al. 2011; IMF 2011a; Habermeirer et al. 2011) now 
calls “capital flow management”).
3 See Grabel (2011a) on the productive incoherence that has emerged in the context of the current crisis.  Also 
note that more broadly, this rupturing of the old financial order is consistent with broader changes that suggest 
that the global financial architecture is becoming multi-nodal and heterogeneous (see Grabel, 2012).
Policymakers in a significant group of de-
veloping countries have availed themselves 
of the new policy space that they enjoy to 
regulate international capital flows.
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Controls in Countries in distress
Iceland was the first country to sign a Stand-by-Arrangement (SBA) during the 
current crisis. What is most notable about the Icelandic SBA is that it includes 
provisions regarding the need for stringent capital controls, something that we do 
not find in earlier SBAs that the IMF signed in connection with East Asian coun-
tries or in other crises during the neo-liberal era. Even more surprising, the SBA 
provided for controls even on capital outflows. Iceland’s controls were initially 
imposed prior to the signing of the SBA in October 2008, though the agreement 
with the Fund made a very strong case for their necessity and maintenance as 
means to restore financial stability and to protect the krona from collapsing. 
The IMF’s stance with respect to Iceland’s capital controls initially appeared 
anomalous. But it soon became clear that it marked a dramatic precedent. For 
example, the SBA with Latvia of December 2008 allowed for the maintenance 
of pre-existing restrictions arising from a partial deposit freeze at Parex, the 
largest domestic bank in the country (IMF 2009a). Soon thereafter, a joint World 
Bank-IMF report (2009: Table 1.4) on the current crisis notes without evaluation 
that six countries (China, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, the Russian Federa-
tion, and Ukraine) all imposed some type of capital control during the crisis. 
Another Fund report acknowledges that Iceland, Indonesia, the Russian Fed-
eration, Argentina, and Ukraine all put capital controls on outflows in place to 
“stop the bleeding” related to the crisis (IMF 2009b). These reports neither offer 
details on the nature of these controls nor commentary on their ultimate efficacy, 
something that further suggests that capital controls—even and most notably on 
outflows—are increasingly taken for granted by the Fund. 
Controls in Countries Faced with too Much of a good thing
Policymakers in a far larger set of developing countries have deployed and 
adjusted capital controls in response to the macroeconomic pressures and 
vulnerabilities aggravated by large capital inflows. These controls illustrate the 
policy space that is increasingly being appropriated in developing countries that 
remain independent of the Fund. 
Brazil is a particularly interesting case since the country’s government (particu-
larly its Finance Minister, Guido Mantega) has been such a strong voice on the 
matter of policy space for capital controls. The IMF’s changing stance regarding 
Brazil’s capital controls also provides a window on both the evolution and con-
tinued equivocation in the views of Fund staff on the matter of capital controls. 
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In late October 2009, Brazil imposed capital controls via a tax on portfolio 
investment. The controls were self-described as modest, temporary, and market-
friendly; they were intended to slow the appreciation of the currency in the face 
of significant international capital inflows to the country. Initially they involved 
a 2 percent tax on money entering the country to invest in equities and fixed-
income investments, while leaving foreign direct investment untaxed. Once it 
became clear that foreign investors were using purchases of American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) issued by Brazilian corporations to avoid the tax, the country’s 
Finance Ministry imposed a 1.5 percent tax on certain trades involving ADRs.  
The IMF’s initial reaction to Brazil’s controls on capital inflows was ever so mildly 
disapproving. A senior official said: “These kinds of taxes provide some room 
for maneuver, but it is not very much, so governments should not be tempted 
to postpone other more fundamental adjustments. Second, it is very complex to 
implement those kinds of taxes, because they have to be applied to every pos-
sible financial instrument,” adding that such taxes have proven to be “porous” 
over time in a number of countries. In response, John Williamson and Arvind 
Subramanian indicted the IMF for its doctrinaire and wrong-headed position on 
the Brazilian capital controls, taking the institution to task for squandering the 
opportunity to think reasonably about the types of measures that governments 
can use to manage surges in international private capital inflows (Subramanian 
and Williamson 2009). A week later the IMF’s Dominique Strauss-Kahn reframed 
the message on Brazil’s capital controls. The new message was, in a word, stun-
ning: “I have no ideology on this”; capital controls are “not something that come 
from hell” (cited in Guha 2009). 
The Brazilian government has continued to strengthen and indeed layer new types 
of controls over existing ones in its ongoing effort to deal with a high volume of 
inflows and as officials seek to close new channels of evasion. For example, in 
October 2010, Brazil twice strengthened the capital controls it first put in place 
in October 2009. The new Brazilian controls triple (from 2 to 6 percent) the tax it 
charges foreign investors on investments in fixed-income bonds. The Brazilian 
controls tax foreign equity purchases at a lower rate (i.e., the same 2 percent rate 
that has been in place since 2009), and foreign direct investment is still not taxed at 
all. This is a particularly good example of fine-tuning controls so that they affect the 
composition, rather than the level of foreign investment. (Indeed, numerous recent 
IMF reports, as well as those by scholars such as Gallagher 2011a, make note of a 
composition effect in Brazil.)  In March 2011 Brazil imposed new capital controls, 
this time on foreign purchases of domestic farmland, a measure that analysts 
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suggest was aimed at curbing China’s growing land purchases in the country. In 
the same month, Brazil increased to 6 percent a tax on repatriated funds that are 
raised abroad through international bond sales and new, renewed, renegotiated, 
or transferred loans with a maturity of up to two years (the previous limit was up 
to 360 days). In August 2011, policymakers added to its existing array of controls 
a 1 percent tax on bets against the U.S. dollar in the futures market, after the real 
reached a 12-year high. Brazilian officials are also set to provide $16 billion in 
tax breaks and to tighten trade barriers to protect manufacturers hurt by imports 
from China (which have been stimulated by the strength of the real). Notably, in an 
August 2011 review of Brazil, IMF economists called the government’s use of capital 
controls “appropriate” (Ragir 2011).4
Brazil is one among many developing countries wherein policymakers are imple-
menting and dynamically adjusting capital controls against a backdrop of large 
inflows. For example, in December 2008, Ecuador implemented a number of 
measures governing inflows and outflows. In terms of outflows, it doubled the tax 
on currency outflows, established a monthly tax on the funds and investments 
that firms kept overseas, and also sought to discourage firms from transferring 
U.S. dollar holdings abroad by granting tax reductions to firms that re-invest their 
profits domestically. In terms of inflow controls, the government established a 
reserve requirement tax (Tussie 2010).5 In December 2009, Taiwan imposed new 
restrictions on inflows in order to reduce speculative pressures from overseas 
investors. The controls preclude foreign investors from placing funds in time 
deposits. In the same month, China added to its existing controls on inflows and 
outflows. In June 2010, Indonesia announced what its officials awkwardly term a 
“quasi capital control” that governs short-term investment. Indonesia’s inflow con-
trols seek to dampen speculation in the country via a one-month holding period 
for central bank money market securities, the introduction of longer maturity 
instruments, and new limits on the sales of central bank paper by investors and 
on the interest rate on funds deposited at the central bank.  
South Korean officials also began to introduce capital controls on inflows in June 
2010. Regulators have since continued to widen them to reduce the risks associated 
with a possible sudden reversal of inflows, rising short-term foreign borrowing, 
and the use of derivative instruments. The controls limit the amount of currency 
4 Curiously in the same month Canadian Prime Minister Harper used some of his time in the country inexplicably 
to lecture the government about the need to dismantle capital controls (Mayeda 2011).
5 As Tussie (2010) notes, what is particularly interesting about Ecuador’s measures is that they demonstrate that 
even a dollarized country has more policy space than is usually understood.  
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forward and derivatives trading in which financial institutions can engage, and 
limit the foreign currency loans extended by banks to local companies. Since 
October of 2010, regulators have audited lenders working with foreign currency 
derivatives. Finally, in April 2011 South Korea levied a tax of up to 0.2 percent 
on holdings of short-term foreign debt by domestic banks (with a lower tax 
levied against longer term debts). In August 2011, South Korea’s government 
announced that it is reviewing “all possibilities” on curbing capital inflows.  
Thailand also began to deploy capital controls in October 2010: authorities intro-
duced a 15 percent withholding tax on capital gains and interest payments on 
foreign holdings of government and state-owned company bonds. In the same 
month, Argentina and Venezuela implemented controls on outflows: in Argen-
tina they involve stricter limits on U.S. dollar purchases, and in Venezuela they 
involve new restrictions on access to foreign currency. Peru has been deploying 
a variety of inflow controls since early 2008. The country’s reserve requirement 
tax (which is a type of control on capital inflows) has been raised three times 
between June and August 2010. Finally, in August 2011, officials in the Philip-
pines announced that they are prepared to impose new controls (in the form of 
prudential limits on certain kinds of transactions by banks) to reduce the volatil-
ity in the peso after it rose to a three-year high.
national Policy divergence 
It bears noting that not all policymakers are responding to the pressures of large 
capital inflows with capital controls. Turkish, Chilean, Mexican, and Colombian 
policymakers have publicly rejected capital controls as a means of dealing with 
the appreciation of their currencies.6 This is not to suggest that policymakers in 
these countries are sitting on the sidelines while their currencies appreciate and 
asset values balloon. Instead, they have stepped up their purchases of dollars 
and, in some cases, are using monetary policy to try to stem the appreciation of 
their currencies. 
National divergences in response to similar pressures reflect many factors, not 
least of which are differing internal political economies, the continued sway 
of neo-liberal ideas in some countries, and perhaps also pride associated with 
dealing with the problem of an excessively strong currency in countries that 
have so long faced the opposite problem. There may also be skepticism about 
the efficacy of these measures, especially since—until quite recently—Brazil’s real 
6 Interestingly, in October 2010 the director of the IMF’s Western Hemispheric department made a case (unsuc-
cessfully) for the use of controls in Colombia owing to the rapid appreciation of its currency (Crowe 2010).  
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appeared almost unstoppable in its appreciation despite the many measures 
taken since 2009. 
are national Measures suFFiCient? 
Will the range of strategies deployed by governments and central banks across 
the developing world solve the problem they aim to address? No, and indeed, 
in the absence of viable, representative, and coordinated mechanisms of global 
economic management, we may descend into a period of nationalist, beggar-thy-
neighbor policies. But in the short-term at least the strategies help protect (even 
if only modestly) developing countries from the negative trade effects of cur-
rency appreciation and the other risks associated with large capital inflows. And 
evidence suggests that these measures have at least partly achieved their chief 
objectives (IMF, various reports, 2010, 2011; Gallagher 2011a). More importantly, 
the unilateral steps that policymakers are taking help to solidify the growing 
international sentiment against unregulated capital flows and light touch finan-
cial regulation.  
The current crisis is exposing clearly the dangers associated with a unilateral 
policy free-for-all in financial matters, and the need for a new regime of coordi-
nated monetary and exchange rate policy and the protection of national policy 
space. It may be that more 
common ground on policy 
space is emerging between 
some Northern and Southern 
policymakers, owing to the 
fact that policymakers in 
wealthy “safe haven countries” 
(namely, Canada, Switzerland, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore), are confronting some of the challenges 
that have frustrated their Southern counterparts. As a consequence, coordinated 
cross-national responses to managing the surges in international capital flows 
may yet be coming, as new alliances form among the diverse countries now fac-
ing the hardships attending currency appreciation.
For advoCates oF enhanCed PoliCy sPaCe
In late 2010 and 2011 the IMF provided us with an interesting vantage point 
from which to observe the continuing tension within the institution on capital 
controls. In several reports, Fund staff note that the institution is seeking to 
The current crisis is exposing clearly the 
dangers associated with a unilateral policy 
free-for-all in financial matters, and the need 
for a new regime of coordinated monetary 
and exchange rate policy and the protection 
of national policy space. 
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develop standards for the appropriateness of different types of controls (IMF 
2010, 2011a, 2011b; Ostry et al. 2011; Habermeirer et al. 2011). The current 
discussion of developing standards for controls was also given life by the French 
government, which seemed eager to use its new leadership of the G-20 and G-8 
in early 2011 to give the Fund a role in coordinating capital controls via a code 
or mandate on the subject (Hollinger and Giles 2011). The issue has since fallen 
off the European agenda as the Eurozone lurches from one crisis to the next. 
But the fact that the IMF tested the waters on the matter of controlling capital 
controls is instructive. Far more instructive is the fact that Brazil and numerous 
developing countries in the G-24 unequivocally and quite publicly rejected any 
such role for the Fund (Wagstyl 2011; Reddy 2011; G-24 2011; Gallagher 2011b). 
Notably, the Fund has not issued a public response to this rebuke by developing 
countries.     
Whether the IMF seizes this opportunity and how it comes to interpret this pos-
sible new charge is of critical importance to advocates of national policy space 
for capital controls (and other measures). It will be important for Fund watchers 
to stay on this issue and continue to advocate coordination that does not pre-
sume a norm of liberalization. We can also hope that those developing countries 
that have used capital controls so successfully will resist any effort to expand the 
IMF’s authority around such a norm. Certainly there is much in the IMF’s own 
actions and official statements by the institution’s key figures during the current 
crisis to call upon should we find that momentum builds around rewriting the 
institution’s new position on capital controls.
Any new regime that attempts to coordinate capital controls must preserve the 
policy autonomy to make continued fine-tuning possible. The two fundamental 
challenges for any new regime is to preserve and indeed maximize national 
policy space for experimentation and to find ways to extend this policy space to 
less autonomous states in the global South (see Rodrik 2001, 2007: ch. 8 on the 
WTO). Barring any substantial change in the global political economy, only some 
developing countries will be positioned to take advantage of the new policy 
autonomy that has emerged at present. The most difficult policy challenge will 
therefore be to address the most pressing needs of those states that lack the 
resources, geopolitical power and/or inclination to pursue an equitable, stable 
developmentalist path.
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6. how to evade Capital Controls . . . and why they 
Can still be effective 
Shari Spiegel
There is a growing consensus that capital account regulations can be used by 
developing countries to help promote economic stability. The IMF, which used 
to promote open capital markets, now supports the use of capital flows manage-
ment, at least under certain circumstances (Ostry et al. 2010, 2011). Many coun-
tries, including the U.S., have used regulations to restrict cross border flows in 
the past. With the increase in global liquidity following the 2008 economic crisis, 
a number of developing and emerging market countries have implemented, or 
are considering implementing, such regulations. 
In designing capital account regulations, policymakers generally try to target 
short-term capital flows, while leaving the current account, areas of the capital 
account, and sometimes the derivatives markets unregulated. However, leav-
ing some external accounts open leaves room for circumvention of regulations 
through these areas. The goal of this paper is to present some of the mechanisms 
used for circumvention, 
to better understand their 
impact on the effectiveness 
of regulations. Although 
more research is needed, our 
analysis indicates that coun-
tries with successful capital 
account management regimes 
have been able to dynamically adapt regulations to correct loopholes, and that 
better monitoring of open areas of external accounts and derivatives markets 
can give policymakers the necessary tools.
There is an ongoing debate on the impact of this circumvention, with some 
economists claiming that it makes the regulations ineffective. There are, how-
ever, costs associated with circumvention, which are an implicit tax on the inves-
tor. Circumvention will likely occur whenever the incentives for evasion exceed 
The question for policymakers should not 
be whether regulations can be circumvent-
ed, but what the cost of circumvention is, 
and whether or not the cost is large enough 
to serve as a disincentive to a significant 
portion of short-term investors.
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these costs. The question for policymakers should not be whether regulations 
can be circumvented, but what the cost of circumvention is, and whether or 
not the cost is large enough to serve as a disincentive to a significant portion of 
short-term investors. More broadly, capital account regulations should be seen 
as tools to reduce surges in short-term cross-border flows rather than necessarily 
stopping these flows altogether. 
Research on mechanisms to circumvent regulations is limited, in large part 
because market participants who engage in these practices do not want to pub-
licize their activities. In one of the few studies in this area, Carvalho and Garcia 
(2008) interview investors in Brazil in the 1990s and document some of the mea-
sures used to evade capital controls during this period. In their analysis, the cost 
of circumvention is based on estimates of the administrative costs of setting up 
the vehicles used for evasion. We argue, however, that administrative costs are 
just one element of the actual cost to the investor. The cost of circumvention is 
ultimately dependent on supply and demand, with the gain from evading regula-
tions often shared between the investor and a financial intermediary.  
The rest of this paper is divided into three sections. The first section discusses 
the cost of evasion. The second presents three types of mechanisms used for 
circumvention: 
1)  traditional forms of evasion through the current account, including over- or 
under-invoicing of trade receivables; 
2)  evasion through open areas of the capital account, focused on disguising 
restricted flows as unrestricted flows; 
3)  evasion through derivatives markets, by which investors create synthetic 
instruments. 
The final section concludes with policy recommendations, emphasizing the 
importance of simple, but flexible, regulations that allow policymakers to adapt 
interventions to changing circumstances. Regulations should be designed to cut 
the link between cross-border flows and the domestic market and dis-incentivize 
domestic agents from becoming financial intermediaries. Monitoring of flows 
throughout the financial system—something regulators should be doing anyway 
to maintain stability in other areas of the financial system—is key to designing an 
effective regulatory regime. 
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the Cost of Circumvention1
Assume that country Z is attracting large inflows of short-term capital due to 
high growth coupled with high relative interest rates.  Three-month interest 
rates in the investors’2 home country are 1 percent for the year (or .25 perent for 
a 3-month period), whereas the expected return on a three-month investment 
in country Z is 5 percent, reflecting higher interest rates and expected currency 
appreciation. To limit the surge in inflows the government of country Z imposes 
a 4.5 percent tax on short term fixed income capital inflows. After-tax returns on 
the three-month investment are now only slightly higher than the .25 percent 
return in the home country, but with greater risk since the expected currency 
appreciation might not materialize due to the foreign exchange tax, as well as 
counterparty, local settlement, legal, and other risks. The investors, who still 
want to capture high country Z domestic returns, look for ways to get around the 
tax, and find a local counterparty that is willing to facilitate circumvention at a 
cost of around 2 percent. The expected return on the new investment would now 
be just under 3 percent, which is still significantly above home country expected 
returns. However, the 3 percent return doesn’t necessarily compensate investors 
for local market risks. It deters some, but not all, investors. 
From the government’s perspective, the tax is marginally successful. The govern-
ment doesn’t earn significant tax revenue, but it does succeed in slowing the 
pace of inflows. However, if the currency starts to strengthen, expected returns 
might increase and investors will be tempted to put the trade back on, weaken-
ing the regulations further. In order to understand how to respond to a new wave 
of capital flows, the government has to better understand how the 2 percent cost 
is derived.
The cost of evasion is a function of three factors: administrative costs, the number 
of intermediaries, and the size of any penalties. Administrative costs represent 
the costs of setting up the vehicles for evasion, such as shell companies, listings 
on stock exchanges, etc. This is often a fixed cost, and represents the minimum 
cost of evasion. Although there are exceptions, many foreign investors,3 especially 
large hedge funds, pension funds and mutual funds, lack the local knowledge and 
personnel to set up these vehicles on their own. They rely on local intermediaries 
1 This section focuses on costs associated with taxes on inflows, but quantity restrictions and restrictions on 
outflows will have similar effects.
2 We use the term “investors” to cover the wide range of financial market players, including short-term 
 speculators.
3 We generally refer to foreign investors, though the pool of investors also includes domestic investors.
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for this role. In general, the intermediary charges the foreign investor a mark-up 
on the administrative costs. Though it varies by country, there is often a limited 
group of local intermediaries that are considered creditworthy enough for foreign 
investors to be willing to use them as their counterparties. Local intermediaries 
are therefore often able to maintain monopoly power and charge rents. In the 
example above, the 2 percent cost represents the administrative costs plus this 
rent. If the currency starts weakening and foreign inflows decline, the intermedi-
ary might lower his price from 2 to 1 percent. If, on the other hand, the currency 
continues to strengthen, attracting additional inflows, the ‘monopoly price’ 
might be raised to 3 percent, which is still lower than the official tax. This simple 
example represents how the ‘gray’ market works, with the government tax being 
split between the foreign investor and the intermediary.
One way to decrease circumvention is to reduce incentives for local institutions 
to act as intermediaries. Many forms of circumvention are illegal and have high 
penalties associated with them, often at multiple times the potential gain. Even 
when circumvention is completely legal, governments can put pressure on local 
agents, such as local financial institutions, to reduce their willingness to act as 
intermediaries. The question for policymakers is how to identify the loopholes, 
and design policies to increase the cost of circumvention. The answer to this 
question depends on the methods of evasion used. 
how to evade Controls
As discussed above, we divide mechanisms for circumvention into three 
categories: current account transactions; capital account transactions, such as 
disguising restricted flows to look like unrestricted flows; and derivatives. In the 
following section we discuss a range of mechanisms in each category. We note 
that for each mechanism discussed, authorities across countries were able to 
dynamically respond by strengthening regulations to address the loopholes. In 
particular, as the size of evasion grows so that circumvention becomes a more 
significant problem, regulators are able to track it more easily, and adapt regula-
tions in response.
CirCuMvention through the Current aCCount:  
over- and under-invoiCing
Over- and under-invoicing is the most typical form of circumventing capital con-
trols via the current account. This mechanism has generally been used as a way 
for domestic entities to evade restrictions on capital outflows. An importer who 
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wants access to foreign exchange can over-invoice his or her imports to obtain 
more foreign exchange than he or she needs, which would then be invested 
abroad. Over-invoicing 
imports would imply higher 
tariff payments at customs, 
but would also imply lower 
reported net income, and 
therefore lower income tax 
payments. Similarly, export-
ers could under-invoice, thus obtaining foreign exchange to invest abroad while 
reducing their income for tax purposes.
This method can also be used to evade restrictions on inflows. Under-invoicing 
imports and over-invoicing exports allows firms to bring additional foreign 
exchange into the country, but it also raises profits and therefore subjects the firms 
to higher taxes. In many countries this tax loss can be significant. For example, with 
a corporate tax of 20–25 percent, an investor would need the investment to return 
25–33 percent to just break even on the trade (assuming zero funding costs)4. None-
theless, there is evidence that this mechanism became increasingly used, especially 
in countries with strong administrative controls, such as China (The Economist 
2008), which have fewer alternative opportunities for circumvention. 
However, as this form of evasion became increasingly significant, it also became 
easier for officials to identify and respond. In 2008, Chinese officials tightened 
restrictions on loopholes, even though China was in the process of liberalizing 
its capital account in other areas at the time. To prevent companies making false 
claims, Chinese regulators, the commerce ministry, and customs authorities 
linked their computer systems to check underlying transactions and eliminate 
discrepancies between proceeds from exports and reported receipts for foreign 
exchange, and forbid banks from buying the foreign exchange when large dis-
crepancies are identified (Yu 2009).
CirCuMvention through the CaPital aCCount:  
disguising restriCted investMents 
A major form of circumvention through the capital account has been to disguise 
restricted investments (i.e., the short-term flows) as unrestricted investments 
(such as FDI, trade finance, or sometimes tradable equity). 
4 This also assumes that the investor doesn’t engage in other forms of tax evasion, such as creating false 
expenses to reduce profits.
Over- and under-invoicing is the most typical 
form of circumventing capital controls via the 
current account. This mechanism has gener-
ally been used as a way for domestic entities 
to evade restrictions on capital outflows.
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Foreign direct investment and tradable equity
Carvalho and Garcia (2008) documented how this mechanism was used in Brazil 
in the 1990s, through FDI and listed equities. Financial intermediaries created 
wholly-owned shell companies as public corporations listed on the Sao Paulo 
Stock Exchange (BOVESPA). International capital flows were invested in equity 
of the company, which was not subject to controls. The shell company then pur-
chases short-term fixed income instruments, with the earnings sent back abroad 
as profit or dividends. The financial intermediary also declared the investment 
as FDI to take advantage of tax holidays. A similar scheme was to set up a 
wholly-owned company listed on the BOVESPA and to manipulate the price so 
that there would be a loss for tax purposes. Disguising short-term investments 
as FDI has also been used to circumvent restrictions in other countries, such as 
Chile and China. For example, in China foreign investors would bring in funds in 
excess of what was needed for investment purposes. These funds would then be 
invested in short-term Chinese interest rates.
As in the current account example, regulators should be able to detect this type 
of evasion, especially when it becomes significant enough to reduce the effec-
tiveness of regulations. For example, the stock market in Brazil, the BOVESPA, 
is one of the largest stock exchanges in the world. Nonetheless, even on the 
BOVESPA, shell transactions might stand out. For example, since 2004, there 
was only one issue with less than 5 investors and brokers.5 Similarly, the central 
bank of Chile detected this type of activity in the Chilean market and subjected 
any investment that was a “potentially speculative direct investment” to the cur-
rency tax, which had the effect of reducing evasion (Carvalho and Garcia 2008; 
Stiglitz et al. 2006). In China, as part of the 2008 reforms, regulators tightened 
requirements on how foreign exchange entering via the FDI account can be 
used, and enacted strict sanctions and penalties for evasion (Yonding 2009). It is 
interesting to note that prior to the strengthening of regulations, analysts warned 
that stricter regulations on FDI would limit investment in China. Yet, despite the 
tightened controls in 2008, China experienced record amounts of FDI in 2010 
(Bloomberg News 2011). 
More broadly, there has been growing evidence of ‘financialization’ of FDI 
(including investments by the companies into fixed income instruments and 
loans between parents and subsidiaries), which appear to carry greater risks 
than greenfield FDI (Ostry et al. 2010). Rather than responding on a piecemeal 
5 Calculations based on the BOVESPA website.
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basis, appropriate policy response might be to expand regulations to incorporate 
these types of inflows, which are financial in nature, but are categorized as FDI. 
For example, companies could pay an up-front tax on all investment, but be able 
to recoup the payment after a period of time deemed to be ‘long-term.’ Although 
this could add to the cost of doing business in a country, the impact would be 
small in the context of the bigger investment. Alternatively, policymakers could 
tax dividends or profits sent abroad, which could be targeted to short-term gains 
or to gains from fixed income investments. More broadly, policymakers should 
better monitor FDI flows, to better distinguish between financial FDI and longer-
term greenfield investment.  
trade Finance
Another example of disguising flows in Brazil in the 1990s was through trade 
finance (Carvalho and Garcia 2008). This case is particularly interesting since it 
illustrates how the gains from circumvention are often shared between the local 
intermediary and the foreign investor. Exporters in Brazil could set up accounts 
to borrow funds for up to one year before shipping merchandise, at low rates. 
Foreign investors who bought the rights to these accounts had access to the low 
interest loans, and could invest the proceeds in short-term securities without 
having to bring money on-shore. Demand for this mechanism led to a black 
market in trade finance rights for short-term investing, and a few banks actually 
set up trading companies specialized in trade financing to take advantage of this 
strategy (Carvalho and Garcia 2008). However, the rate earned on these accounts 
was below the government interest rate. Carvallo and Garcia point out that 
one reason for this was that “foreign investors seeking the high return in Brazil 
offered capital at interest rates below the country’s base rate due to restrictions 
on other investment means.” In other words, the exporters acted as the financial 
intermediaries, and shared the gains from circumvention with the foreign inves-
tor. However, this form of circumvention was less of an issue for regulators since 
the trades were financed by local currency loans and did not affect the exchange 
rate, or bring dollars into the domestic market. The trades did increase leverage 
in the system, but this should be dealt with through prudential regulations. 
Similarly, in China, export firms often receive an advance from foreign buyers 
for up to a year, which could be invested on-shore in short-term interest rate 
products. To prevent this access from being sold for a profit, the 2008 regulations 
required firms to present contracts to show that the advance is necessary, and 
ceilings have been imposed on the maximum advance size. 
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derivatives Markets
Derivatives are particularly potent instruments for circumvention because inves-
tors can create synthetic instruments to mimic domestic investments without 
actually moving funds across borders. While authorities can monitor and regu-
late domestic derivatives markets, offshore markets are harder to assess. None-
theless, trades in offshore markets are generally offset in the domestic market, 
which means that local regulations can still effect these investments.
non-deliverable Forwards (ndFs)
The simplest derivative product used to access local market interest rates 
offshore are NDFs. An NDF is a forward currency trade whereby the investor 
buys one currency (say the Brazilian real) and sells another currency (the base 
currency, which is often USD, EUR, or JPY) at an agreed-upon rate for settlement 
at some point in the future, say one, three or six months. However, instead of 
exchanging currencies at the settlement date, the counterparties calculate the 
gain or loss in the base currency, e.g., USDs, and settle the trade in that currency 
offshore. The NDF creates a synthetic short-term interest rate investment, funded 
by borrowing in the base currency. The difference between onshore interest rates 
and those implied in the NDF market is a good indicator of how well exchange 
controls are working. If the two rates are relatively close, this is a sign that 
foreigners are able to offset their risk with local counterparties fairly easily and 
gain access to local market interest rates. If the implied interest rate in the NDF 
market is significantly below the local market rate, as was the case, for example, 
in Indian rates during the 1990s, it is a sign that controls are effective at keeping 
foreign investors from accessing the domestic short-term fixed income market. 
If an offshore derivatives market were to have significant interest from both buy-
ers and sellers, it is possible that an offshore market could develop separately 
from the domestic market. However, in most cases, investors in these markets 
are speculating, with most investors on the same side of a trade—either putting 
on a carry trade, buying local currency during bubbles, or shorting a currency 
during a crisis. A 2005 Federal Reserve Bank of New York study (Lipscomb 2005) 
found that 60 to 80 percent of NDF volume is generated by speculative interests, 
with increasing participation from hedge funds. International financial institu-
tions generally act as market-makers, which means they tend to offset their 
positions either through the brokers market, or directly with onshore institu-
tions, often with their local branches. For example, a New York branch of a 
major international bank could enter an NDF with a hedge fund, by which the 
Regulating Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development     79
fund buys 100 million dollars worth of Thai Bahts (THB). The bank would then 
be short THB, which it might buy from its local branch. However this trade can 
be done via internal accounting without actually bringing the dollars on-shore. 
In other words, an important loophole exists when transactions between foreign 
banks and their branches are not monitored and regulated. 
The local branch is now short THB and long USD, so it would go into the local 
market and sell USD and buy THB Treasuries to cover its short position. In the 
end, the NDF position is transferred to the books of the local bank. The goal of 
the regulators is to break the link between the offshore and onshore markets.
During the Asian crisis Malaysia did just this. Malaysia initially experienced cir-
cumvention of its controls through the offshore NDF market. In response, authori-
ties instituted regulations on domestic banks, which restricted them from trans-
acting directly with foreign institutions. These regulations cut the link between 
the domestic and offshore market, and successfully limited the transfer of risk 
from local balance sheets to offshore players. More recently Korea took a first step 
at limiting open FX derivative positions of local banks with the goal of limiting 
the transmission from the offshore market, though the measures were somewhat 
narrow in scope as they allowed corporates to hedge their risk offshore, and 
didn’t completely sever the link between the onshore and offshore markets. 
An alternative structure that’s similar to an NDF is a structured note. These are usually 
issued at an off-shore banking center and can be designed to give the foreign investor 
offshore access to domestic interest rates. Further, these measures can be designed to 
include embedded additional leverage that is not necessarily obvious to regulators.
american depository receipts (adrs) and equity swaps
Back-to-back operations can also be done in the equities market through ADRs.6 
In this case, the foreign investor buys an ADR financed with a repurchase agree-
ment—known as a “repo”—in New York. At the same time, the local intermediary 
sells the same stock with a reverse repo in the local market.7 The difference in 
financing rates between the repo and the reverse repo captures the difference 
between U.S. and foreign rates.  
6 ADRs represent equity in a foreign stock, but are traded on a U.S. exchange.
7  A repurchase agreement, or repo is, is the sale of securities with an agreement for the seller to buy back the 
securities at a later date. In essence the seller is borrowing short-term funds at an agreed upon interest rate. A re-
verse repo is the same transaction from the buyer’s perspective. The buyer is lending short-term funds at an agreed 
upon interest rate. In this example, the repo is financed in USD while the reverse repo is invested in local currency.
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A similar structure exists in the equity swap market. In this market, a foreign 
investor can buy an offshore equity swap from a domestic resident who can 
hedge without the tax. Such offshore equity swap markets exist for Malaysia, 
Korea, and Thailand. 
In all of these examples, investments are made offshore, but ultimately hedged 
locally. Authorities monitoring the domestic market should be able to respond 
to these types of circumvention by regulating the onshore activities. For exam-
ple, in response to widespread use of the ADR arbitrage, the Brazilian central 
bank instituted high penalties on this trade. However, it is not necessary for 
authorities to target a particular trade. In Colombia, regulators used prudential 
regulations to restrict foreign currency exposure and gross positions in foreign 
currency derivatives of the domestic financial intermediaries (Ostry et al. 2011), 
thus limiting the ability of domestic financial institutions to engage in these 
types of trades. Monitoring transactions between banks and their subsidiaries, 
and subjecting these to regulations, would help reduce the ability of agents to 
circumvent restrictions. Insisting that all such off-balance-sheet transactions with 
foreign investors are reported on the balance sheet of financial market players 
could help to monitor these types of transactions.
onshore derivatives Markets
Local derivatives markets provide more direct opportunities for circumvention, 
especially when these markets are open to foreign investors. A foreign investor 
who wants exposure to domestic interest rates can purchase a derivative instru-
ment without bringing funds onshore.8 An example of derivatives that could be 
used to circumvent restrictions on short-term investments would be deliverable 
forward currency contracts and options strategies. Similar to forwards, option 
strategies can be used to create a synthetic investment in local market instru-
ments.9  Another example of a structure to get around restrictions on short-term 
debt would be a long-term bond with embedded options that can be exercised in 
the short-term. 
Many developing and emerging markets still have relatively undeveloped deriva-
tives markets. Countries that have more developed derivatives markets, such as 
Brazil, have taken measures to incorporate this market in the broader regulatory 
environment. In response to a growth in some of these strategies in the 1990s, 
8 Or bringing only small portion of the notional value of the trade onshore for margin requirements.
9 For example, ‘box options’, which are two puts and two calls, with the price on the strike date fixed create a 
synthetic local market investment.
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the Brazilian central bank initially subjected synthetic fixed income trades to 
the same regulations as direct fixed income investments (Carvallo and Garcia 
2008). In 2011, Brazil attempted to regulate the derivatives market more broadly 
by subjecting all derivatives trades to a 2 percent tax. Although this tax is low 
relative to expected returns, it represents an initial step in regulating derivatives 
and has the added benefit of helping regulators collect better information about 
positions and be able to better monitor the market. 
ConClusion
There is still an open debate on whether capital account regulations should be 
temporary mechanisms (Ostry et al. 2011) or part of a permanent regime to be 
strengthened or weakened depending on the economic environment. Those who 
support temporary measures argue that capital account regulations become inef-
fective over the long run and are, at best, short-term tools to deal with temporary 
surges in inflows (Ostry et al. 2011). We argue that a permanent but flexible 
regime, based on simple rules, may be the best choice for many countries. 
The effectiveness of capital account regulatory regimes has varied, with some 
experiences more successful than others. Regulations have been most effective 
in countries with stricter controls across different types of capital flows and in 
countries with existing controls so that the administrative apparatus is already in 
place (Ostry et al. 2010). The cost of building necessary administrative support is 
not negligible, and it’s often difficult to design and implement effective programs 
during crises or bubbles, when vested interests are apt to oppose them.
Although more research is needed, our preliminary analysis of different forms 
of circumvention seems to indicate that countries are able to dynamically 
strengthen regulations over time in ways that enhance stability. In general, 
 countries that are thought of as having the most successful regimes have all 
maintained flexible regulations, which they adapted to changes in the economic 
environments, as well as to opening of loopholes. In both Chile and Colombia in 
the 1990s, policymakers reacted strongly to new loopholes in existing regula-
tions by modifying the details of the framework (Stiglitz et al. 2006). In China 
and Brazil, policymakers strengthened regulations when various forms of eva-
sion become more significant. In Malaysia, policymakers responded to evasion 
through the offshore market by strengthening regulations on domestic banks. 
Dynamic management of regulations does not mean that policymakers should be 
expected to always respond to changes in markets in a timely manner;  markets 
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move quickly and it usually takes regulators time to adjust to the changes, 
even in developed markets. Nonetheless, markets give signals when evasion is 
increasing. Monitoring is crucial to this process; when circumventions grow, an 
alert regulatory body should 
be able to detect them and 
adjust regulations accord-
ingly. By monitoring financial 
markets—something regula-
tors should already be doing 
to maintain the stability of 
the financial system in other 
areas—they should be better able to dynamically adjust regulations in response to 
market developments over time. It is often argued that circumvention is particu-
larly a problem in better-developed markets, such as those with active derivative 
markets. While this is true, these markets should give regulators more tools (such 
as clearing houses) to monitor flows and thus dynamically design interventions.
More broadly, cross-border flows represent only one set of risk factors in the 
financial system, and should not be treated as any less of an issue for surveil-
lance than other financial market transactions. Monitoring open areas of the cur-
rent account, capital account, and derivatives markets where circumvention can 
occur, is crucial to being able to identify circumvention as it becomes significant. 
Many cross-border flows go through the banking system, but other non-bank 
institutions, such as the big trading companies, which often have their own capi-
tal financing groups are also part of the market. Regulators need to include all 
institutions that act as financial intermediaries under their regulatory umbrella. 
Better monitoring of capital account flows can have the added benefit of reduc-
ing tax evasion more broadly, as well as providing information to policymakers 
on other risks in the economy. 
By monitoring financial markets—some-
thing regulators should already be doing to 
maintain the stability of the financial system 
in other areas—they should be better able to 
dynamically adjust regulations in response 
to market developments over time.
Regulating Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development     83
reFerenCes
Auguste, Sebastion and Katherine Dominguez, Herman Kamil, and Linda Tesar (2005). 
“Cross-Border Trading as a Mechanism for Implicit Capital Flight: ADRs and the 
Argentine Crisis.” Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michi-
gan, Discussion Paper No. 533.
Bloomberg News (2011). “Foreign Direct Investment in China in 2010 Rises to Record 
$105.7 Billion,” 17 January. Available at Bloomberg.com, http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-01-18/foreign-direct-investment-in-china-in-2010-rises-to-record-
105-7-billion.html.
Carvalho, Bernardo S. de M., and Márcio G. P. Garcia (2008). “Ineffective Controls on 
Capital Inflows under Sophisticated Financial Markets: Brazil in the Nineties,” in S. 
Edwards and M. Garcia (eds.), Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerg-
ing Markets. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Clements, Benedict, and Herman Kamil (2009). “Are Capital Controls Effective in the 
21st Century? The Recent Experience of Colombia,” IMF Working Paper, WP/09/30. 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Coelho, Bruno and Kevin Gallagher (2010). “Capital Controls and 21st Century Financial 
Crises: Evidence from Colombia and Thailand,” PERI Working Paper No. 213. Uni-
versity of Massachusetts–Amherst: Political Economy Research Institute.
The Economist (2008). “Capital Inflows to China; Hot and Bothered,” 26 June. Available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/11639442.
Garber, Peter M. (1998). “Derivatives in international capital flow.” NBER Working Paper 
No. 6623, June. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Habermeier, Karl, Annamaria Kokenyne, and Chikako Baba (2011). “The Effectiveness 
of Capital Controls and Prudential Policies in Managing Large Inflows,” IMF Staff 
Position Note SDN 11/14 Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Lipscomb, Laura (2005). “An Overview of Non-Deliverable Foreign Exchange Forward 
Markets,” 25 May. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Available at http://www.bis.
org/publ/cgfs22fedny5.pdf.
Magud, Nicolas, Carmen Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff (2006). “Capital Controls: Myth 
and Reality: A Portfolio Balance Approach to Capital Controls,” unpublished, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University.
Ocampo, José Antonio and Camilo Tovar (2003). “Colombia’s Experience with Reserve 
Requirements on Capital Inflows.” CEPAL Review Nº 81: 7–31.
84   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  March 2012
Ocampo, José Antonio, Shari Spiegel, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2008). “Capital Market Lib-
eralization and Development,” in J. A. Ocampo and J. E. Stiglitz (eds.), Capital Market 
Liberalization and Development,” New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ostry, Jonathan D., Atish R. Ghosh, Karl Habermeier, Luc Laeven, Marcos Chamon, 
Mahvash S. Qureshi, and Annamaria Kokenyne (2011). “Managing Capital Inflows: 
What Tools to Use,” IMF Staff Position Note 11/06. Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund.
Ostry, Jonathan D., Atish R. Ghosh, Karl Habermeier, Marcos Chamon, Mahvash S. 
Qureshi,and Dennis B. S. Reinhardt (2010). “Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls,” 
IMF Staff Position Note 10/04. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Ostry, Jonathan, Ghosh, Atish R. and Chamon, Marcos (2011). “Managing Capital 
Inflows: The Role of Capital Controls and Prudential Policies.” NBER Working Paper  
No. w17363. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919437.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., José Antonio Ocampo, Shari Spiegel, Ricardo Ffrench Davis, and 
Deepak Nayyar (2006). Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization and 
Development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Yu, Yongding (2009). “The Management of Cross-Border Capital Flows and Macroeco-
nomic Stability in China,” TWN Global Economy Series. Penang, Malaysia: Third 
World Network.
Regulating Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development     85
7. China’s Capital Controls:  
stylized Facts and referential lessons
Ming Zhang
After the full liberalization of its current account in 1996, China began to liberal-
ize its capital account in a gradual and cautious way. From the capital flow cat-
egory perspective, the control on direct investment has already been removed, 
but portfolio investment and short-term debt are still regulated tightly. From 
the capital flow direction perspective, the intention of the Chinese government 
on capital control is determined by the real direction of capital flow at current 
stage. For example, during the 1990s when China had a limited foreign exchange 
reserve and faced capital outflow pressure, the government adopted an “easy in, 
difficult out” strategy. However, during the 2000s when China had already accu-
mulated a huge foreign exchange reserve and had been facing dramatic capital 
inflow, the government turned to an alternative “easy out, difficult in” strategy. 
The counter-cyclical style of China’s capital control strategy demonstrates the 
government’s effort to avoid vast capital outflow or inflows.
China’s capital account has already been partially opened (Table 1). According 
to People’s Bank of China (PBC), by the end of 2010, inside the 40 specific items 
under capital account transactions classified by IMF, 12 percent had been fully 
opened, 20 percent had been basically opened, 43 percent had been partially 
opened, and the remaining 25 percent had not been opened yet (Ge 2011).
The Chinese government has already removed the major obstacles on inward 
and outward direct investment, thinking that direct investment is very stable 
and productive. FDI can flow in freely as long as the foreign enterprises get 
permission from the Ministry of Commerce, and the FDI companies can remit 
their legal profits to their home country as they want. By the end of 2010, the 
Chinese government had approved the establishment of over 680 thousand FDI 
companies and had utilized over $1.1 trillion USD foreign capitals (Sun 2011). 
The Chinese government began to allow domestic enterprise to make overseas 
direct investment in 2001, whereas China’s outbound direct investment has been 
accelerated since 2008. By the end of 2010, Chinese enterprises had established 
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over 160 thousand firms overseas, and the accumulated investment amount 
reached $259 billion USD (Sun 2011).
The Chinese government has been very cautious to loosen the control of port-
folio investment, let alone financial derivatives, because portfolio capital flow 
tends to be more volatile and speculative. The experience of Southeast Asia’s 
financial crisis had strengthened the above belief. The typical approach has been 
to set quotas for inward and outward portfolio investment. On the one hand, a 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor mechanism (QFII) was established in late 
2002 to introduce overseas portfolio investment. By the end of 2010, the Chinese 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) had approved 97 foreign inves-
tors to enter domestic capital markets and the cumulative investment reached 
$19.7 billion USD  (Sun 2011). On the other hand, a Qualified Domestic Institu-
tional Investor mechanism (QDII) was founded in early 2006 to allow domestic 
financial institutions to invest in global financial markets. By the end of 2010, 
Market  Inflow Outflow 
Money Market Residents Prior approval by PBC and 
SAFE 
No permission except for 
authorized entities 
Non-Residents No permission No permission 
Stock Market Residents List H/N/S shares abroad, 
repatriate of QDII 
QDII 
Non-residents B shares, QFII, RMB QFII Sell B shares, repatriate of 
QFII  and RMB QFII 
Bond and 
Other Debts 
Residents Prior approval by PBC and 
SAFE 
No permission except for 
authorized entities 
Non-residents QFII, RMB QFII Repatriate of QFII and 
RMB QFII 
Derivatives 
and Other 
Instruments 
Residents Operations by financial 
institutions are subject to 
review of qualifications 
and to limit on foreign 
exchange position 
Operations by financial 
institutions are subject to 
review of qualifications 
and to limit on foreign 
exchange position 
Non-residents No permission No permission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note to typesetting: This table goes in Chapter 7 as Table 1 
table 1:  China’s Capital account Controls (as of september 2011)
Sources: Yu 2007 and we made some revisions.
Note: H/N/S refers to Hong Kong/New York/Singapore stock markets. RMB is the Chinese currency. 
See page v for full list of abbreviations.
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SAFE had approved 88 domestic investors to invest overseas and the accumula-
tive scale reached $68.4 billion USD.
The Chinese government has been employing different treatments to foreign and 
domestic enterprises in cross-border debt financing. As for debt inflows, foreign 
enterprises are allowed to borrow freely for many years as long as total foreign 
liability does not exceed the gap between the registered capital and the invest-
ment amount, but qualified domestic enterprises did not get the permission to 
borrow short-term foreign debt under quotas until early 2010. As for debt out-
flows, Chinese commercial banks have been authorized to lend overseas since 
2008, and qualified domestic enterprises have been approved to lend money to 
their overseas subsidiaries since 2009.
After the global financial crisis, the Chinese government has been promoting 
RMB internationalization aggressively. Therefore, the further liberalization of the 
Chinese capital account from then on has been overlapping with the measures 
to develop an offshore RMB financial center. The existing and potential progress 
includes: First, Chinese financial institutions were allowed to issue RMB bonds in 
Hong Kong in 2007, and the issuers have gradually expanded to domestic enter-
prises, Chinese Ministry of Finance, Hong Kong’s financial institutions and enter-
prises, and even transnational companies. Second, certain RMB-holding foreign 
financial investors (including foreign central banks, Hong Kong’s RMB settlement 
banks and participation banks) were allowed to invest on China’s domestic bond 
market. Third, a RMB QFII mechanism will be established to facilitate foreign 
institutional investors to invest on China’s domestic financial markets with RMB. 
Fourth, Chinese households will be authorized to invest exchange-traded funds 
based on Hong Kong’s stock market.
Why has China taken a gradual and cautious approach to liberalize its capital 
account? First, the Chinese government prefers a more independent monetary 
policy because China is a large economy and has a different business cycle 
compared with United States. Considering the RMB exchange rate is still inflex-
ible against U.S. dollar, if China’s capital account is fully opened, PBC could do 
nothing but import the Fed’s monetary policy. Second, Chinese financial markets 
are still underdeveloped and domestic investors are significantly inexperienced. 
They could not afford the drastic boom and bust of asset prices resulting from 
huge capital inflow and outflow. If there is a similar financial crisis in China, the 
consequence will be much more serious than in the United States. Third, capital 
control has been a key element in Chinese characteristic financial repression, 
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which underpins the dominating investment-driven growth strategy. By limit-
ing Chinese households and corporations to invest on overseas portfolios, the 
Chinese government could maintain very low deposit and loan interest rates, 
which boosts the heavy investment of state-owned enterprises and local govern-
ment on manufactures and infrastructures. Fourth, China’s economic reform has 
not been completed and the property rights still need to be defined more clearly. 
Lots of Chinese wealthy people (some of them are corrupted officials or entrepre-
neurs with ‘original sin,’ a situation where nations are not able to borrow abroad 
in their domestic currency) fear that their properties may be nationalized some 
day. Once the capital account is fully opened, there might be a massive capital 
outflow, even accompanied by money laundering and asset stripping (Yu 2007). 
Is China’s capital control still effective? The majority voice from the recent 
literatures shows that, although there are some leakages, China’s capital account 
control is still effective to a large extent. For example, Ma and McCauley (2008) 
found the sustained and significant gaps between onshore and offshore RMB 
interest rates and persistent USD/RMB interest rate differentials, which reflected 
the efficacy of China’s capital account control. In another example, Otani et al. 
(2011) discovered that the empirically quantified strength of capital control (by 
increasing the transaction costs of cross-border financial transactions) was con-
sistent with the Chinese government’s intention to influence capital movements.
There is other evidence about the efficacy of China’s capital control. In the first 
half of 2008, China faced a dramatic short-term capital inflow (Figure 1). To 
mitigate the capital inflow, the Chinese government has adopted three measures: 
first, a data exchange program was established between the Customs, the Minis-
try of Commerce, and SAFE to screen the capital inflow through transfer pricing 
in foreign trade, namely high export-invoicing and low import-invoicing; second, 
anther data exchange program was founded between the Ministry of Commerce, 
SAFE, and commercial banks to check whether the registered capitals or loans 
of foreign enterprises flow into domestic asset markets; third, the government 
began to investigate and punish cross-border underground banking businesses 
extensively and severely. These measures achieved an instant and significant 
effect. From June of 2008, the short-term capital inflow declined dramatically. 
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, China began to face short-term capital 
outflows, and therefore the government loosened them. However, under the global 
excess liquidity exacerbated by collective quantitative easing, China has been fac-
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ing a new wave of short-term capital inflow since late 2009. Therefore the focus of 
Chinese capital control turned to dealing with massive capital inflow again.
Are there any referential lessons that could be drawn from China’s experience 
of capital control for other developing countries? First, in comparison with other 
emerging market economies such as Chile or Brazil that prefer price measures 
in capital control, China prefers quantitative measures instead, especially on 
quotas and administrative approvals. On the one hand, this demonstrated that 
China’s liberalization of capital accounts still lags behind the above economies 
significantly. On the other hand, because the quantitative measures tend to make 
more distortions than price measures, China is suffering a much higher welfare 
cost than Chile or Brazil in executing capital controls. Therefore, in the future 
China may turn to more price-oriented capital control tools such as unremuner-
ated reserve requirements and withholding taxes.
Second, it seems that the Chinese government does not follow the prescriptions 
made by the IMF about how to deal with capital inflow. The IMF suggested that 
the countries should take a three-tool approach to handle capital inflow: the 
macroeconomic policies, the macroprudential regulations, and the capital con-
trols. Capital control should not be a replacement but a complement to proper 
macroeconomic and macroprudential policies (IMF 2011). However, China does 
Figure 1: China’s short-term international Capital Flow
Notes: The monthly short-term international capital flow is calculated by the monthly foreign ex-
change purchase by PBC minus the sum of monthly trade surplus and FDI utilized, which is a very 
rough estimation of high frequency short-term capital inflow.
Sources: CEIC and the author’s calculation.
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not satisfy the criteria of using capital control tools directly. On the one hand, the 
Chinese government hasn’t utilized all the necessary macroeconomic tools to 
manage capital inflow, especially the exchange rate appreciation. According to 
the IMF, the systematic macroeconomic policy responses toward capital inflow 
include: tight fiscal policy, interest rate cut, exchange rate appreciation and 
sterilized intervention. As for China, in order to mitigate the negative impacts of 
the global financial crisis and promote domestic structural adjustment, the fiscal 
policy should be properly expansionary. To fight inflation pressure, PBC has to 
raise interest rates. PBC has been doing sterilized intervention heavily in the past 
several years. 
The only available tool for PBC to adopt now is a faster appreciation of the RMB 
exchange rate. However, the concerns that a fast RMB appreciation might hurt 
export and employment, and a fast RMB appreciation may result in an even 
higher appreciation expectation thus leading to exchange rate overshooting, 
dominated the debate among policymakers. The probability for a significantly 
faster appreciation of RMB remains low. On the other hand, China has a long 
way to go in operating appropriate macroprudential regulations. Although the 
Chinese major commercial banks got a good overhaul in the early 2000s, after 
the burst of global financial crises, the banks lent heavily to local government to 
make infrastructure investments, which might bury the seed of a new wave of 
non-performing loans after several years. Besides that, there are still lots of finan-
cial fragilities in domestic financial sectors, and this may be why the Chinese 
government could not afford faster capital account liberalization.
Third, China still faces the challenge of sequencing capital account openness 
and the liberalization of the interest rates and exchange rates. Some economists 
argue that, due to the resistance of interest groups, it is very difficult to complete 
the liberalization of interest rates and exchange rates in the short-term, there-
fore the Chinese government should speed up the opening of its capital account 
first. Ideally and theoretically, the fast liberalization of the capital account will 
exert external pressure on the government to further liberalize interest rates and 
exchange rates. However, if the capital account is fully opened before the liber-
alization of interest rates and exchange rates, there will be a significant interest 
rate spread between domestic and overseas markets and a strong RMB apprecia-
tion expectation, which will no doubt arouse more dramatic short-term capital 
inflow. The volatile and speculative capital inflow will exacerbate the domestic 
excess liquidity, thus leading to asset price bubbles and inflation pressure first. If 
the capital inflow suddenly stops or even reverses in the future, there will prob-
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ably be a devastating financial crisis. Therefore, the liberalization of interest rates 
and exchange rates should be a prerequisite for fully opening the Chinese capital 
account. Moreover, the liberalization of interest rates and exchange rates could 
improve resource allocation and promote the transition of growth model. The 
Chinese government should try to overcome the resistance of interest groups, 
and liberalize interest rates and exchange rates as soon as possible.
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Section III: The global Cooperation of Capital 
Account Regulations?
8. the iMF, Capital account regulation, and 
 emerging Market economies
Paulo Nogueira Batista, Jr.1
The international financial crisis has led to a major revision of economic policy 
recommendations since 2008. This revision, albeit unfinished, has affected a 
large number of policy issues, including of course regulation and supervision. 
The previous preference for light touch regulation and the faith in the self-
correcting virtues of free markets have been replaced by a renewed emphasis 
on the role of governments and central banks in preventing speculative excesses 
and the build-up of risks. 
An important part of this debate is, or should be, the regulation of international 
capital flows. Prior to the crisis, capital account liberalization was almost an 
article of faith in some circles. The benefits of free capital flows were accepted 
with no major reservations by many policymakers and international organiza-
tions. Capital controls were stigmatized.
This has changed to some extent. However, as José Antonio Ocampo pointed 
out, there is a curious dichotomy in what is now mainstream thinking. The need 
for strong regulation and supervision is generally recognized—and how could 
it not be after what happened in the financial systems of the United States and 
Europe? But, curiously, this recognition does not extend in the same degree to 
the regulation of international financial flows. As Ocampo observed, cross-border 
finance has received much less attention, as if it did not require regulation—or 
indeed as if it was not part of finance. I will come back to this point when I 
1 Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund for Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guy-
ana, Haiti, Panama, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. The views expressed in this paper should not be attributed 
to the IMF or to the governments the author represents at the IMF’s Executive Board. 
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address the hesitant nature of the International Monetary Fund’s recent shift 
toward the acceptance of capital account regulations.
the standard aPProaCh
Before the crisis broke out in 2007–2008, the standard approach recommended 
to countries facing large-scale capital inflows involved basically two aspects: 
fiscal adjustment and exchange rate appreciation. In addition, it was suggested 
that restrictions on outflows of capital be relaxed. That was the message that 
countries received from the IMF, for example, but little else. Even international 
reserve accumulation was frowned upon.
For example, Brazil had begun to accumulate reserves in earnest in 2006. This 
would serve us well during the crisis. However, staff of the Fund in annual Article 
IV consultations warned Brazil against excessive reserve growth. 
Even at that time, the insufficiency of the standard approach—let the currency 
rise and adjust fiscal policy—was relatively clear. Emerging market countries had 
ample experience of the dangers of exchange rate overvaluation. A persistently 
strong currency undermined the economy’s international competitiveness and 
could lead to dangerously high current account deficits. A sudden reversal of 
capital flows—as often happened—forced economies to undergo painful adjust-
ment. In Latin America, perhaps more than in most other regions, boom-bust 
cycles driven by international capital movements were an often-recurring 
 phenomenon.    
Fiscal policy was not well placed to respond to large and volatile capital move-
ments. In theory, fiscal adjustment could allow looser monetary policy, lowering 
the attractiveness of domestic financial assets for foreign investors. In practice, 
fiscal policy is a slow, heavy, and clumsy instrument to deploy against fast-
moving and fickle capital flows. It is always subject to political constraints and 
largely dependent on legislative approval. Also, one must bear in mind that 
fiscal policy has other objectives; it seems to make little sense to tie it to the 
fluctuating moods of international investors. 
Moreover, as has been noted by several analysts, there is what we could call “the 
paradox of good fundamentals.” Fiscal adjustment, leading to an improvement in 
public accounts and fiscal fundamentals, may strengthen confidence and attract 
further flows of capital from abroad.  
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Removing restrictions on outflows can help to somewhat alleviate upward pres-
sure on the exchange rate, if residents do take the opportunity to invest outside 
the country. But this can also increase external vulnerability at a later stage, 
facilitating capital flight in times of uncertainty and crisis. 
outbreak oF the Crisis
The weakness of the standard approach became glaring with the outbreak of 
the crisis. The wall of liquidity produced by the expansionary monetary poli-
cies of the reserve currency issuing central banks—the Federal Reserve first and 
foremost, but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the Bank 
of England—contributed to create formidable problems for emerging market 
countries. Emerging markets suffered less and recovered faster from the crisis—a 
factor that reinforced their attractiveness for international investors. Growth and 
interest rate differentials between emerging markets and advanced economies 
combined to generate large flows of capital from the latter to the former.
Beyond these cyclical factors, there seems to be occurring a fundamental reas-
sessment of international risks in favor of emerging markets, i.e., a reallocation 
of portfolios that may be leading to a longer-lasting increase in the supply of 
capital to emerging markets. This has its positive sides of course, but many 
emerging market countries will be dealing with an “embarras de richesses.”
One has spoken of the “curse of natural resources.” One could equally speak of 
the “curse of the overabundance of capital flows.” One of the worst things that can 
happen to a country is to fall into the good graces of international capital markets. 
Since mid-2011, the worsening of the economic and financial situation in the 
advanced economies, notably in the euro area, highlights yet again that capital 
inflows can be a very mixed blessing. Changes in the availability of external 
loans and investments can 
happen quickly and unex-
pectedly. If the country receiv-
ing inflows is unprepared, 
these sudden reversals can 
cause great damage to the economy and the financial system. The euro area cri-
sis has not hit emerging markets with full force so far, but it led to an increase in 
risk aversion and to a flight to so-called safe havens, generating some turbulence 
and exchange rate depreciation. 
One of the worst things that can happen to 
a country is to fall into the good graces of 
international capital markets. 
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Now, there is still a widespread view that capital flows are of benefit to recipient 
countries. This view is not entirely wrong; one may well be able to construct a 
plausible case in its favor. But the least one can say is that it often flies in the face 
of experience. Quite a number of economies have been severely hurt, sometimes 
literally destroyed, by imprudent capital account liberalization and surges in 
capital flows. One has only to look to emerging countries in Eastern Europe for 
recent examples. Iceland is another shocking case.
I would like to mention, in passing, that an often-unnoticed aspect of the euro 
area crisis is the role played by the boom-bust cycle associated to free capital 
movements. Abundant capital inflows allowed pro-cyclical fiscal policies, rapid 
credit growth, and high current account deficits in the periphery of the euro 
zone, as well as in Iceland and several emerging market countries in Eastern 
Europe. The sharp reversal of flows after the 2008 crisis forced these economies 
to undergo a wrenching adjustment process. As time goes by, we will probably 
come to realize that capital account management policies may be necessary not 
only in emerging markets but also in advanced economies. 
the need For CaPital aCCount ManageMent
Policymakers in emerging markets seem to be aware of the risks associated to 
capital movements. Painful experiences have made them acutely conscious of 
the dangers of external indebtedness and foreign capital. On the other hand, the 
temptation remains to enjoy the good times, in the hope that “this time it will 
be different.” In any case, many countries have been adopting measures to curb 
inflows or to safeguard against risks brought by them. The task, as we know, is 
far from easy. 
Reserve accumulation is an alternative. For many emerging market economies, it 
has been extremely important as a mechanism of self-insurance against external 
shocks. It has drawbacks, however. First, costs may be substantial, especially 
when interest rate differentials are persistently high. With low interest rates in 
the reserve currency issuing countries, the remuneration of reserves has fallen 
substantially. Interest rates in developing countries tend to be higher. When ster-
ilized interventions fail to avoid appreciation of the national currency, losses for 
the central banks tend to be high. This is particularly the case for Brazil, where 
interest rates have been chronically very high.  
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Moreover, reserve accumulation is yet another example of the paradox of strong 
fundamentals: high reserves increase the perception that the country is safe and 
this attracts further inflows.
The conclusion seems inescapable: macroeconomic policies—fiscal, monetary, 
exchange rate, reserve accumulation—alone do not suffice. There is increasing 
recognition that countries blessed or cursed with an overly abundant supply 
of international capital will be well advised to resort to macroprudential mea-
sures and capital controls. To avoid the stigma attached to capital controls, the 
IMF staff has recently used the expression “capital flow measures” (CFMs) that 
encompass both macroprudential measures and capital controls.
iMF and g-20 disCussions oF CaPital aCCount regulation
In 2010, the IMF belatedly recognized that capital controls and macroprudential 
measures are “part of the toolkit” available to policymakers. This was a welcome 
step. The Brazilian chair in the IMF had repeatedly called for a reconsideration 
of the institution´s reluctance to accept that fiscal adjustment plus exchange rate 
flexibility would not take care of the problems faced by countries overwhelmed 
by surges in capital inflows.
That said, the IMF´s recognition is still somewhat hesitant. In March 2011, the 
Executive Board of the Fund discussed a “possible framework” for capital flow 
management that was broadly endorsed by a majority of the Board, as a first 
round articulation of the institution´s views. This tentative framework leaves 
much to be desired. For instance, capital account regulations are seen as a last 
resort to be used after everything else has been tried. They are presented as 
a possible complement and not a substitute for “sound macroeconomic poli-
cies.” They are recommended as temporary instruments, given that they can be 
evaded as times go by. At the same time, and in contradiction to the previous 
point, a big deal is made of possible externalities or spillovers of capital controls. 
None of these qualifications seem persuasive. For instance, macroprudential 
measures and capital account regulations, adopted at a relatively early stage, 
preferably in combination with other measures such as reserve accumulation, 
may avoid the build-up of problems that become increasingly difficult to deal 
with. Tools that can be used quickly, such as prudential measures and controls, 
are instrumental in avoiding the development of such situations. 
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Even amongst Fund staff, there is no consensus on these points. As the Fund’s 
chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, observed in May, when he summarized a Rio 
de Janeiro conference on capital flows, “we should move away from strict policy 
orderings toward a more fluid approach of using ‘many or most of the tools most 
of the time’ instead of ‘this now, that later.’” This observation contradicts flatly 
one of the features of the “possible framework” endorsed by the Executive Board 
in March. Blanchard also observed that evidence presented at the Rio conference 
suggested that spillovers across recipient countries were not very large. “Theo-
retical and further empirical work is badly needed here,” he added.     
In so far as effectiveness is concerned, the experiences of Brazil and other coun-
tries seem to show that prudential measures and capital account regulations can 
at the very least moderate appreciation, lengthen the profile of external liabili-
ties, and improve the composition of capital inflows. IMF staff has tended to 
support this sort of preliminary conclusion in its studies of country experiences.
Despite the lack of firm knowledge in the staff of the IMF about many issues and 
the lack of consensus in the Executive Board, Fund Management, supported by 
most advanced countries, jumped the gun in March and had the Board endorse 
the “possible framework” that I have alluded to. Does this help the membership 
in any way? Not much I would say. It may even be counterproductive in the 
end. Under the pretext of allowing capital account regulations in some limited 
circumstances, the Fund may be seeking to extend its jurisdiction to the capital 
account. 
Under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, member countries have no obliga-
tion whatsoever to liberalize capital account transactions. Legally speaking, they 
enjoy full freedom to regulate capital movements. This does not apply to coun-
tries that have given up this freedom, in part or in total, by their membership of 
the OECD, of the euro area, or that have signed bilateral investment agreements 
or free trade agreements with the United States. Those cases apart, member 
countries are entirely free, under Article VI of the Articles of Agreement, to 
adopt capital controls. This Article states that “members may exercise such 
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.” Under 
some circumstances, the Fund may even require them to adopt controls to avoid 
the use of the institution´s resources to finance capital flight. This is exactly what 
happened in the case of Iceland, a country hard hit by the severe impact of the 
international crisis on its overblown financial sector. Iceland requested financial 
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assistance from the Fund and controls on outflows of capital became an impor-
tant part of the IMF’s program for Iceland.  
Some advanced countries have been calling on the Fund to establish codes of 
conduct or guidelines for the management of capital flows. President Nicolas 
Sarkozy of France was particularly blunt about this when he launched the 
agenda for the French presidency of the G-20 and the G-8 in January 2011. He 
called for the establishment by the G-20 of a code of conduct and criticized 
the “recent multiplication of unilateral measures” affecting capital movements. 
President Sarkozy came back to the subject in even more forceful terms at the 
opening of a G-20 Seminar in China, last March:
A code of good conduct, strong guidelines and a common framework gov-
erning the possibility of implementing capital controls where necessary 
must define the conditions under which restrictions on capital movements 
are legitimate, effective and appropriate to a given situation. If we agree on 
these rules, ladies and gentlemen, it will be a major evolution in the doc-
trine of the IMF, to the benefit of the emerging countries, which suffer from 
excessive volatility of capital movements. Is it reasonable, today, given the 
increasing impact of capital movements, that the IMF can issue recom-
mendations to a country only as concerns its current account balance of 
payments and not concerning its capital account? I would like someone to 
explain to me why a recommendation about one is legitimate and a rec-
ommendation concerning the other is illegitimate. Expanding the super-
vision of the IMF to include theses aspects strikes me as crucial. In the 
longer term, France—and I’m saying this now—is favorable to a modifica-
tion of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to broaden its supervision mandate. 
Yet if we decide on more coordination, more rules and more supervision, 
we then need to decide which organization is in charge of enforcing such 
rules and conducting such supervision. For France, it’s clear. It’s the IMF.
The Brazilian chair at the Fund and in the G-20 has been very critical of these 
attempts to establish a framework or a “code of conduct” for capital account 
management. The debate is still ongoing, but has lost some of its steam since 
the beginning of the year. Time has shown that the focus of the IMF and some 
advanced countries on guidelines or even a “code of conduct” for capital flow 
measures was ill-timed and unnecessary. In that discussion, among many other 
problems, insufficient consideration was given to “push” factors or to the poli-
cies in major advanced economies that produced large and often disruptive 
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financial flows. As the IMF and the G-20 wasted precious time on this, the crisis 
reemerged in the advanced countries, especially in the euro area, due to unsus-
tainable debt levels, fragile banking systems and, ironically, the after-effects of 
the collapse of a credit boom driven by free capital flows. 
The Brazilian chair in the IMF has argued that it would be highly inappropriate 
and politically unsustainable to attempt to use the Fund´s skewed voting power, 
which gives undue weight to advanced countries, to impose their agenda on 
developing countries that are not willing to face any restrictions on the liberty to 
manage the capital account. 
There is a further irony here. Some of the countries that are at the epicentre of 
the worst crisis since the Depression of the 1930s, and are still far from having 
solved their own problems, seem very eager to promote the establishment of 
codes of conduct for the rest 
of the world, including for 
emerging market countries 
that are currently dealing 
with overabundant liquidity 
generated by the monetary 
policies of these very same 
countries. One is tempted to 
say: put your own house in order before you start preaching to others again. It is 
too early to forget that the previous round of preaching by developed countries—
deregulate, liberalize, trust markets, etc.—ended in tears for them and for those 
developing countries that followed that preaching all too eagerly.
keynes and white
Free capital movements were not part of the IMF´s original mandate. Article 
VI of the Articles of Agreement was there from the very beginning. Misguided 
attempts to amend or suppress this Article in the late 1990s came to nothing. 
At the time, the Brazilian chair at the IMF was among those who opposed the 
attempt to impose capital account liberalization as an obligation.
Those who know the history of the IMF are aware that the founding fathers of 
the institution, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, had learned from 
the acute instability caused by laissez-faire with respect to international capital 
movements in the period between the World Wars. Keynes explained at the time 
of the creation of the Fund that members would have “full liberty to control such 
It is too early to forget that the previous 
round of preaching by developed coun-
tries—deregulate, liberalize, trust markets, 
etc.—ended in tears for them and for those 
developing countries that followed that 
preaching all too eagerly.
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movements.” Each country was given the choice to leave all transactions free or 
to enforce controls. If it chose the latter, Keynes was of the view that it should be 
left “to discover its own technique.” 
Keynes and White were right, I believe. Since the global crisis, the pendulum has 
swung again away from laissez-faire and towards recognition that strong regula-
tion and supervision of financial activities are indispensable to the smooth and 
efficient functioning of a market economy. Capital movements are no exception. 
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9. the need for north-south Coordination
Stephany Griffith-Jones and Kevin P. Gallagher
Developing countries have in recent years become again the destination for 
speculative capital flows, with inflows reaching pre-crisis levels. Many of these 
nations are deploying prudential capital regulations to stem these flows. Such 
measures could be coupled with action by developed countries in order to dis-
courage capital outflows and risk taking from their economies, so as to encour-
age capital to productive use within their own economies; such measures would 
simultaneously avoid excessive exchange rate strengthening in developing 
economies, both supporting their own growth and helping avoid possible future 
crises within these developing economies. 
Indeed, one important aim of regulating cross-border capital flows in both recipi-
ent and source countries is the reduction of systemic risk build up in both of 
them, thus reducing risk of future crises.
We will argue therefore that such measures of managing excessive capital 
outflows from developed countries, and especially from the U.S., could be a rare 
“win-win” opportunity, as they would benefit both the U.S. and the developing 
economies. The only ones to lose would possibly be financial institutions, mak-
ing short-term profits; however, we have seen the disastrous results of defining 
economic policies only to maximize profits for the financial industry, while 
neglecting their impact on systemic financial and macroeconomic stability and  
on the real economy.
CaPital Flows in the wake oF the Crisis
As nations across Asia and Latin America still have a long way to go in terms 
of income growth, foreign investment is quite welcome. The problem is, the 
sheer volume and composition of these flows implies that a large part of them 
are short-term, volatile, and do not go into productive investment. Indeed, mass 
inflows of short-term capital have been causing asset bubbles and currency 
appreciation in developing countries, making macroeconomic policy difficult 
and increasing the risk of future crises.  
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Short inflows have been flocking to the developing world largely through the 
mechanism of the carry trade and other mechanisms, usually using derivatives.  
Since the crisis began, interest rates have been very low in the U.S. and other 
industrialized nations. As Mohan in this volume shows, there is clear evidence 
over the last 30 years that there is broad correspondence between periods of 
accommodative monetary policy in advanced economies and capital flows to 
emerging market economies, as well as the reverse; each monetary tightening 
produces capital flows reversals and often crises in emerging countries.
In the recent period, increased U.S. liquidity and low interest rates have trig-
gered U.S. financial institutions to decrease their risk-taking in the U.S., thus 
leading to little or no credit creation, which is the main transmission channel of 
monetary expansion to domestic economic activity; it has, however, increased 
risk taking abroad, channelling it to nations with higher interest rates for rapid 
return, as well as better growth prospects in the medium term. Speculative short-
term flows push up the value of emerging market currencies and create asset 
bubbles. For this reason, the U.S. was criticized at the G-20 meeting in Seoul in 
late 2010. For example, Brazil, with high interest rates, had seen an appreciation 
of over 40 percent due in part to the carry trade, and was most vocal in Seoul. 
But this is a problem in many emerging and even low-income developing coun-
tries, like Uganda, with excessive short-term inflows.
Prudential regulations in develoPing Countries
Emerging and developing economies have a “new” set of options to stem the 
tide. One of them, which several are now pursuing, is to engage in prudential 
capital account management, by taxing, putting unremunerated reserve require-
ments or discouraging by other means, excessive capital inflows. This is not a 
panacea on its own, but does help provide greater monetary policy autonomy 
to those countries; this is essential, as their growth rates are at present high, and 
it is essential for them not only to avoid inflation in goods and services, but also 
asset price bubbles and overvalued exchange rates.
Many nations such as Brazil, China, Argentina, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, 
Peru, and Indonesia have put in place various forms of capital account regula-
tions to limit excessive inflows. Such controls have been recently sanctioned 
by the IMF—a very significant shift. However, the support by the IMF for capital 
account regulations has some limitations (as discussed by Nogueira Batista and 
Ocampo in this volume).
Regulating Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development     105
Indeed, capital account management measures follow a mountain of economic 
evidence in academia and by the international financial institutions—most 
notably the National Bureau of Economic Research in the U.S., the International 
Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the Asian Development Bank—that 
capital account management 
by developing countries 
is a useful tool of policy, if 
accompanied by broadly 
prudent macro-economic poli-
cies. In February 2010, IMF 
economists published a staff 
position note titled, “Capital 
Inflows: The Role of Controls,” 
empirically showing that 
capital controls not only work 
but “were associated with 
avoiding some of the worst growth outcomes” of the current economic crisis. The 
paper concludes that the “use of capital controls—in addition to both prudential 
and macroeconomic policy—is justified as part of the policy toolkit.”
That IMF report singles out measures such as taxes on short-term debt (like Bra-
zil’s) or requirements whereby inflows of short-term debt need to be accompa-
nied by an unremunerated deposit to be placed in the central bank for a certain 
period of time (as practiced in the past by nations such as Chile, Colombia, and 
Thailand). The goal of these measures—which are often turned on when capital 
flows start to overheat and turned off when such flows cool—is to prevent mas-
sive inflows of hot money that can appreciate the exchange rate and threaten the 
macroeconomic stability of a nation.
The IMF’s findings came at an appropriate time. In the wake of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve’s quantitative easing and other measures to loosen monetary policy, the 
carry trade again started  bringing speculative capital to developing countries 
that could disrupt their recovery from the crisis (even though there have been 
episodes in autumn 2011 of brief reversals of such flows). 
To make the proper deployment of capital account management effective how-
ever, at least four obstacles need to be overcome: 
Capital account management measures 
follow a mountain of economic evidence in 
academia and by the international financial 
institutions—most notably the National Bureau 
of Economic Research in the U.S., the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the United Nations, 
and the Asian Development Bank—that capital 
account management by developing countries 
is a useful tool of policy, if accompanied by 
broadly prudent macro-economic policies.
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First, after a while investors creatively evade prudential capital management 
through derivatives and other instruments. Second, U.S. trade and investment 
agreements make capital controls difficult to implement. Third, speculative capital 
can still wreak havoc because hot money bypasses countries that successfully 
deploy controls and goes instead to nations that do not. Fourth, the massive scale of 
capital flowing from source countries may overwhelm even those countries using 
capital account management of their inflows, given their relatively small size.
Brazil started imposing a tax on hot money inflows in 2009, and has been fine-
tuning it ever since, in part because of the volume of flows but also because the 
regulation was being evaded. Some investors have bypassed controls by disguis-
ing short-term capital as foreign direct investment, through currency swaps and 
other derivatives, and by purchasing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs).
ADRs are issued by U.S. banks and allow investors to buy shares of firms outside 
the U.S.—enabling investors to purchase Brazilian shares but in New York and 
thereby skirt controls in Brazil. In a step in the right direction, Brazil moved to 
put a 1.5 percent tax on ADRs to stem speculating around the controls. Thus, 
a Brazilian bank or investor that deposits shares with foreign banks will be 
charged the tax. Most recently (mid-2011), Brazil has started taxing net foreign 
exchange derivative positions above a certain level, which is an interesting 
measure as it may help curb excessive pressure on the national currency to 
become too strong, and help avoid evasion of other capital account management 
measures. It would be helpful for emerging economies to exchange experiences 
on regulating capital flows to see to it that controls are not evaded.
Since 2003, U.S. trade and investment treaties have made prudential manage-
ment of the capital account by developing-country trading partners difficult if not 
impossible by mandating the free flow of capital to and from a country, regard-
less of its level of development—for instance, in trade deals with Chile, Peru, 
and Singapore. (In Singapore’s and Chile’s cases, the countries resisted these 
measures, but ultimately agreed to the treaties.) Recently ratified deals with 
Colombia and South Korea would also ban prudential capital controls. Other 
higher-income countries and trade partners—such as Canada and Japan—grant 
countries the right to use the macroeconomic tool, or at least grant exemptions 
to prevent or mitigate crises. 
The third and perhaps most difficult problem is that capital will simply flow by 
those nations that successfully deploy controls to nations that do not, (imply-
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ing negative externalities for the latter). Some economists, such as former 
IMF economist Arvind Subramanian propose full-fledged coordinated capital 
controls among all emerging market economies to circumvent the problem. This 
idea has merit, but of course not all emerging markets will agree to coordinate.  
We propose attacking the problem at its source.
The fourth, and also serious, problem is that if interest differentials are impor-
tant, the incentive for investors to come into emerging economies is very large, 
and thus the scale of capital account management effort by the emerging 
country would have to be very large; this is particularly the case because global 
capital markets are so large and so mobile, and can thus overwhelm relatively 
small emerging and developing economies and financial markets. Again comple-
mentary measures in the source countries would help tackle the issue. Though 
we propose below measures to be taken in the U.S. currently the main source 
of carry trade, such measures would be more effective if they were coordinated 
with other countries that are sources of short-term capital outflows or risk taking.
regulate the Carry trade in the united states
As pointed out, actions taken by developing countries on their capital accounts 
may not be enough, as the wall of money at times coming towards them is so 
large. Therefore, it may be desirable to complement these measures with action 
by the countries where the capital is coming from, especially the U.S. Given that 
the majority of the carry trade effect will in the near future come from the U.S., 
the United States could start regulating the outflow of capital due to the carry 
trade. As pointed out, though the scale may be greater now, there have been 
several previous episodes where very loose U.S. monetary policy contributed 
to surges in capital flows to developing economies, episodes that have mostly 
ended in tears. Already in 1998, one of the authors of this essay, writing with 
Jane D’Arista (D’Arista and Griffith-Jones 2008) argued for measures to discourage 
excessively large portfolio outflows from source countries, such as unremuner-
ated reserve requirements on such outflows.
At present, the U.S. could introduce measures to discourage the carry trade 
flows going from that country to the rest of the world, and especially developing 
countries, when these are excessive; this could be done for example by taxing 
such flows (on the spot market) and excessive risk taking abroad. Thus, foreign 
exchange derivatives that mimic spot transactions could have higher margin 
requirements, to discourage them. Alternatively, such foreign exchange deriva-
tives could also be taxed at a level equivalent to the tax on foreign exchange spot 
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transactions, on the notional value of that derivative, such as non-deliverable 
forwards. Interesting lessons could be drawn, for example, from the recent expe-
rience of Brazil in taxing foreign exchange derivatives, which also seems to show 
the feasibility of such taxes. There are two routes through which U.S. monetary 
easing is transmitted abroad:
(a) the money and credit supply channel, which implies higher capital outflows 
and less credit creation in the U.S., and 
(b) the derivatives channel, whereby the fixed risk budget of U.S. banks or hedge 
funds is allocated more towards emerging economies risk and therefore less to 
risk taking in the U.S. 
The above sketched proposal would attempt to curb both routes, when and if 
desirable, that is if excessive capital and risk taking was going abroad.
Such a measure would benefit the U.S. economy, as the purpose of monetary 
easing is precisely to encourage increased lending and risk-taking in the U.S., 
and not for funds to be channeled abroad; it would benefit emerging countries, 
whose economies are being harmed by excessive short-term inflows that could 
cause future crises. It would thus be a big win-win for the world economy.
The results of the most recent U.S. Congressional elections unfortunately make 
it difficult in the near future for the U.S. to pursue the best policy to keep its 
economy recovering: further fiscal expansion. As Keynes taught us—and as we 
have seen during numerous crises—private investment and consumption will 
not recover on their own (due both to over-leveraging and lack of confidence), 
without the stimulus of aggregate demand, which only governments can give in 
these particular circumstances. Once the recovery is on track, fiscal policy needs 
to contract, to avoid both overheating and excessive public debt. 
On its own, loose U.S. monetary policy seems, indeed, not to be enough to restore 
the U.S. economy to growth; supportive fiscal policy would be highly desirable, as 
would other measures to stimulate aggregate demand. Furthermore, easy mon-
etary policy may contribute to further overheating of asset prices and exchange 
rates in the emerging economies, which could not just complicate macroeco-
nomic management for them now, but also increase the risk of future crises.
To ensure loose monetary policy helps the U.S. economy to grow, institutional 
mechanisms and a broader framework need to be found to channel the addi-
tional liquidity created by the Fed as credit to the real economy. The key is to 
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expand credit to small and medium-sized enterprises, starved of funds at pres-
ent, and to finance large investments in infrastructure, including that required to 
generate clean energy and energy conservation. Institutional innovations may be 
necessary to achieve this, such as the creation of an Infrastructure Fund, as well 
as possibly special institutions dedicated to lending to small and medium enter-
prises. Indeed, in the U.S., the Federal Reserve could, for example, possibly use 
some of the liquidity it creates to purchase bonds of a U.S. Infrastructure Fund or 
Bank; this would both provide credit to a sector key for future development, as 
well as lead to an increase in aggregate investment and demand.
Internationally, if the U.S. dug into the emergency toolbox again, it could place 
prudent capital regulations or taxation on the outflow of speculative capital from 
the U.S. via mechanisms such as the carry trade; this might help avoid future 
crises in those countries, which would harm not only them, but also the U.S. 
and the world economy. Taxation may have some important advantages. First, 
taxes are more difficult to avoid or evade, as they involve not just authorities 
like the Federal Reserve, but also the Internal Revenue Service, with the latter 
having possibly stronger enforcement mechanisms. Second, such taxation could 
generate some additional revenue for a U.S. government with a large budget 
deficit, surely an attractive feature. However, the tax would need some ex-ante 
flexibility on rates, so it could be modified according to the level of outflows and 
derivatives positions. Complementary to introducing measures like new taxes to 
discourage outflows of capital or increased risk taking abroad, it seems clearly 
desirable—in the U.S. and elsewhere—to reduce existing tax biases in favor of 
such flows, like tax loopholes; indeed, this could be a first step to discourage 
excessive short-term outflows.
Measures to discourage short-term outflows would facilitate the liquidity created 
by the Fed to stay in the U.S. and have a better chance of going toward produc-
tive investment. 
the road ahead
Re-orienting capital flows for productive development, leading to growth, should 
be a key priority. Prudential capital account regulations, deployed in both the 
industrialized and developing world, should be examined as one instrument to 
achieve this aim. Coordination between developed and developing countries 
on this issue would be desirable; this should be eased by the fact that often the 
aims of both developed and developing countries may coincide. However, it 
does not seem desirable for such coordination to be imposed multilaterally, as 
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no institution at present seems to have the appropriate, well-trusted governance 
ability to represent the collective interests of all countries. Nevertheless, the IMF 
could continue to be a useful forum to exchange experiences on capital account 
management (by both developed and developing countries) and possibly provide 
a useful voluntary forum for informal coordination, in cases where all countries 
involved desire such a role to be played. 
To rectify some of the problems related to capital flows, industrialized nations 
(especially the U.S.) should consider regulating the carry trade and providing 
safeguards in their trade treaties to allow developing nations to deploy pruden-
tial regulation. Developing countries should also put in place prudential regula-
tions. The Financial Stability Board, or another relevant body, as well as national 
regulatory authorities, should watchdog those who evade these regulations.
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10. international regulation of the Capital account
Arvind Subramanian
This short essay, which is based on Jeanne, Subramanian, and Williamson (forth-
coming), argues that there is a growing need for an international regime to regu-
late capital account transactions. Such a regime should allow nations to deploy 
capital controls that are deemed ‘corrective’ but should also provide mechanisms 
for disciplining capital controls where they have spillover effects via facilitating 
undervalued exchange rates and hence beggar-thy-neighbor trade effects on 
partner countries. Cooperation between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) might be necessary to implement such 
a regime.
CorreCtive versus struCtural CaPital Controls
A new wave of theoretical research shows that capital controls, in certain situ-
ations, can be seen as correcting for market failure, rather than being seen as 
distortionary in the market (Korinek 2009; Jeanne and Korinek 2010; Bianchi 
2010; etc.). This new work provides a rigorous, welfare-based basis for public 
intervention. The rationale is essentially the same as for “macroprudential” 
regulation to deal with booms and busts in credit and asset prices in a domes-
tic context (Brunnermeier 2009; Adrian and Shin 2009). In a new book I have 
authored with Olivier Jeanne and John Williamson, we argue that there should 
be a global regime that allows for corrective capital controls. A current example 
of a corrective capital control might be Brazil’s tax on foreign currency purchases 
of equities that was put in place in 2010.
However, capital controls can also be used to sustain undervalued exchange 
rates as an instrument of mercantilism, with beggar-thy-neighbor effects on trad-
ing. The obvious present-day example of a nation that deploys structural controls 
is that of China, where capital controls play a part in an elaborate regime to keep 
the nation’s currency undervalued in order to support an export-led growth strat-
egy. Our view is that there is a need to regulate these structural controls, not least 
because the freedoms of smaller countries are affected by spillovers from these 
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distortive controls. We must also consider multilateral rules on capital flows even 
within the IMF.
an alternative aPProaCh For an international regulatory 
regiMe
Although some nations may currently benefit from the status quo, a global 
regulatory regime for the use of capital controls would make more nations better 
off than under current circumstances. Why so, if non-regulation is appealing 
for some states because the status quo provides policy space and freedom? But 
the current debate seems to suggest that non-regulation might mean less policy 
space for some. This is especially evident in the pre-2008, intellectual zeitgeist 
which created stigma from national and uncoordinated action. For example, 
Brazil in 2009 suffered from the worst of both possible worlds: out of fear of the 
stigma, it imposed weak controls, which ended up being ineffective in restricting 
inflows but that incurred the stigma anyway. 
In addition, non-regulation has led to abuse of structural controls, and these, 
in turn, create negative global externalities. We need to regulate capital inflows 
nationally, especially from 
a cyclical/prudential per-
spective (Ostry et al. 2010),  
but there is no consensus 
regarding multilateral rules on 
permissible curbs on flows. 
A starting point for a new 
regime would be the recogni-
tion of the need for corrective controls while at the same time seeing that capital 
controls/undervalued exchange rates are potentially as big a problem as capital 
inflows and overly ambitious capital flows.  
Thus, the case for an international regime is:
• Because there can be circumstances in which unconstrained national actions 
are collectively damaging;
• Because a lack of rules stigmatizes countries for not abiding by whatever hap-
pens to be the conventional wisdom, which in recent years has favored free 
capital mobility, and countries that impose capital controls therefore often do 
so apologetically and with less-than-optimal vigor;
A starting point for a new regime would be 
the recognition of the need for corrective 
controls while at the same time seeing that 
capital controls/undervalued exchange rates 
are potentially as big a problem as capital 
inflows and overly ambitious capital flows.
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• Because the lack of a rule fails to give countries a pointer of what they should 
be aiming for; and 
• To try in a different way to persuade China to revalue its exchange rate.
ProPosal: syMMetry with trade
Of course the full details would need attention, but for the sake of argument 
a regime for capital account regulations could be set up that is analogous to 
the global trade regime. In trade, as in the WTO, nations are permitted to have 
contingent protections for a variety of reasons, with a long-run commitment 
to phase those out and replace them with safeguards for extraordinary events. 
When a nation’s measures adversely affect another nation however, the affected 
nation can dispute the measure and convene a tribunal whereby the party found 
to be in violation with stated codes of conduct has to change that measure or 
face economic retaliation.  
In our book we find no evidence that capital account liberalization is good for 
growth: hence rules on structural capital regulations should in principle be more 
permissive than those, say, on goods. But, as was the case in the WTO, we sug-
gest that all quantitative restrictions on capital flows be converted to price-based 
measures and that there be a “binding” of the amount of controls that can be 
deployed.   
The main features of course would be “optimal” or corrective controls that tax on 
inflows independent of duration of investment. This tax ought to be:
• differentiated according to the type of flow (debt versus equity, versus foreign 
exchange, etc.).
• the tax rate ought to be set at a level which is countercyclical: from 0 to 15 
percent in a calibrated model.
To summarize, corrective controls should be price-based, countercyclical, with 
a maximum effective tax rate of 15 percent, and, crucially, with a “structural 
exemption” that would be negotiated down or disciplined. Such a new regime 
would be housed at the IMF and should institute cooperation between IMF and 
WTO (Mattoo and Subramanian 2008).
The IMF has been able to influence member countries that have borrowed from 
it, but it has not been successful in affecting economic policy in countries that do 
not need IMF money. Moreover, the IMF lacks an effective enforcement mecha-
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nism. Compounding these problems is the IMF’s eroding legitimacy. It lost its 
status as a trusted interlocutor in emerging markets, particularly in Asia, after 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. There, the IMF was seen as having failed 
to provide enough money to countries in need and as having attached unneces-
sarily tough conditions to its loans, which many believe aggravated the effects of 
the crisis. The IMF’s governance structure is also outdated; it reflects the receding 
realities of the Atlantic-centered world of 1945 rather than the rise of Asia in the 
21st century.
One possibility going forward would be for the IMF and the WTO to cooperate 
on exchange-rate issues. The IMF would continue to provide technical expertise 
to assess the valuation of currencies. But because undervalued currencies have 
serious consequences for global trade, it would make sense to take advantage of 
the WTO’s enforcement mechanism, which is credible and effective. The WTO 
would not displace the IMF; rather, this arrangement would harness the com-
parative advantages of each institution.
obJeCtions
A few objections to controls are commonly raised. I will address each of these 
objections, in turn, and argue why they are not good arguments against the type 
of global governance system that we are proposing.
The first argument against controls is that controls are always distortive. Here, 
we must draw a distinction between controls which might create a distortion, 
and ones that correct for a current distortion. Another common objection is that 
controls are easily evaded. Evidence for this is mixed, and evasion depends 
largely on the types of controls enacted. Nonetheless, destigmatizing the use of 
capital controls, and therefore giving their use legitimacy, may go a long way 
towards cutting down some forms of evasion. Another objection is that controls 
have costly unintended consequences. Here too the evidence is mixed. On bal-
ance, capital controls can be a legitimate tool and not just the last option as was 
previously suggested by the IMF.
One of the few good arguments for allowing blunt instruments, such as quantita-
tive controls, is related to implementation capacity. Where regulatory regimes 
are weak, blunt instruments might often have to take precedence over more 
finely tuned ones. 
Regulating Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development     115
One current problem with introducing a regulatory regime that phases out 
structural capital controls would be inducing cooperation from China. We have 
already some analogues from the WTO for how to approach this issue. These 
analogues involve invoking carrots and sticks, both in trade in goods and in 
capital. 
Carrots in the trade arena could take the form of eventually granting China the 
status of a market economy, which would make it less vulnerable to arbitrary 
unilateral action—especially antidumping duties—by its trading partners (Messer-
lin 2004). At the moment, the disciplines on such actions are less stringent when 
the target is a non-market economy. 
In trade in assets, carrots could take the form of securing investment opportu-
nities for its sovereign wealth funds (SWF) in an environment where Chinese 
investments could increasingly be subject to national regulations with a protec-
tionist slant. Clear rules on SWF-related investments could thus be one of the 
inducements for China to cooperate (see Mattoo and Subramanian 2008). It is 
worth noting here that China’s huge stockpile of reserves (which is not likely to 
be eliminated any time soon) will mean that the Chinese state will be a foreign 
investor for some considerable time, so guaranteeing an outlet for these invest-
ments could be important for China (and also for the oil-exporting countries). 
The nature of the carrots in this area is spelled out in Mattoo and Subramanian 
(2008).
Sticks in trade in goods could of course take the form of imposing tariffs on 
countries that do not agree to bring their capital account restrictions in line with 
new rules. Sticks in trade in assets could take the form of a broad reciprocity 
requirement whereby capital importing countries declare that they will limit 
sales of their public debt henceforth to only include official institutions from 
countries in which they themselves are allowed to buy and hold public debt.
ConClusion
Intellectually, the ground has shifted in favor of cyclical, prudentially based 
measures to restrict surges in capital inflows. But that is now a given. The issues 
going forward are first, whether this shift to allow corrective controls should be 
codified in an international regime for capital account regulation; and second, 
whether there should also be regulation of structural controls which facilitate 
beggar-thy-neighbor practices. 
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Some American economists and lawmakers have called for imposing a duty on 
imports from countries with undervalued exchange rates. But any such unilat-
eral action would be, by definition, partial and hence ineffective. Undervalued 
currencies affect more than just one country: China’s cheap yuan, for example, 
has an impact not only on the United States and the European Union but also 
on emerging economies and African countries, whose products compete with 
China’s on the world market.
A multilateral approach to such distortions may prove more fruitful. Under the 
historical division of labor between the International Monetary Fund and the 
WTO, the IMF has jurisdiction over questions relating to exchange rates. But its 
oversight has been weak at best. Surely a better approach would be to imple-
ment a comprehensive regulatory regime that addresses the problem of excess 
capital flows in addition to distortive controls, such as structural exchange rate 
regimes which lead to broad spillovers in the global economy. An analogue to 
the WTO, but administered by the IMF, would be one possible mechanism for 
such regulation.
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11. Capital account regulations  
and the trading system
Kevin P. Gallagher
The global community has not made a conscious effort to coordinate measures 
to regulate global capital flows. In the absence of such an effort, a patchwork 
de-facto regime has arisen—including global, regional, and bilateral trade and 
investment treaties—that may complicate efforts to coordinate capital account 
regulations in the 21st century. This short essay discusses how capital flows are 
treated in the trading system and outlines practical measures that nations may 
take to create the policy space for CARs in new and existing treaties.
Table 1 summarizes the extent to which capital account regulations are permit-
ted under various trade and investment arrangements.  
Under the World Trade Organization, if a nation has committed to granting 
market access in cross-border trade in financial services or committed to allow-
ing foreign investment in financial services, it must liberalize its capital account 
in order to honor those specific commitments. The WTO does have a prudential 
exception and a balance of payments exception, but it is not clear that such 
WTO US BITS/FTAs Other BITS/FTAs
Permissible Capital Controls
Current no no no
Capital
inflows no* no sometimes
outflows no* no sometimes 
Safeguard Provisions
Current yes** no yes**
Capital
inflows no no yes
outflows yes no yes
Number of Countries Covered 69 58
Dispute Resolution format State-to-State Investor-State Investor-State
Enforcement instrument Retaliation Investor compensation Investor compensation
*Capital controls fully permissible for nations that have not committed to liberalize cross-border trade in financial services
**Permitted only under IMF approval
Policy Space for Capital Controls: A Comparisontable 1: Policy space for Capital Controls: a Comparison
Source: Gallagher 2011
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safeguards will apply to all types of capital controls. In any event, at this writing 
most developing countries have not yet agreed to grant market access in the 
financial services sectors that would require open capital accounts. However, 
developed countries see the liberalization of financial services in developing 
countries as the cornerstone of a new WTO agreement under the Doha Round.
Some, but not all, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties (BITs) also restrict the ability of developing nations to deploy capital controls. 
Virtually all U.S. agreements require the free flow of capital to and from the U.S. 
and its trading partner, without exception. In contrast to the WTO where when a 
dispute arises, such a dispute has to be brought by a state (and can thus be diplo-
matically “screened”), FTAs allow the foreign firm to directly file a claim against 
a host state for such measures. If a claim is lost the host state has to change its 
policy and pay damages to the private firm. Such a claim was rendered under 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT when, in the aftermath of Argentina’s financial crisis 
Argentina sought to impose a tax on outflows that was deemed to be tantamount 
to an “expropriation” (Salacuse 2010).
However, while U.S. FTAs and BITs strictly forbid the use of capital account 
regulations, the agreements of other major capital exporting nations allow for 
more flexibility. Most BITs and FTAs conducted by Japan, the European Union, 
and Canada either have a safeguard measure whereby a nation is able to pursue 
its domestic regulations related to capital account regulations, or a safeguard 
measure to prevent and mitigate financial crises. For instance, the EU-Chile and 
Canada-Chile agreements have annexes that allow Chile to deploy its infamous 
unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs), whereas the U.S.-Chile agreement 
does not.
These examples of flexibility among many of the world’s larger capital exports 
can provide the basis and example for global reform.
the world trade organization
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is currently the only bind-
ing multilateral pact that disciplines capital account regulations, though specific 
countries may have certain freedoms if the governments in place in the 1990s 
did not make widespread commitments in the financial services sector. More 
specifically:
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• A member is most protected from a WTO challenge over capital account 
regulations if it committed no financial services sectors to GATS coverage in 
any mode. 
• However, even nations that have made widespread commitments in financial 
services may have—if challenged—recourse to various exceptions, although 
these have not been tested and the record of WTO exceptions in other con-
texts is not reassuring.
• The policy space for controls on current account transactions defers to the IMF. 
The GATS is part of the Marrakesh Treaty that serves as an umbrella for the vari-
ous agreements reached at the end of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations 
that established the WTO. The GATS provides a general framework disciplining 
policies “affecting trade in services” and establishes a commitment for periodic 
future negotiations. The GATS is divided on the one hand into a part on “General 
Obligations,” which binds all members. These include the obligation to pro-
vide most favored nation treatment to all WTO members (Article II), and some 
disciplines on non-discriminatory domestic regulations that are still being fully 
developed (Article VI).
On the other hand, the GATS also includes a part dealing with “Specific Com-
mitments,” which apply only to the extent that countries choose to adopt them 
by listing them in their country-specific schedules. These cover primarily the 
disciplines of Market Access (Article XVI) and National Treatment (Article XVII) 
(Raghavan 2009). 
Numerous annexes cover rules for specific sectors: the Annexes on Financial Ser-
vices are of particular relevance for capital account regulations. Trade in services 
occurs across the four services ‘modes’ discussed in the GATS in general: Mode 1 
(Cross-border supply), Mode 2 (Consumption abroad), Mode 3 (Commercial Pres-
ence) and Mode 4 (Presence of natural persons). With respect to capital account 
regulations, Modes 1 and 3 are most important:
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IMF analysts have found that about 16 countries have significant Mode 1 com-
mitments in financial services, while around 50 each have significant Mode 2 
and 3 commitments for the sector—this includes most OECD countries. (Valckx 
2002, Kireyev 2002.) 
The IMF has articulated how commitments in Modes 1 and 3 can impact the 
capital account and related regulations:
Of course, if a nation has not made commitments then it is free to pursue any 
and all capital account regulations that it sees fit. If a nation has made com-
mitments, a distinction needs to be made with respect to financial services 
and capital flows. Under the GATS nations liberalize specific types of financial 
services, such as banking, securities, insurance, and so forth. That said, if a 
nation has made a commitment in a particular sector and capital account regula-
tions restrict the ability of WTO members to make capital movements linked to 
box 1: relevant definitions in gats
Mode 1: Cross-border supply	is	defined	to	cover	services	flows	from	the	territory	of	one	
Member	into	the	territory	of	another	Member	(e.g.,	banking	or	architectural	services	transmit-
ted	via	telecommunications	or	mail).
Mode 3: Commercial presence	occurs	when	the	user	of	a	financial	service	is	immobile	and	
the	provider	is	mobile,	implying	that	the	financial	service	supplier	of	one	WTO	Member	estab-
lishes	a	territorial	presence,	possibly	through	ownership	or	lease,	in	another	Member’s	territory	
to	provide	a	financial	service	(e.g.,	subsidiaries	of	foreign	banks	in	a	domestic	territory).	
box 2: Capital account liberalization and gats Commitments
WTO	members	must	allow	cross-border	(inward	and	outward)	movements	of	capital	if	these	
are	an	essential	part	of	a	service	for	which	they	have	made	liberalization	commitments	regard-
ing	its	cross-border	supply	(without	establishment).	For	example,	international	capital	transac-
tions	are	an	integral	part	of	accepting	deposits	from	or	making	loans	to	nonresidents	(mode	
1).	International	capital	transactions	are	also	usually	associated	with	financial	services	such	as	
securities	trading	on	behalf	of	a	customer	residing	in	another	country.	The	establishment	of	a	
commercial	presence	(mode	3)	in	a	host	country	by	a	foreign	services	supplier	involves	both	
trade	in	services	and	international	capital	transactions.	In	permitting	the	establishment	of	a	
commercial	presence,	WTO	members	must	allow	inward	(but	not	outward)	capital	transfers	
related	to	the	supply	of	the	service	committed.
Source:	IMF	2010
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the particular financial service, then those nations may be brought to the WTO 
under its dispute resolution mechanism (WTO 2010).
WTO members have recourse to binding dispute settlement procedures, where 
perceived violations of GATS commitments can be challenged and retaliatory 
sanctions or payments authorized as compensation. The process for disputes 
is “state-to-state” dispute resolution where a party has to demonstrate damage 
from a particular policy to that party’s government and the government decides 
whether or not to enter into a dispute on behalf of the affected party. Such a 
dispute is carried out at the WTO with the “defending” government representing 
the party from which the dispute originated.
If a nation’s capital account regulations were found in violation of its GATS com-
mitments, it could invoke one or more exceptions in the GATS text. A first option 
would be to claim that the measure was taken for prudential reasons under 
Article 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services. This exception reads:
Inflows controls such as unremunerated reserve requirements or inflows taxes 
could be argued to be of a prudential nature, especially given the new IMF report 
discussed earlier. However, the sentence stating that prudential measures “shall 
not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations 
under the Agreement” is regarded by some as self-cancelling and thus of limited 
utility (Tucker and Wallach 2009; Raghavan 2009). Others however do not see 
the measure to be second-guessing but rather “as a means of catching hidden 
opportunistic and protectionist measures masquerading as prudential” (Van 
Aaken and Kurtz 2009). Still others point out that, in contrast with other parts 
of the GATS that require a host nation to defend the “necessity” of the measure, 
there is no necessity test for the prudential exception in the GATS. This arguably 
gives nations more room to deploy controls. Indeed, Argentina lost cases related 
box 3: Prudential exception in gats
Notwithstanding	any	other	provisions	of	the	Agreement,	a	Member	shall	not	be	prevented	
from	taking	measures	for	prudential	reasons,	including	for	the	protection	of	investors,	deposi-
tors,	policy	holders	or	persons	to	whom	a	fiduciary	duty	is	owed	by	a	financial	service	supplier,	
or	to	ensure	the	integrity	and	stability	of	the	financial	system.	Where	such	measures	do	not	
conform	with	the	provisions	of	the	Agreement,	they	shall	not	be	used	as	a	means	of	avoiding	
the	Member’s	commitments	or	obligations	under	the	Agreement.
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to controls under BITs because they failed such a “necessity test.” Nations have 
requested that the WTO elaborate on what is and is not covered in the prudential 
exception, but such requests have fallen on deaf ears (Cornford 2004). And as of 
this writing, the prudential exception has not been tested.  
If a country’s capital account regulations were found in violation of its GATS 
commitments in financial services, it could also invoke Article XII “Restrictions 
to Safeguard the Balance of Payments.” Paragraph 1 of Article XII states:
The next paragraph specifies that such measures can be deployed as long as 
they do not discriminate among other WTO members, are consistent with the 
IMF Articles (thus pertain only to capital account controls), “avoid unnecessary 
damage” to other members, do “not exceed those necessary” to deal with the bal-
ance of payments problem, and are temporary and phased out progressively. 
It may be extremely difficult for a capital control to meet all of these conditions, 
especially the hurdles dealing with the notion of “necessity,” a slippery concept 
in trade law that countries have had difficulty proving. Moreover, concern has 
been expressed about the extent to which the Balance of Payments exception 
provides nations with the policy place for restrictions on capital inflows that are 
more preventative in nature and may occur before “serious” balance of payments 
difficulties exist (Hagan 2000). If a nation does choose to use this derogation, the 
nation is required to notify the WTO’s Balance of Payments Committee.
Ftas and bits
U.S. BITs and FTAs do not permit restrictions on inflows or outflows. If a nation 
does restrict either type of capital flow they can be subject to investor-state 
arbitration whereby the government of the host state would pay for the “dam-
box 4: balance of Payments exception in gats
In	the	event	of	serious	balance-of-payments	and	external	financial	difficulties	or	threat	thereof,	
a	Member	may	adopt	or	maintain	restrictions	on	trade	in	services	on	which	it	has	undertaken	
specific	commitments,	including	on	payments	or	transfers	for	transactions	related	to	such	com-
mitments.	It	is	recognized	that	particular	pressures	on	the	balance	of	payments	of	a	Member	
in	the	process	of	economic	development	or	economic	transition	may	necessitate	the	use	of	
restrictions	to	ensure,	inter	alia,	the	maintenance	of	a	level	of	financial	reserves	adequate	for	the	
implementation	of	its	programme	of	economic	development	or	economic	transition.
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ages” accrued to the foreign investor. The BITs and FTAs of other major capital 
exporters such as those negotiated by the EU, Japan, China, and Canada, either 
completely “carve out” host country legislation on capital account regulations 
(therefore permitting them) or allow for a temporary safeguard on inflows and 
outflows to prevent or mitigate a financial crisis. The U.S. does not have either 
measure. However, a handful of FTAs have recently allowed for a grace period 
whereby foreign investors are not allowed to file claims against a host state until 
after the crisis period has subsided. 
Capital Controls and u.s. treaties
In contrast with the treaties of many other industrialized nations, the template 
for United States trade and investment treaties does not leave adequate flexibil-
ity for nations to use capital account regulations to prevent and mitigate financial 
crises (Gallagher 2011). At their core, U.S. treaties see restrictions on the move-
ment of speculative capital as a violation of their terms. The safeguards in U.S. 
treaties were not intended to cover capital account regulations.
U.S. trade and investment treaties explicitly deem capital account regulations as 
actionable measures that can trigger investor-state claims. The Transfers provi-
sions in the investment chapters of trade treaties, or in stand alone BITs, require 
that capital be allowed to flow between trading partners “freely and without 
delay.” This is reinforced in trade treaties’ chapters on financial services that 
often state that nations are not permitted to pose “limitations on the total value 
of transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas” across borders.
In the financial services chapters of U.S. trade treaties, and in U.S. BITs, there is 
usually a section on “exceptions.” One exception, informally referred to as the 
“prudential exception,” usually has language similar to the following from the 
U.S.-Peru trade treaty:
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Capital account regulations are not seen as permissible under this exception. 
This has been communicated by the United States Trade Representative and 
in 2003 testimony by the Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs 
to the U.S. Congress and reiterated in a recent letter by U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner in response to a letter signed by more than 250 economists 
requesting that the U.S. reform its treaties (see Taylor 2003; Geithner, 2011). In 
general this is because the term “prudential reasons” is usually interpreted in a 
much narrower fashion, pertaining to individual financial institutions. Concern 
has also been expressed that the last sentence is “self-canceling,” making many 
measures not permissible. 
The prudential exception in services chapters or BITs is usually followed by an 
exception for monetary policy that often reads like (again to use the U.S.-Peru 
Trade treaty):
box 5: Prudential exception for u.s.
Financial	Services	chapter:	Article	12.10:		Exceptions	
1.	Notwithstanding	any	other	provision	of	this	Chapter	or	Chapter	Ten	(Investment),	Four-
teen	(Telecommunications),	or	Fifteen	(Electronic	Commerce),	including	specifically	Articles	
14.16	(Relationship	to	Other	Chapters)	and	11.1	(Scope	and	Coverage)	with	respect	to	the	
supply	of	financial	services	in	the	territory	of	a	Party	by	a	covered	investment,	a	Party	shall	not	
be	prevented	from	adopting	or	maintaining	measures	for	prudential	reasons,	including	for	the	
protection	of	investors,	depositors,	policy	holders,	or	persons	to	whom	a	fiduciary	duty	is	owed	
by	a	financial	institution	or	cross-border	financial	service	supplier,	or	to	ensure	the	integrity	
and	stability	of	the	financial	system.		Where	such	measures	do	not	conform	with	the	provisions	
of	this	Agreement	referred	to	in	this	paragraph,	they	shall	not	be	used	as	a	means	of	avoiding	
the	Party’s	commitments	or	obligations	under	such	provisions.
box 6: More exceptions in u.s. Ftas?
Nothing	in	this	Chapter	or	Chapter	Ten	(Investment),	Fourteen	(Telecommunications),	or	
Fifteen	(Electronic-Commerce),	including	specifically	Articles	14.16	(Relationship	to	Other	
Chapters)	and	11.1	(Scope	and	Coverage)	with	respect	to	the	supply	of	financial	services	in	the	
territory	of	a	Party	by	a	covered	investment,	applies	to	non-discriminatory	measures	of	general	
application	taken	by	any	public	entity	in	pursuit	of	monetary	and	related	credit	or	exchange	
rate	policies.		This	paragraph	shall	not	affect	a	Party’s	obligations	under	Article	10.9	(Perfor-
mance	Requirements)	with	respect	to	measures	covered	by	Chapter	Ten	(Investment)	or	under	
Article	10.8	(Transfers)	or	11.10	(Transfers	and	Payments).
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This second exception could be seen as granting nations the flexibility to pursue 
necessary monetary and exchange rate policy (of which capital account regu-
lations are part). Yet the last sentence in that paragraph specifically excludes 
transfers.
These provisions were very controversial with the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore 
trade treaties in the early 2000s. U.S. trading partners repeatedly asked for a 
safeguard that would include capital account regulations but the United States 
has denied that request (Vandevelde 2008). In a few instances, U.S. negotia-
tors granted special annexes that allowed U.S. trading partners to receive an 
extended grace period before investor-state claims can be filed with respect to 
capital account regulations, as well as limits on damages related to certain types 
of controls.
These annexes are still inadequate in the wake of the financial crisis for at least 
four reasons. First, the annexes still allow for investor-state claims related to 
capital account regulations—they just require investors to delay the claims for 
compensation. An investor has to wait one year to file a claim related to capital 
account regulations to prevent and mitigate crises, but that claim can be for a 
measure taken during the cooling-off year. The prospect of such investor-state 
cases could discourage the use of controls that may be beneficial to financial 
stability. 
Second, many other nations’ treaties allow for capital account regulations. 
Indeed, the Canada-Chile FTA, the EU-Korea FTA, the Japan-Peru BIT, and the 
Japan-Korea BIT (just to name a few) all grant greater flexibility for capital account 
regulations. This gives incentives for nations to apply controls in a discriminatory 
manner (applying controls on EU investors but not on U.S. investors). 
Third, the IMF has expressed concerns that restrictions on capital controls in 
U.S. agreements, even those with the special annexes, may conflict with the 
IMF’s authority to recommend capital controls in certain country programs, as 
they have done in Iceland and several other countries. Finally, the special dis-
pute settlement procedure included in the U.S.-Chile and Singapore FTAs did not 
become a standard feature of U.S. agreements. It is not in CAFTA, any U.S. BIT, 
or the recently ratified U.S.-Korea FTA.
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Capital account regulations and bits and Ftas for Major Capital exporters
The EU, Japan, Canada, and increasingly China are major capital exporters. Each of 
these capital exporters has numerous BITs and FTAs with nations across the world.  
And loosely, the BITs of these nations have the same general characteristics found in 
U.S. BITs.  However, in the case of the use of capital account regulations to prevent 
and mitigate financial crises, the BITs and investment provisions of all BITs and 
FTAs by these exporters either contain a  broad “balance of payments” temporary 
safeguard exception or a “controlled entry” exception that allows a nation to deploy 
its domestic laws pertaining to capital account regulations.
Examples of the balance-of-payments approach can be found in the EU-South 
Africa and Mexico FTAs (remember Mexico negotiated such a provision in 
NAFTA), the Japan-South Korea BIT, and the ASEAN agreements. The Korea-
Japan BIT has language that clearly allows for restrictions on both inflows and 
outflows, presumably inspired by the 1997 crisis. The BIT states:
Another way capital account regulations are treated by capital exporters in 
FTAs and BITs is referred to as ‘controlled entry’ whereby a nation’s domestic 
laws regarding capital account regulations are deferred to. Canada and the EU’s 
FTAs with Chile and Colombia each have a balance-of-payments safeguard and 
a controlled entry deferment. As an example of controlled entry, the invest-
ment chapter of the FTA between Canada and Colombia has an Annex, which 
states “Colombia reserves the right to maintain or adopt measures to maintain 
or preserve the stability of its currency, in accordance with Colombian domestic 
legislation,” and lists specific laws and resolutions in Colombia that pertain to 
capital account regulations.
Controlled entry provisions are to be found in BITs as well. The EU does not 
sign many BITs as a union, but individual countries do. The China-Germany BIT 
box 7: exception in korea-Japan bit
a.	 	in	the	event	of	serious	balance-of-payments	and	external	financial	difficulties	or	threat	
thereof;	or
b.		in	cases	where,	in	exceptional	circumstances,	movements	of	capital	cause	or	threaten	to	cause	
serious	difficulties	for	macroeconomic	management,	in	particular,	monetary	or	exchange	
rate	policies	
Source:	Salacuse	2010,	268.
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states that transfers must comply with China’s laws on exchange controls (Ander-
son 2009). In the case of China, that nation has to approve all foreign inflows and 
outflows of short-term capital (see Zhang in this group of essays).
Interestingly, EU member BITs vary a great deal. Some, like the China-Germany 
BIT and the UK-Bangladesh BIT, allow for a nation to defer to its own laws 
governing capital account regulations. On the other hand, Sweden and Austria 
had U.S.-style BITs with no exceptions whatsoever. However, the European Court 
of Justice ruled in 2009 that Sweden’s and Austria’s BITs with several developing 
countries were in violation to their obligations under the EU treaty. While the EU 
treaty requires EU members to allow for free transfers, it also allows members 
to have exceptions. The court found that Sweden’s and Austria’s treaties were 
incompatible with the EU treaty and that such treaties would need to be renego-
tiated to include exceptions to the transfer provisions (Salacuse 2010). In 2011, 
the EU ordered its members to re-negotiate their bilateral investment treaties  
with developing countries. The predominant reason for their wish to re-negotiate 
was due to a recent decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) regarding the 
free transfer of capital clauses included in many EU member state BITs. Indeed, 
the ECJ concluded that these clauses are in contradiction with EU law and need 
to be re-negotiated. The decision is based on the fact that the EU treaty, while 
demanding the free transfer of capital, also provides for the possibility to regu-
late and restrict the free transfer of capital if the economic situation so requires.
oPtions For reForM
Reforming treaties in order to grant individual nations and the global community 
the policy space to deploy capital account regulations to prevent and mitigate 
financial crises is fairly simple 
at the technical level but quite 
difficult at the political level. 
Box 8 outlines the technical 
measures that could be made 
to future or existing treaties in 
order for such treaties to allow 
nations and the global com-
munity to deploy and coordinate capital account regulations to manage global 
capital flows in such a manner that enhances financial stability and economic 
development.  
Reforming treaties in order to grant indi-
vidual nations and the global community 
the policy space to deploy capital account 
regulations to prevent and mitigate financial 
crises is fairly simple at the technical level 
but quite difficult at the political level.
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box 8:  reforming trade and investment treaties  
for Capital account regulation
National-level
•	 	Draft	and	pass	a	law	or	resolution	that	allows	the	nation’s	financial	authorities	to	put	capital	
account	regulations	in	place	during	periods	of	anticipated	or	actual	financial	instability.
WTO
•	 	Critically	assess	the	benefits	of	“listing”	cross	border	trade	in	financial	services	(Mode	1)	or	
commercial	presence	of	foreign	services	(Mode	3)	under	GATS	commitments.
•	 	If	a	nation	chooses	to	make	Mode	1	and	Mode	3	commitments,	opt	for	“limiting”	such	
liberalization	with	exception	to	national	laws	regarding	capital	account	regulations.
•	 	If	a	nation	has	existing	commitments	to	liberalize	their	financial	sector	through	Mode	1	or	
Mode	3,	seek	clarifying	language	under	the	exceptions	in	the	GATS.
FTAs/BITs
•	 	Remove	short-term	debt	obligations	and	portfolio	investments	from	the	list	of	investments	
covered	in	treaties.	
•	 	Create	‘controlled	entry’	Annexes	in	BITs	and	FTAs	that	provide	full	exception	for	when	a	
nation	deploys	a	national	law	pertaining	to	capital	account	regulations.
•	 	Design	a	balance-of-payments	exception	that	covers	both	inflows	and	outflows	such	as	the	
provisions	found	in	the	Japan-South	Korea	BIT.
•	 Clarify	that	the	Essential	Security	exceptions	cover	financial	crises,	and	that	measures	taken	
by	host	nations	are	self-judging.
•	 	Resort	to	a	State-to-State	dispute	resolution	process	for	claims	related	to	financial	crises,	
analogous	to	the	WTO	and	the	other	chapters	in	most	FTAs.
•	 	If	a	nation	has	an	existing	FTA	or	BIT	that	does	not	permit	capital	account	regulations,	seek	
to	negotiate	interpretive	notes	that	clarify	existing	exceptions	in	the	treaties.
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